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ABSTRACT
Cyber-attacks targeting individuals and enterprises have become a predominant part
of the computer/information age. Such attacks are becoming more sophisticated and
prevalent on a day-to-day basis. The exponential growth of cyber plays and cyber
players necessitate the inauguration of new methods and research for better under-
standing the “cyber kill chain,” particularly with the rise of advanced and novel mal-
ware and the extraordinary growth in the population of Internet residents, especially
connected Internet of Things (IoT) devices.
Mathematical modeling could be used to represent real-world cyber-attack situa-
tions. Such models play a beneficial role when it comes to the secure design and eval-
uation of systems/infrastructures by providing a better understanding of the threat
itself and the attacker’s conduct during the lifetime of a cyber attack. Therefore, the
main goal of this dissertation is to construct a proper theoretical framework to be
able to model and thus evaluate the defensive strategies/technologies’ effectiveness
from a security standpoint.
To this end, we first present a Markov-based general framework to model the
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interactions between the two famous players of (network) security games, i.e., a system
defender and an attacker taking actions to reach its attack objective(s) in the game.
We mainly focus on the most significant and tangible aspects of sophisticated cyber
attacks: (1) the amount of time it takes for the adversary to accomplish its mission and
(2) the success probabilities of fulfilling the attack objective(s) by translating attacker-
defender interactions into well-defined games and providing rigorous cryptographic
security guarantees for a system given both players’ tactics and strategies.
We study various attack-defense scenarios, including Moving Target Defense (MTD)
strategies, multi-stage attacks, and Advanced Persistent Threats (APT). We provide
general theorems about how the probability of a successful adversary defeating a de-
fender’s strategy is related to the amount of time (or any measure of cost) spent by
the adversary in such scenarios. We also introduce the notion of learning in cyber-
security games and describe a general “game of consequences” meaning that each
player’s chances of making a progressive move in the game depend on its previous
actions.
Finally, we walk through a malware propagation and botnet construction game in
which we investigate the importance of defense systems’ learning rates to fight against
the self-propagating class of malware such as worms and bots. We introduce a new
propagation modeling and containment strategy called the “learning-based model”
and study the containment criterion for the propagation of the malware based on
theoretical and simulation analysis.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Cyber-attacks targeting individuals or enterprises have become a predominant part of
the computer/information age. Such attacks are becoming more sophisticated (qual-
itative aspects) and prevalent (quantitative aspects) on a day-to-day basis [18]. The
exponential growth of cyber plays and cyber players necessitate the inauguration of
new methods and research for better understanding the “cyber kill chain,” partic-
ularly with the rise of advanced and novel malware (e.g., Stuxnet [35], WannaCry
ransomware crypto worm [18], the Mirai and its variants [6]) and the extraordinary
growth in the population of Internet residents, especially connected Internet of Things
(IoT) devices.
Mathematical models can represent real-world cyber-attack situations. Such mod-
els can play a beneficial role when it comes to the design and evaluation of sys-
tems/infrastructures, especially from a security perspective. Utilizing mathematical
modeling, we can have a better understanding of system vulnerabilities, attack vec-
tors, points of failure, and in general, the life cycle of a cyber attack. Moreover,
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one can analyze various security defense mechanisms/strategies, provide rigorous se-
curity guarantees for a system, and perform a cost-benefit analysis by finding the
best attack-response strategies in different attack scenarios. Besides, we can define
what it means for a system/infrastructure/strategy to be secure using mathematical
approaches.
We believe that measuring the security of a system, or in other words, how much
security capacity a system has by design, is an interesting problem that requires fur-
ther investigation as it can provide a better understanding of the system under the
attack, and the actions that must be taken by a defender protecting the system.
Through this presented dissertation (especially in Chapters 2-3), we show how one
can measure security and study under what circumstances (e.g., defense strategies,
attacker’s (time) budget) a system can be called secure by defining the notion of “se-
curity capacity,” and “capacity region” of a system and relating the most significant
and tangible aspects of sophisticated cyber attacks, i.e., the amount of time it takes
for the adversary to accomplish its mission and the success probabilities of fulfilling
the attack objective(s). The presented worst-case analysis is beneficial when it comes
to bootstrapping cryptographic protocols and having a proper reduction to common
assumptions such as the rate of play or the learning rate of a defender. We also
present an average-case analysis of a particular cyber-attack scenario, namely a mal-
ware propagation and botnet construction game, which shows how a robust learning
mechanism from the defender’s side can immensely restrict the adversary’s progress
in the game.
2
1.1 Motivation
Overall, mathematical modeling can help the security community to understand the
threat better, to analyze the attacker’s conduct during the lifetime of a cyber-attack,
and, therefore, to be able to provide authentic responses to adversarial actions in dif-
ferent phases of an attack. The sparse amount of research on modeling and evaluating
defensive systems’ efficiency (especially from a security perspective), however, war-
rants the need for constructing a proper theoretical framework. Such a framework
allows the community to be able to evaluate the defensive strategies/technologies’
effectiveness from a security standpoint, and this is the primary objective of this dis-
sertation, i.e., to utilize mathematical approaches to model and study various cyber
scenarios prevalent today.
1.2 Outline of the Dissertation
We start this dissertation with the main focus on Moving Target Defense (MTD)
games as the state of the art defense strategy. MTD seems to be a promising defense
mechanism in that it makes fulfilling the attack objective more difficult for an adver-
sary by changing the attack surface dynamically. To get a better understanding of
MTD’s effectiveness, we propose a general Markov-model-based framework for Mov-
ing Target Defense analysis. The presented framework allows modeling of a broad
range of MTD strategies. We further provide general theorems about how the prob-
ability of a successful adversary defeating an MTD strategy is related to the amount
of time or cost spent by the adversary and show how a multi-level composition of
MTD strategies can be analyzed by a straightforward combination of the analysis for
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each one of these strategies. Within the proposed framework, we define the concept
of security capacity, which measures the strength and effectiveness of an MTD strat-
egy. The security capacity depends on MTD specific parameters and general system
parameters. We apply our framework to two concrete MTD examples.
We then focus on a more general game to extend our analysis and presented lan-
guage to a broader range of cyber attack and defense scenarios, especially multi-stage
and APT-like attacks. Using a Markov-based general framework, we model the in-
teractions between the two famous players of network security games, i.e., a defender
(taking advantage of common security tools and technologies such as Intrusion De-
tection and Prevention Systems (IDPSes), Firewalls, and Honeypots (HPs)) and an
attacker (and possibly its agents) who takes actions to reach its attack objective(s)
in the game. Again, we mainly focus on the most significant and tangible aspects of
sophisticated cyber-attacks: (1) the amount of time it takes for the adversary to ac-
complish its mission and (2) the success probabilities of fulfilling the attack objectives.
Therefore, our goal is to translate attacker-defender interactions into a well-defined
game so that we can provide rigorous cryptographic security guarantees for a system
given both players’ tactics and strategies. In this game, to have a more comprehensive
and realistic model, we consider an intelligent defender (in contrast to a ‘dummy’ one)
where it can learn regarding the adversarial actions and strategies. As time elapses,
the defender’s learning process can potentially lead to smaller chances of making a
progressive move for the attacker. We provide general theorems about how the learn-
ing rate of the defender plays a role in the adversary’s success probability of winning
the introduced game. Within this framework, we can extend the previously defined
notion of “security capacity” to a capacity region concept where we relate attack suc-
cess probabilities to the time or cost spent by the attacker. The presented worst-case
4
analysis in this chapter is beneficial when it comes to bootstrapping cryptographic
protocols and having a proper reduction to common assumptions such as the learning
rate of a defender.
As the last part of this dissertation, we walk through a malware propagation and
botnet construction game in which we investigate the importance of defense systems’
learning rates to fight against the self-propagating class of malware such as worms
and bots. To this end, we introduce a new propagation modeling and containment
strategy called the “learning-based model” based on the interactions between an
adversary (and its agents) who wishes to construct a zombie army of a specific size,
and a defender taking advantage of standard security tools and technologies in the
network environment. We present an average-case analysis which is valuable from
practical perspective for understanding how the adversary advances in its mission
(without being able to bootstrap cryptographic protocols based on this analysis).
1.3 Organization and Summary of Contributions
This dissertation is organized as follows: In Chapter 2, we propose a Markov-model-
based framework for Moving Target Defense analysis. The presented framework allows
modeling of a broad range of MTD strategies. We further provide general theorems
about how the probability of a successful adversary defeating an MTD strategy is re-
lated to the amount of time or cost spent by the adversary and show how a multi-level
composition of MTD strategies can be analyzed by a straightforward combination of
the analysis for each one of these strategies. Within the proposed framework, we
define the concept of security capacity, which measures the strength and effectiveness
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of an MTD strategy. The security capacity depends on MTD specific parameters
and more general system parameters. We apply our framework to two concrete MTD
examples. Our contributions and results can be summarized as follows:
• We present a formal definition of MTD as the interaction between a defender
and an attacker modeled by probabilistic algorithms and we show that such an
interaction corresponds to a defender-attacker game characterized by a Markov
chain. Our framework is general in that it formally defines (and can be used to
analyze) a large class of MTD strategies as games based on Markov chains.
• We prove a first theorem analyzing the number of time steps needed for an
adversary to “win” an MTD game. We measure the effectiveness of an MTD
strategy by analyzing when the attacker will be in a winning state for the first
time. Additional analysis of how long an attacker will be in a winning state once
it arrives at a winning state and when the attacker will again be in a winning
state once it exits a winning state is required to understand the efficacy of
an MTD strategy in more detail. Since reaching a winning state allows an
adversary to launch a successful attack, we think that when the attacker will
be in a winning state for the first time is the most crucial question to analyze
first. Based on this theorem, we introduce the concept of security capacity
as a measure of the effectiveness of an MTD strategy; an MTD strategy with
security capacity c has the property that, for all s and t such that c = s+ t, the
probability that the adversary wins the MTD game within 2t time steps is at
most 2−s. We show that time steps can be converted into any measure of cost
for the adversary.
• We further analyze two concrete examples of MTD schemes (IP hopping MTD
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mechanism) to demonstrate the applicability of our framework beyond a mere
theoretical exercise.
• Motivated by the idea of Defense in Depth (DiD), we notice that a single MTD
may not be beneficial in that it provides a small security capacity. Therefore, it
may be possible to obtain a large security capacity, only if multiple MTDs are
deployed together. We call this approach a “Layered MTD” or “MTD∗.” In this
regard, we expand our framework by introducing compositions of MTD games
for which we extend our theorem and show how one can analyze a multi-layer
MTD game.
In Chapter 3, we present a Markov-based framework and methodology for model-
ing various computer security scenarios prevailing today, including opportunistic, tar-
geted and multi-stage attacks. Motivated by the rise of Advanced Persistent Threats
(APT), we are particularly interested in situations in which each players’ progress
in the game can be viewed and modeled as an incremental process. From the view-
point of the attacker, a progressive adversarial move associated with a probability
distribution can bring it one step closer to its desired winning state (i.e., the attack
objective). Similarly, by monitoring the system and capturing the adversarial moves,
the defender can also get one step closer to its objective which could be different
based on various attack/defense scenarios. For instance, the defender’s goal could be
generating a detection signal that indicates the presence of a coordinated set of ac-
tivities that are part of an APT campaign [50], developing a signature for a malware
attack to halt next adversarial moves [55, 85], or shuffling its resources after enough
number of samples (evidence) is obtained as in a Moving Target Defense strategy
(MTD) [47,76].
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Our contributions and results are summarized as follows:
• First, we propose a general network security game based on the interactions
between an adversary, (and possibly its agents, e.g., bots controlled by a bot-
master), and a defender who is equipped with a logically centralized defense
system implemented in the network. We explain how this game can be directly
mapped to an equivalent Markov model and we provide the security analysis for
this Markov model as well as presenting compelling interpretations of the role
of both players’ strategies in their probability of winning the introduced game.
• We introduce the notion of learning in cybersecurity games and describe a gen-
eral “game of consequences” meaning that each player’s (mainly the attacker)
chances of making a progressive move in the game depends on its previous ac-
tions. More specifically, as a consequence of the adversarial imperfect moves in
the game, the other party, i.e., the defender has the opportunity to incremen-
tally learn more and more about the attack technology. This learning enables
the defender to be able to seize and halt following adversarial moves in the
game, in other words, containing the attackers’ progress in the game. We argue
that such learning is possible since the actions that need to be taken by an
adversary in each cycle of a cyber attack’s life inevitably entails abnormal and
suspicious events and activities on both host and network levels.
• Unlike game-theoretic methods which commonly focus on finding the best attack-
response strategies for the players, we, however, with a cryptographic mindset,
mainly focus on the most significant and tangible aspects of sophisticated cy-
ber attacks: (1) the amount of time it takes for the adversary to accomplish
its mission and (2) the success probabilities of fulfilling the attack objectives.
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Therefore, our goal is to translate attacker-defender interactions into a well-
defined game so that we can provide rigorous cryptographic security guaran-
tees for a system given both players’ tactics and strategies. We generalize the
basic notion of computational security of a cryptographic scheme [45] to a sys-
tem/infrastructure which must be defended and introduce a computationally
secure system in which a “given system is (Tbud, k, )-secure (for Tbud, k > 0,
and  ≤ 1), if any adversary limited with a (time) budget at most Tbud succeeds
in reaching the attack objective k, with probability at most .” We study under
which circumstances the defense system can provide an effective response that
makes  = negl(k)poly(Tbud).
• By modeling the learning rate of the defender as a function f (l) (which is the
probability of detecting and halting a next adversarial move) where l represents
the number of adversarial moves and actions so far observed and collected, we
present the following results:
− If f (l) does not converge to 1, then we call such a learning rate stagnating,
and the adversary can reach its winning state (attack objective) k within
poly(k) time budget.
− If f (l) → 1 and more specifically 1 − f (l) = O(l−2), then the probability
of the adversary winning the game is proven to be negligible in k and
polynomial in the attacker’s time budget, i.e.,  = negl(k)poly(Tbud).
− The above results hold for time budget measured in logical Markov model
transitions or physical time (seconds), and also hold for learning rates that
remain equal to f(l) = 0 until a certain number l = L∗ adversarial moves
have been collected after which learning starts.
9
− The adversary may not reach its desired winning state of k, but will reach
a much smaller kc (called containment parameter) of the order O(L
∗ +
log Tbud), where Tbud is the attacker’s time budget, for 1− f (l) = O(l−2).
− We conclude that at a metalevel the adversary needs to find one at-
tack exploit/vector for which the defender cannot find a fast enough in-
creasing learning rate and the defender needs to have a learning sys-
tem/methodology in place which should be able to reach fast enough learn-
ing rates for any possible attack exploit/vector. In practice, infrastructures
are being compromised and this means that effort is needed in order to un-
derstand a defense system’s associated learning rates and why these are
≤ 1−Ω(l−a) for some ‘a’ too small or have L∗ = O(k) (i.e., learning starts
too late).
• The proposed adversarial/defender game in terms of a Markov model is general
and fits most practical scenarios as our extensive overview shows. To show
how the presented modeling can be applied to various cyber attack and defense
scenarios, we walk through two examples and provide the security analysis for
them: (1) a malware propagation and botnet construction game (due to the
increase in the number of bots found in the wild), and (2) a moving target
defense game (as the state of the art defense strategy).
Based on our theoretical analysis and its applicability to practical scenarios, we
understand when an adversary with a time budget Tbud can be contained and pre-
vented from reaching its attack objective k with probability ≥ 1− negl(k)poly(Tbud).
As a consequence, if such containment is in place, then this allows one to trust cryp-
tographic protocols/systems which assume (for proving their security) attackers that
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have not reached k (and have a key renewal / refresh operation that can be called
every Tbud seconds in order to push adversaries back to their initial state). Moreover,
we believe that the introduced notion of learning is an exciting approach to model
cybersecurity games and worth further investigations since it enables one to consider
a more intelligent defender instead of a “dummy” one. Besides, through this pre-
sented framework, we are able to extend the idea of security capacity introduced in
Chapter 2 and provide the definition of a security capacity region as a metric for gaug-
ing a defensive system’s efficiency from a security perspective (by presenting rigorous
cryptographic security guarantees in terms of the security capacity region).
In Chapter 4, we study the effectiveness of content-based filtering strategies1
based on automatic signature generation schemes. Instead of presenting yet another
malware detection/prevention methodology, we revisit the spread of malware phe-
nomenon, especially the self-propagating ones such as worms and bots, from a new
perspective. We introduce a new model for capturing the interactions of an adversary
and its agents with the defensive system during the early phases of a zombie army
construction. Unlike a malware propagator who usually follows a passive attack strat-
egy for malware distribution to a broad audience, meaning that the attack technology
usually remains the same after unleashing the first few samples of the malware, the
defender can incrementally learn regarding the attack technology (specifically, from
observed malware payloads). As time elapses, and the defender captures more attack
data, it can reach better detection rates and accuracy. This learning rate indeed
reflects into higher quality malware signatures which can be used for online mali-
cious traffic filtering and hence malware containment purposes. Our contributions
1As one of the most effective and feasible solutions to tackle the spreading of worm-like malware
[54].
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and results are summarized as follows:
• Motivated by the advances in networking infrastructure and technologies such as
the introduction of Software-Defined Networking (SDN), and also the widespread
embrace of Automated Machine Learning (AutoML) techniques in different
realms of networking and security fields, we introduce a novel malware propaga-
tion model called the “learning-based model” suitable for today’s technologies
and more advanced malware.
• The previous outdated models are mainly focused on the attacker’s strategies
(specifically target discovery and scanning rates [16,71,75]), or in best cases, an
ill-defined cleaning of the infection or patching processes [15,21,103]. However,
we show how the increased knowledge of the defender can be taken into consid-
eration by modeling the learning rate of the defense system as a function f(l)
(which is the probability of detecting and filtering a next malicious payload)
where l represents the number of malicious payloads for a specific exploit so far
collected.
• The model leads to the development of an automatic self-replicating malware
containment strategy that prevents the spread of the malware beyond its early
stages of propagation.
• We provide precise conditions on the convergence rates of a learning-based sig-
nature generation algorithm that determines whether the malware spread will
ultimately settle or not.
• We derive tight upper and lower bounds on the total number of hosts the mal-
ware propagator can infect.
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• The model is general enough and enables us to evaluate the effectiveness of
learning-based signature generation schemes and containment strategies. It is
especially suitable for “Cloud environments” where the defender (in this case
the Cloud service provider) has more control, and better visibility over its net-
work/infrastracture and the environment exposes more homogeneity by having
high-level similarities in the different layers of the software stack (e.g., hypervi-
sors, OS).
• We study learning functions of the form 1 − f(l) = ( A
A+l
)α in which A is con-
sidered to slow down the learning process, and α is the amplification factor in
the learning. This enables us to capture characteristics of both yesteryears mal-
ware (e.g., a monomorphic worm) and also today’s more advanced ones such as
polymorphic malware.
• Our numerical analysis and simulation results show that regardless of attacker’s
scanning rates, with a proper learning function that converges fast enough to 1,
the propagation will be contained and only a negligible number of susceptible
population will be infected.
• The attacker needs to find just one exploit for which the defender is too slow
to react or too slow in learning. Instead of focusing on higher scan rates,
the attacker must invest in more stealthier and robust target discovery schemes
and malware delivery techniques which would not raise suspicions, and provides
fewer attack samples to the defense system.
We conclude and summarize this dissertation in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 2
Markov Modeling of Moving
Target Defense Games
2.1 Introduction
In spite of the fact that today’s computer systems are designed and implemented
with security in mind and take advantage of secure services, security primitives and
mechanisms, and crypto protocols, the history of computer systems has patently
revealed that perfect security is unattainable [1], i.e., all systems have vulnerabilities
that can be exploited to launch successful attacks.
For a static system in which configuration parameters and system settings remain
relatively unchanged over relatively long periods, attackers have enough time to infer
system’s configurations, vulnerabilities, and the corresponding attack vectors which
can lead to the attacker’s success in compromising the system in any number of
ways [2]. In order to mitigate such potential risks, Moving Target Defense (MTD) has
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been introduced as the notion of controlling change across multiple system dimensions
to intensify uncertainty and complexity for attackers, by reducing their window of
opportunity and increasing the costs of their probes and attack efforts [60]. Research
in MTD focuses on enabling the continued safe operation of a system by dynamically
hiding vulnerabilities or attack vectors (which we call targets in our framework).
To date, various MTD schemes have been introduced as a proactive defensive so-
lution to make a system less stationary and less deterministic. In general terms, these
techniques can be categorized into five different domains based on their placement
within the execution stack [62]: (1) Dynamic Data which mostly involves changing
data representation or its format [10, 17, 57], (2) Dynamic Software which includes
changing the application code [70, 72], (3) Dynamic Runtime Environment which is
about altering the execution environment [36, 63, 77], (4) Dynamic Platform which
deals with modifying platform properties [20,29,73] and finally (5) Dynamic Network
which is about changing network configurations and properties [5, 34]. A thorough
study of most of these methods, including their advantages and weaknesses, can be
found in [61].
Our Approach. Even though the use of MTD seems to be a promising defense strat-
egy and many efforts have been made to introduce different practical MTD schemes,
most research only focuses on introducing a new MTD scheme in one of the five cate-
gories mentioned above and then assessing the effectiveness of the introduced method
using a simulation-based approach. However, there has been very few research that
shows the effectiveness of these methods from a theoretical standpoint, especially
when multiple MTD schemes at different layers of the software stack are combined.
Therefore, in the first part of this dissertation, we introduce a Markov-based ap-
proach for modeling different MTD schemes/strategies. Then, we show how the
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introduced framework can be used to gauge the effectiveness of any given MTD
scheme/strategy.
Contributions, Results & Organization. Our contributions are summarized as
follows:
• In Section 2.3.1, we define MTD as the interaction between a defender and an
attacker modeled by probabilistic algorithms and show that such an interaction
corresponds to a defender-attacker game characterized by a Markov chain. Our
framework is general in that it formally defines (and can be used to analyze)
a large class of MTD strategies as games based on Markov chains. We walk
through two concrete examples of MTD games in Section 2.3.2, and later we
provide their analysis to demonstrate the applicability of our framework beyond
a mere theoretical exercise.
• Section 2.4 proves a first theorem analyzing the number of time steps needed
for an adversary to “win” an MTD game. Based on this theorem we introduce
security capacity as a measure of the effectiveness of an MTD strategy; an MTD
strategy with security capacity c has the property that, for all s and t such that
c = s + t, the probability that the adversary wins the MTD game within 2t
time steps is at most 2−s. We show that time steps can be converted into any
measure of cost for the adversary.
• Although a single MTD may not be very effective in that it has a small security
capacity, it may be possible to obtain a large security capacity if multiple MTDs
are deployed together. We call this approach a “Layered MTD” or “MTD∗.”
In this regard, Section 2.4.3 is an expansion of our framework by introducing
compositions of MTD games for which we extend our theorem.
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2.2 Background and Related Work
A central theme in MTD research is first to present a new feasible technique and then
estimate its effectiveness. In this regard, many MTD techniques have been proposed,
e.g., Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [36], Software Diversity [59, 66],
Dynamic Data [4, 57], etc. Existing methods for estimating the effectiveness of such
techniques are mainly divided in two categories: a) simulation based [77, 79, 94, 101]
and b) based on mathematical models [24,28,33,99].
Simulation-based: Two examples of simulation-based methods for evaluating MTD’s
effectiveness are [94,101]. In [94], the authors introduce a quantitative framework for
evaluating the effectiveness of MTD strategies (in the network layer) using simulation
experiments. Because of the limited scope of experimental conditions, it is difficult to
compare the effectiveness of an MTD strategy for different system settings. Zhuang
et al. [101] present a preliminary design schema of MTD in enterprise networks. The
authors investigate an adversary’s chance of success in a network with dynamic con-
figurations and parameters using a simulation-based approach. One of the problems
with simulation-based MTD evaluation is that these techniques are case-dependent
meaning that they only stand for their specific introduced example.
Based on mathematical models: The work described in [24] considers the effec-
tiveness of “Diversity defenses” (including Address Space, Instruction Set, and Data
Randomization) as an MTD method. The authors present a model for analyzing the
effect of MTD, focusing on scenarios where only the undefined semantics of the un-
derlying programming language is changed. The study is worthwhile as the authors
show that the effectiveness of MTD depends on multiple aspects: the type of execu-
tion properties that are changed, address randomization entropy, etc. However, the
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study does not lead to a generally applicable framework.
Of specific interest to us are game theoretic models that assist in the design and
analysis of MTD mechanisms [58]. They can be used to maximize the defender’s
“security” while minimizing/constraining the “diversity rate,” defined as the time
interval between each system adaptation (in our terminology, we use λ which is the
rate at which the defender moves in its MTD strategy), to a usable setting (i.e., to
a setting giving acceptable performance overhead): Lye and Wing [46] use a two-
player general-sum stochastic game to model the interaction between an attacker and
a defender (system administrator) for analyzing the security of computer networks.
Manadhata [48] looks into the MTD problem as a game of perfect and complete
information for attack surface shifting. Zhu et al. [96] propose a game theoreti-
cal framework for multi-layer attack surface shifting with an adaptive defender who
changes defense strategy based on real-time feedback information and risk analysis.
Carter et al. [12] study dynamic platform MTD through a game theoretical approach
for modeling an attacker who can monitor the defender’s moves in the game.
Rather than using game theory, we propose a general framework where the moves
of the attacker and defender are represented in a Markov model allowing an immediate
and straightforward characterization of the effectiveness of the used MTD strategy
by the defender (with respect to the modeled attacker).
Zhuang [97, 100] made a first attempt using Markov models to analyze MTD
strategies; each state in the proposed Markov model represents the complete config-
uration of the whole system which means that the number of states in the Markov
model grows exponentially in the number of machines in the system. This attempt
being too complex, Zhuang [97, 99] considers an attack graph as a Markov model
where transitions are labeled with a probability density and where nodes keep track
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of the machine’s configuration together with necessary overall system parameters of
which the probability densities are a function. Nodes can represent physical machines,
software stacks, or software objects such as Virtual Machines (VMs). A transition
from one node to another node means that the adversary extends its footprint to
the other node. MTD can now be modeled as being part of the overall system pa-
rameters. From this attack graph perspective, precise formulas can be derived with
respect to the time needed for an adversary reaching its objective as a function of
these probability density functions, which in turn are functions of the MTD and sys-
tem parameters [97,98]. Such formulas cannot become concrete as the whole system
architecture with MTD and adversarial behavior needs to be modeled – the proposed
Markov model requires too much detail. As a result only simple relationships can
be proven such as a larger diversity rate λ implies a larger expected time till suc-
cessful attack, and faster expected transition times imply a smaller expected time till
successful attack.
We realize that using Markov models in which each state represents a complete
system configuration is useful only if we could compress the Markov model to one
where states simply represent the projection of the necessary system and MTD pa-
rameters. This can lead to precise formulas and relations which are easy to interpret
by plugging in the known parameters.
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2.3 Defining MTD as a Two-player Game
2.3.1 MTD Games
First, by expressing MTD as an abstract game between a defender and an attacker,
we show how a large class of MTD strategies can be modeled via this representa-
tion. After providing an algorithmic definition of MTD games, we explain how this
interpretation of players’ interactions within the system, naturally translates into an
equivalent definition based on a Markov modeling description of MTD games.
Definition 1. An MTD game is defined by a set of possible defender moves D =
{, d1, d2, . . .}, attacker moves A = {, a1, a2, . . .} (where  indicates “no move”) and
a probabilistic algorithm M which outputs a stream of triples {(Di, Ai, wi)}i≥1 with
Di ⊆ D, Ai ⊆ A, and wi ∈ {0, 1} indicating whether the attacker has beaten the
defender’s moving target strategy; we say the attacker is in a winning state at time
step i if wi = 1.
The above definition as an interplay of a defender and adversarial strategy is
very general: AlgorithmM is probabilistic and uses coin tosses which, together with
the current state of M, decides at each time step i which collection of defender and
adversarial moves are being played and in what order. The changes result in a change
in the state of the algorithm M from time step to time step. M’s state represents
the combination of the adversary’s and defender’s state together with the state of
the system which is attacked/defended. This means that M also models adaptive
strategies.
Algorithm 1 shows howM can be simulated; simState keeps track of the system
state ϕ, the view of the defender viewD, the view of the attacker viewA, and whether
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the attacker is in a winning position; NextState(., ., .) simulates how the moves by
the attacker and defender change the system state; the defender and attacker are
represented by algorithms D and A where D.update(., .) and A.update(., .) keep track
of how their views change because of the new system state; notice that even if only
one party moves, both views may be affected.
Algorithm 1 MTD Game Simulator
1: function Simulator(M)
2: ϕ = initial system state;
3: viewA = adversary’s initial state of the system used in its adversarial strategy;
4: viewD = defender’s initial state of the system used in its MTD strategy;
5: Initialize simState = (ϕ, viewD, viewA, 0);
6: while true do
7: (moveD,moveA,w)←M(simState);
8: ϕ = NextState(ϕ,moveD,moveA);
9: viewD ← D.update(viewD, ϕ);
10: (viewA, w)← A.update(viewA, ϕ);
11: simState = (ϕ, viewD, viewA, w);
12: if w == 1 then
13: Return “Attacker is in a winning position”;
14: end if
15: end while
16: end function
We measure the effectiveness of an MTD strategy by analyzing when the attacker
will be in a winning state for the first time.1 For this purpose, we do not need to
keep track of the exact moves being played by the defender and attacker; we only
need to keep track of how the state of M changes from time step to time step and
whether the new state corresponds to a winning state for the adversary. This defines
1Additional analysis of how long an attacker will be in a winning state once it arrives at a winning
state and when the attacker will again be in a winning state once it exits a winning state is required
to understand the effect of an MTD strategy in more detail. Since reaching a winning state allows
an adversary to launch a successful attack, we think that when the attacker will be in a winning
state for the first time is the most crucial question to analyze first.
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a Markov chain2 where state transitions are a function of coin tosses. This leads to
the following definition:
Definition 2. An M-MTD game is defined by a (k + 1)× (k + 1) transition matrix
M which describes a Markov chain of state transitions that reflect both defender and
attacker moves. Initially the game starts in the state 0. For next time steps, the game
transitions from its current state i to a new state j with probability Mi,j. We say the
attacker wins the M-MTD game within T time slots if (the winning) state k has been
entered during at least one of the first T time slots of the MTD game.
Note that state k represents the winning state from the adversary’s perspective.
In other words, it depicts full control by the adversary; once the adversary reaches
state k, it is possible for the attacker to launch an attack that will be successful
against the system which the defender attempts to protect using its MTD strategy.
From the above discussion we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Each MTD game can be described as an M-MTD game for some transi-
tion matrix M .
A subclass of MTD games with a more natural and intuitive correspondence to
MTD strategies is given in the next definition:
Definition 3. A (MD, λ,MA, µ)-MTD Game is defined by
1. parameters λ and µ satisfying 0 ≤ λ+µ ≤ 1 which represent the rate of play of
the defender and attacker, respectively.
2We avoid unnecessary state explosion by representing states by system and MTD parameters
needed for describing the MTD game between adversary and defender with sufficient precision.
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2. (k + 1) × (k + 1) transition matrices MD and MA; for i, j ∈ {0, . . . , k}, MDi,j,
and MAi,j respectively represent the probability of transitioning from an state i
to an state j when the defender, respectively the attacker, issues a move in the
state i.
Initially the joint defender-attacker state is 0. At each next time step either with
probability λ the defender makes a move according to MD, or with probability µ the
attacker makes a move according to MA, or with probability 1 − λ − µ neither the
defender nor the attacker makes a move. We say the attacker wins the MTD game
within T time slots if it enters state k during one of its moves in the first T time slots
of the MTD game.
In the above definition, we exclude the possibility of both the defender and attacker
playing at the same time: a (three-valued) random coin flip decides with probability
λ that the defender can move, with probability µ that the attacker can move, and
with probability 1− λ− µ that no one moves.
Notice that a (MD, λ,MA, µ)-MTD game is fully described by the transition ma-
trix
M = λMD + µMA + (1− λ− µ)Ik+1, (2.1)
where Ik+1 is the (k + 1) × (k + 1) identity matrix. At each time slot the joint
defender-attacker state transitions to a new state according to M ; M represents the
MTD game as a Markov chain as in Definition 2.
A couple questions concerning the limitations of this abstract definitional frame-
work immediately arise: The above definitions relate to a logical discrete time axis
where at each fixed time step or “logical clock cycle” the system state changes ac-
cording to the transition matrix M . How can this logical time be translated to real
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time (which is what we are interested in) or cost of playing (in some cases we may be
able to assign a cost to adversarial moves)? The above definitions are very general
and may lead to very complex huge Markov chains in order to model real systems.
How much detail is needed in order to model a complex MTD game, is it possible
to decompose games in multiple layers simplifying the analysis? Finally, how can we
measure the security offered by an MTD strategy? The remainder of this chapter
answers such questions demonstrating the richness of the language provided by our
definitional framework.
2.3.2 MTD Game Examples
In order to show how our framework can be used to model different MTD techniques,
we consider a system taking advantage of IP hopping (also known as IP address
randomization) as an example of an MTD scheme.
The central intuition behind IP hopping is to frequently change the IP addresses
of the hosts in a network to make reconnaissance difficult for an adversary who is
trying to locate a host by IP addresses so that the attacker is forced to continually
rescan the network to locate a specific target(s). Implementations of this technique
have been proposed for OpenFlow [34] and DHCP [5].
From the adversary’s perspective, a spatial search for the target host in a pool of
N IP addresses is needed, which is performed by sending network probes to specific IP
addresses. The probe may be a simple SYN packet to locate a host with a particular
open port or an operating system/software fingerprinting to locate a host running a
particular system. If the adversary receives an acknowledgment, the probe found a
target, which means the adversary moved successfully and is now in control of the
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target. The adversary continues the search until all targets are found.
We consider two different scenarios in which the adversary’s goal is to locate and
control one, respectively k, valuable/vulnerable hosts in the network. This is referred
to as Single-Target Hiding (STH) and Multiple-Target Hiding (MTH). Our analysis
of STH assumes an optimal adaptive adversary while our analysis of MTH assumes
an almost optimal adaptive adversary (being almost optimal is shown in Section 2.4).
As explained earlier in the model development section, for both scenarios, we assume
independence of action for players and exclude the possibility of both players issuing
a move at the same time.
Single-Target Hiding
In IP hopping techniques, new IP addresses from a pool of unused addresses in the
network subnet will be selected and assigned to hosts at some (average) rate λ. For
instance, the defender plays a memoryless MTD strategy such that every time step it
randomizes the IP addresses with probability λ (and with probability 1−λ there would
be no randomization). Meanwhile, the adversary sends a probe at an average rate µ in
an attempt to identify a target. It may play an adaptive strategy: If the attacker has
tried a set of say q IP addresses after the defender’s last IP address randomization,
then the (q + 1)-st trial should not be one of the q IP addresses it already tried,
instead it should guess a new one. Even though the attacker does not learn when
the defender randomizes the IP addresses, if it tries each IP address in sequential
round robin order, then it knows that its next guess will never be of an IP address
it already tried since the defender’s last IP address randomization. As the defender
plays memoryless, it does not matter whether the attacker tries each IP address in
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Figure 2.1: Markov chain of Single-Target Hiding
fixed known sequential round robin order. This optimal adaptive adversarial strategy
is described by the Markov chain in Figure 2.1.
The Markov chain has N + 1 states where N equals the total number of possible
IP addresses. Let state N (in the figure denoted by “Win”) represent the winning
state for the adversary and let states 0, 1, . . . , N − 1 correspond to when the defender
randomized the IP address for the last time, i.e., state q means that exactly q time
steps ago the IP address was randomized (by the defender). For 0 ≤ q ≤ N − 1,
• Mq,0 = λ; with probability λ the defender randomizes the IP address, as a result
the Markov chain transitions back to the state 0,
• Mq,q+1 = µ(N − q − 1)/(N − q); with probability µ the attacker tries the next
IP address which with probability 1− 1/(N − q) is not the right target,
• Mq,N = µ/(N − q); with probability µ the attacker tries the next IP address
which with probability 1/(N − q) is correct (i.e., the target host) meaning that
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the Markov chain transitions to the winning state for the adversary,
• Mq,q = 1− λ− µ; with probability 1− λ− µ both the defender and attacker do
not issue a move,
• MN,0 = λ and MN,N = 1− λ; the adversary does not need to try IP addresses,
it will only be kicked out of the winning state if the defender randomizes the
IP addresses.
Multiple-Target Hiding
The IP hopping game described above considers the case where the adversary only
needs to find one single target. Another possible scenario one can think of is the
case in which the adversary needs to find/penetrate more than one host/target in a
network taking advantage of IP hopping defense strategy. Let N be the total number
of “locations” where K targets (i.e., attack vectors or vulnerabilities) may hide; only
if the combination of a smaller subset of k locations of these K target attack vectors
are known by the attacker, the attacker is capable of launching a successful attack by
exploiting the combination of the k associated vulnerabilities, i.e., the attacker wins
the MTD game. The defender moves by re-allocating a target causing the attacker
to renew its search for the locations. The attacker moves by selecting one of the
N possible locations and testing whether it corresponds to one of the targets. For
example, consider a hit-list worm targeting specific hosts on the network or servers
part of a redundant system an adversary is attempting to disrupt. The MTH defense
limits the success of an adversary attempting to compromise and persist on a set of
servers in a network.
Both the defender and attacker interface with the defender’s “system,” the system
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implements the defender’s MTD strategy and can also control the rate at which each
party may access the system. Each time step allows three possibilities for defender-
attacker moves (giving an example of the more abstract (MD, λ,MA, µ)-MTD game):
[Defender moves] If the defender issues a move, it will take priority over any
other player’s request. We assume a system which controls its own MTD: if the
system/defender thinks it is time to move (i.e., re-allocate a target), then it will stall
any other requests (in particular, those made by an adversary who wishes to figure
out where targets are hiding by getting in touch with locations and testing them).
In our analysis we only consider a defender who plays a memoryless strategy: at
every time step, the defender plays (issues a move) with probability λ regardless of
any learned information about the attacker’s strategy. Also, when the defender plays,
it will choose one of the K targets at random and re-allocate the selected target to a
random location (among one of the other N −K possible locations).
[Attacker moves] The defender has not issued a move, but the attacker has: We
consider adaptive adversarial strategies, i.e., the adversary can be modeled by a prob-
abilistic algorithm A which uses previously learned information in order to select a
new future time step at which the adversary will issue its next move. A few exam-
ples of previously learned information are the times at which the defender issued a
move, and the attacker’s discovery of when it gains/loses the location of a target. In
our analysis we give the adversary more detailed information (for free): we assume
that as soon as the defender re-allocates a target (which its location was known to
the attacker before re-allocation), the attacker is told that this location does not any
more correspond to one of the K targets.
[No moves] No moves are issued by either the defender or the adversary. We consider
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Figure 2.2: Markov chain of Multiple-Target Hiding
an adaptive adversarial strategy which, given some number of time steps T , maximizes
the probability of winning the game (by finding a subset of k locations) within T
time steps: suppose the attacker moves and decides to wait by not issuing a move the
very next time step. Then the attacker runs the extra risk to lose one of the found
targets during the next time step as the defender plays a memoryless strategy and
will play/move with probability λ. This extra risk translates into a higher probability
of not being able to learn a sufficient number of k locations within T time steps. To
reduce this unnecessary probability of losing a location while waiting, the attacker
should not wait in the first place. This means an optimal adaptive adversarial strategy
is to issue moves at every time step as much as the system allows access. We assume
a system which limits the rate r at which a party is allowed to access the system (in
more detail: whenever a party requests to access the system, the request is put in a
FIFO queue and the system will serve requests according to a memoryless Poisson
process corresponding to r). Since the defender moves take priority, this implies that
the attacker only plays when the defender does not play. Therefore, if the defender
plays memoryless with probability λ, then either the defender moves with probability
λ, or the attacker moves with probability µ = min{r, 1 − λ}, or with probability
1− λ− µ no one moves.
Figure 2.2 depicts the Markov chain which describes a close approximation of the
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above MTD game (the winning state “k” is denoted by state “Win”); as in the Single-
Target Hiding game, an optimal adversary should select new locations according to
a round robin strategy – we analyze a suboptimal adversary who selects random new
locations: If the game is in state i and if the attacker plays, which happens with
probability µ, then the attacker will hit one of the K − i unknown locations with
probability (K − i)/(N − i) (since the defender chooses new locations uniformly at
random): this explains the transition probability Mi,i+1 from state i to state i+ 1. If
the game is in state i + 1 and if the defender plays, which happens with probability
λ, then the defender will randomize one of the i+ 1 locations known to the adversary
with probability (i+ 1)/K: this explains the transition probability Mi+1,i from state
i+ 1 to state i. Hence, transition matrix M is given by
Mi,i+1 = µ(K − i)/(N − i) for 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1,
Mi+1,i = λ(i+ 1)/K for 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, (2.2)
Mi,i = 1−Mi,i+1−Mi,i−1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ k− 1, M0,0 = 1−M0,1, and Mk,k = 1−Mk,k−1.
2.4 Security Analysis of MTD Games
We prove the following theorem which provides an upper bound on the winning prob-
ability of an attacker playing an M -MTD game within T time steps. The theorem’s
interpretation lead to the definition of “security capacity” of MTD games. The proofs
of theorems in this chapter are presented in Section A.1.
Theorem 1 (Adversary’s Winning Probability of an M -MTD Game). For an M-
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MTD game with stationary distribution3 pi (i.e., piM = pi) and the initial state 0
representing the worst state to start the game from the adversary’s perspective,4 the
probability that the attacker wins in the first T time steps is ≤ T · pi(k), where k is
the winning state.
In order to apply this or next theorems, an upper bound on pi(k) for a stationary
distribution pi must be computed/estimated in an efficient way. We refer the reader to
the works presented in [7,40], which offer promising algorithms for efficiently comput-
ing this probability. Therefore, even if the Markov chain of an MTD game remains
complex/large (after compressing the chain to one where states only represent the
projection to necessary system and MTD parameters), the theorems can be used for
security analysis of the MTD game. The main challenge is to find an appropriate
Markov chain in the first place.
We can interpret Theorem 1 as follows: suppose pi(k) = 2−c. Then, the probability
that the attacker wins in the first T = 2t time steps is ≤ 2−(c−t). We may interpret
s = c − t as a security parameter and interpret c as the “security capacity” of the
MTD game. The capacity c = s + t is split into “a probability 2−s of successful
attack” and “a considered time window of 2t logical time steps.”
Definition 4. An M-MTD game has at least security capacity c if the probability that
the attacker wins in the first T = 2t time steps is ≤ 2−s for all t+ s = c. Notice that
an M-MTD game with stationary distribution pi satisfying the conditions of Theorem
3This implicitly assumes the existence of a stationary distribution; this distribution may not be
unique, however, the theorem applies to any such distribution as long as the other condition of the
theorem is met.
4This excludes a scenario where initially the adversary has a leg up – e.g., because the initial
state of the system is a “default” state where the adversary can assume specific “default” settings
before the defender had the opportunity to move “targets” around.
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1 has at least a security capacity5 c = − log pi(k).
If we know the cost of the real resources (i.e. money, time, etc.) an adversary
needs to spend in order to move, then the next theorem shows how to compute the
adversarial cost needed for a successful attack.
Theorem 2 (Cost Analysis). For an M-MTD game with an expected adversarial
cost per logical moves equal to α, stationary distribution pi, and the initial state 0
representing the worst state to start the game from the adversary’s perspective, the
probability that the attacker wins the M-MTD game by paying at most C is ≤ C ·
pi(k)/α, where k is the winning state.
Notice that C/α estimates the number of logical time slots T within which the
adversary wins the M -MTD game. Applying Theorem 1 with T = C/α immediately
gives the above result. A precise proof turns out to be more complex and is given in
the appendix A.1.2.
Now we study the security analysis of the two MTD examples we introduced
previously to show how the theorems can be used for gauging the effectiveness of an
MTD scheme.
5See the previous footnote, the security capacity will not be much larger than − log pi(k).
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2.4.1 Security Analysis of Single-Target Hiding Game
We compute the stationary distribution for the Single-Target Hiding scenario as fol-
lows: Equation piM = pi gives for 1 ≤ q ≤ N − 1
pi(0) = (1− µ)pi(0) + λpi(N) + λ
N−1∑
q=1
pi(q), (2.3)
pi(q) = (1− λ− µ)pi(q) + µ(N − q)pi(q − 1)
(N − q + 1) , (2.4)
pi(N) = (1− λ)pi(N) +
N−1∑
q=0
µpi(q)/(N − q). (2.5)
Equation (2.4) yields the recurrence relation
pi(q) =
µ
µ+ λ
N − q
N − q + 1pi(q − 1)
which is solved by
pi(q) =
(
µ
µ+ λ
)q
N − q
N
pi(0).
Equation (2.3) combined with
∑N
q=1 pi(q) = 1− pi(0) is solved by
pi(0) =
λ
µ+ λ
.
Now we are able to derive
N−1∑
q=0
pi(q)/(N − q) =
{
1−
(
µ
λ+ µ
)N}
/N.
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Substituting this in (2.5) gives the equilibrium probability of the winning state for
the adversary:
pi(N) =
{
1−
(
µ
λ+ µ
)N}
· µ
λN
. (2.6)
In practice, the security capacity − log pi(N) ≈ log(λN/µ) is rather small as N is
restricted to the number of unused addresses in the network subnet.
2.4.2 Security Analysis of Multiple-Target Hiding Game
In order to find the stationary distribution pi of M in (2.2), we observe that
∑i
j=0 pi(j)
and
∑k
j=i+1 pi(j) do not change after multiplying with M . This means that the
probability of leaving state i+ 1 to i must be equal the probability of leaving state i
to i+ 1 as a result of one multiplication by M : For 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1,
pi(i) ·Mi,i+1 = pi(i+ 1) ·Mi+1,i.
Rewriting the recurrence relation yields
pi(k) = pi(0)
k−1∏
i=0
pi(i+ 1)
pi(i)
= pi(0)
k−1∏
i=0
Mi,i+1
Mi+1,i
= pi(0)
k−1∏
i=0
µ(K − i)/(N − i)
λ(i+ 1)/K
= pi(0)
(
µK
λ
)k k−1∏
i=0
(K − k + i+ 1)
(i+ 1)(N − i)
≤
(
µK(K − k + 1)
λ(N − k + 1)
)k
.
Notice that if K = k = 1, which describes the Single-Target Hiding game, the
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upper bound is µ/(λN) which is close to (2.6) implying (by extrapolation) that the
suboptimal adversary considered in the multiple-target hiding game is close to opti-
mal.
The security capacity − log pi(k) ≥ k(log(λ(N−k+1))−log(µK(K−k+1))) scales
linearly with k showing that multiple-target hiding is a good MTD design principle.
2.4.3 Composition of MTD Games
In order to design and maintain secure systems, the system architect or operator must
be aware of the systems’ attack vectors and vulnerabilities. This can be achieved
only if a higher-level view of the system and these attack vectors is presented. A
Cyber Attack Life Cycle (CALC), also known as “Cyber Kill Chain,” provides this
higher-level view of an attack in multiple stages where each stage accomplishes an
intermediate goal. A more holistic approach for analytics and sensing can be taken
into consideration by using the knowledge of the entire CALC [102]. The research
summarized in [61] considers a large class of MTD schemes and establishes various
CALC stages for which each of these schemes can be effective. Rather than using
CALC, a more detailed representation of threats is through attack graphs [74], where
each node represents a system state with attacker capabilities and a (labeled) directed
edge represents an adversarial behavior causing a change in the system state. An
attack graph teaches how individual (local) attacks can be combined in order to
produce larger attack paths (reaching a global goal).
Composition of MTD games seems to be a natural defense mechanism meaning
that although a single MTD may not have sufficient security capacity, a composition
of multiple MTDs deployed together may have sufficient security capacity. Therefore,
37
the system’s defender, by having a higher-level view of the system through CALC
or attack graphs, might be able to get higher security by composing multiple MTDs
(along attack paths).
In this section, we analyze the composition of several levels/layers of MTD where
the attacker can only play at a higher level if it is in the winning state of the previous
level. Equivalently, the game at the higher level does not allow the attacker to move if
it is not in the winning state of the previous level. The main idea is that the attacker
must slowly penetrate the defense mechanism as in an Advanced Persistent Threat
(APT) [87]. We call this approach a Layered MTD or MTD∗:
Definition 5. A Layered MTD game (or MTD∗) is a composition of a sequence
of MTD games Mj, 0 ≤ j ≤ f , defined by the following rules: The defender plays
all the games at each timeslot; the adversary plays MTD game M0 each timeslot; for
0 ≤ j ≤ f−1, the adversary only plays MTD game Mj+1 in a timeslot if the adversary
is in the winning position of MTD game Mj at the beginning of that timeslot.
6 The
MTD∗ game is won by the adversary, if the winning state in Mf has been reached.
In the above definition, we assume that for all layers/levels Mj, the transitions
occur with the same frequency (we analyze different frequencies in Section 2.4.4). The
next theorem analyzes the security capacity of a layered MTD game.7
Theorem 3 (Upper Bound on the Winning Probability of a Layered MTD Game).
Let Mj with the winning state kj, stationary distribution pij, and at least a security
capacity cj = − log pij(kj), 0 ≤ j ≤ f , represent a sequence of MTD games. Assume
that for each Mj-MTD game the initial state 0 represents the worst state to start the
6If the adversary is not in the winning position of MTD game Mj , then these rules effectively
change Mj+1 temporarily into an MTD game M
′
j+1 where only the defender plays.
7For the thorough analysis and examples of analyzing composed games see A.1.3.
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game from the adversary’s perspective. Furthermore, assume that in each Mj-MTD
game the defender implements moves which can transition from state kj (the losing
state from the defender’s perspective) to a state 6= kj, hence, λj = 1− (Mj)kj ,kj > 0.
Then, the probability that the attacker wins the layered MTD game based on
M0, . . . ,Mf in the first T time steps is
≤ T · pi0(k0)
f∏
j=1
pij(kj)/λj.
i.e., the layered MTD game has a security capacity at least
c =
f∑
j=0
cj + log
f∏
j=1
λj. (2.7)
2.4.4 Time Conversion
How do we define a composition game made of levels with different time scales? Let
us measure the time tj per logical transition at level j in a universal time unit (e.g.
seconds) such that tj ≥ 1 for all j. In reality defender and adversarial moves complete
in very little time and corresponding transitions are close to immediate; the rate of
play, however, measured in universal time units scales with 1/tj. The corresponding
new transition matrix for level j is equal to
Mnewj =
1
tj
Mj + (1− 1
tj
)I.
Since the time per transition in Mnewj is now 1 universal time unit regardless of
the level, we can apply the composition theorem to these new transition matrices.
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Clearly the transformation to the new transition matrices does not have any effect
on the stationary distribution pij since for the new transition matrix we also have
pij = pijM
new
j . This proves that pij(kj) stays the same for M
new
j . However we notice
that
λnewj = 1− (Mnewj )kj ,kj = 1− [
1
tj
(Mj)kj ,kj + (1−
1
tj
)]
=
1
tj
(1− (Mj)kj ,kj) =
λj
tj
Moreover, T new = T · t0 since it is measured in time steps for the lowest level game.
This yields the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Assume that for each Mj-MTD game the transitions take on average
tj ≥ 1 time units. Then, the probability that the attacker wins the layered MTD game
based on M0, . . . ,Mf in the first T time units is
≤ T · t0pi0(k0)
f∏
j=1
tjpij(kj)/λj.
Corollary 2. The security capacity of the layered MTD game measured in time units
is at least (2.7) minus a time conversion factor log
∏f
j=0 tj which corresponds to how
much time transitions take in each game.
2.5 Concluding Remarks and Future Directions
In this Chapter, we introduced a Markov-model-based framework for MTD analysis.
The framework allows modeling of concrete MTD strategies, provides general theo-
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rems about how the probability of a successful adversary defeating an MTD strategy
is related to the amount of time/cost spend by the adversary, and shows how a multi-
level composition of MTD strategies/schemes can be analyzed by a straightforward
combination of each MTD strategy’s analysis.
Central in the proposed framework is the concept of security capacity, which
measures the strength of an MTD strategy: the security capacity depends on MTD
specific parameters and in general system parameters. As the first direction for fu-
ture research, the security capacity versus system performance can be analyzed as a
function of system and MTD parameters. This allows the defender to understand the
price paid for deploying an MTD strategy from the performance perspective, and how
MTD and system parameters should be set given system constraints and parameters.
Also, various MTD strategies can be compared, and the most effective one concerning
the defender’s cost in terms of performance can be selected.
MTD strategies hide targets, which is a combinatorial game leading to information
theoretic guarantees expressed by the security capacity. As demonstrated in the
analysis of the Multiple-Target Hiding MTD game, the security capacity is the largest
if an adversary needs to find multiple targets (and not just one single target) which
are each being hidden by the MTD strategy. The analysis shows that the probability
of finding each target scales with the product of the probabilities of finding each
specific target. This exponential dependency on the number of hidden targets is also
demonstrated by the analysis of Layered MTD strategies.
A second direction for future research is to analyze the Layered MTD composi-
tion in more detail and improve the lower bound on the security capacity proved in
this work (as demonstrated for the toy example (see A.1.3), even though the current
proven bound shows an exponential dependency on the number of layers, it is much
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weaker when compared to simulation results). Additional future research regarding
the composition is to investigate into what extent MTD schemes and strategies can
be composed according to a more effective and adaptive mechanism where the state
in each MTD game supplies feedback to each other MTD game in their composition.
Feedback from one MTD game can be used to adapt the MTD parameters of an-
other MTD game, and this could lead to an overall larger security capacity of the
composition.
In the next chapter, we focus on a more general game to extend our analysis and
presented language to a broader range of cyber attack and defense games, especially
APT-like attacks. We study how the probability of a successful adversary defeating
a defender’s strategy is related to the amount of time/cost spent by the adversary in
such scenarios. We present a Markov-based general framework to model the inter-
actions between the two famous players of network security games, i.e., a defender
(taking advantage of common security tools and technologies such as Intrusion De-
tection and Prevention Systems (IDPSes), Firewalls, and Honeypots (HPs)) and an
attacker (and possibly its agents) who takes actions to reach its attack objective(s)
in the game. Similar to our previous line of thinking in Chapter 2, we mainly focus
on the most significant and tangible aspects of sophisticated cyber-attacks: (1) the
amount of time it takes for the adversary to accomplish its mission and (2) the suc-
cess probabilities of fulfilling the attack objectives. Therefore, our goal is to translate
attacker-defender interactions into a well-defined game so that we can provide rig-
orous cryptographic security guarantees for a system given both players’ tactics and
strategies.
We introduce a notion of “learning” in cybersecurity games and study its impact
on players chances of prosperity in the game. The presented framework extends the
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idea of security capacity introduced in Chapter 2 and provides the definition of a
security capacity region as a metric for gauging a defensive system’s efficiency from
a security perspective (by presenting rigorous cryptographic security guarantees in
terms of the security capacity region).
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Chapter 3
Toward a Theory of Cyber Attacks
based on Markov Models
3.1 Introduction
Cyber attacks targeting individuals or enterprises have become a predominant part
of the computer/information age. Such attacks are becoming more sophisticated
(qualitative aspects) and prevalent (quantitative aspects) on a daily basis [18]. The
exponential growth of cyber plays and cyber players necessitate the inauguration of
new methods and research for better understanding the “cyber kill chain,” partic-
ularly with the rise of advanced and novel malware (e.g., Stuxnet [35], WannaCry
ransomware crypto worm [52], the Mirai and its variants [6,8]) and the extraordinary
growth in the population of Internet residents, especially connected Internet of Things
(IoT) devices.
Mathematical modeling could be used to represent real-world cyber-attack situa-
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tions. Such models play a beneficial role when it comes to the secure design and eval-
uation of systems/infrastructures by providing a better understanding of the threat
itself and the attacker’s conduct during the lifetime of a cyber attack. The sparse
amount of research on modeling and evaluating a defensive systems’ efficiency (es-
pecially from a security perspective), however, warrants the need for constructing a
proper theoretical framework. Such a framework allows the community to be able
to evaluate the defensive technologies’ effectiveness from a security standpoint. In
this regard, a proper model is needed to capture the interactions between the two fa-
mous players of network security games i.e., a defender (taking advantage of common
security tools and technologies such as Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems
(IDPSes), Firewalls, and Honeypots (HPs)) and an attacker (and possibly its agents)
who takes action to reach its attack objective(s) in the game. Modeling only one
player by itself (e.g., opportunistic/targeted attacks, or a defensive system such as
an IDPS) without acknowledging the other party’s capabilities, set of actions, and
strategies would be unjustifiable. Hence, a realistic model should take both par-
ties’ characteristics, objectives, and actions into consideration, as they are typically
oppositional.
Game-theoretic methods have been proposed to model the interactions between an
attacker and a defender in a network environment [3,11,13,46,87]. Although essential
and insightful, as figuring out the best attack-response strategy is in the focal point
of a game-theoretic analysis, such models suffer from a lack of general applicability
due to the case-specific assumptions made to reduce the complexity of the problem
leading to a case-specific game with a corresponding set of players’ actions and payoffs.
Therefore, the developed models become ineffective in the representation of general
settings.
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Our Approach. We introduce a Markov-based framework and methodology for
modeling various computer security scenarios prevailing today, including opportunis-
tic, targeted and multi-stage attacks. Motivated by the rise of Advanced Persistent
Threats (APT), we are particularly interested in situations in which each players’
progress in the game can be viewed and modeled as an incremental process. For an
adversary limited with a specific time budget (representing the “dwell-time” in an
APT-like attack [26]), a progressive, adversarial move associated with a probability
distribution can bring it one step closer to its desired winning state. In our frame-
work, we call this winning state the attack objective, which can represent individual
goals in any stage of an APT (e.g., data exfiltration) or the attack itself as a whole.
Similarly, by monitoring the environment and capturing the adversarial moves, the
defender tries to put all the gained information together so that it can eventually
prevent the adversary from fulfilling its mission. For instance, the defender’s goal
could be generating a detection signal that indicates the presence of a coordinated
set of activities that are part of an APT campaign [50], developing a signature for
a malware attack to halt next adversarial moves [55, 84], or shuffling its resources
after enough number of samples (evidence) is obtained as in a Moving Target Defense
strategy (MTD) [47,76].
Contributions & Results. Our contributions are summarized as follows:
• We introduce the notion of learning in cybersecurity games and describe a gen-
eral “game of consequences” meaning that each player’s (mainly the attacker)
chances of making a progressive move in the game depends on its previous ac-
tions. More specifically, as a consequence of the adversarial imperfect moves in
the game, the other party, i.e., the defender has the opportunity to incremen-
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tally learn more and more about the attack technology. This learning enables
the defender to be able to seize and halt following adversarial moves in the game,
in other words, containing the attackers’ progress in the game. We argue that
such learning is possible since the actions that need to be taken by an adversary
in each cycle of a cyber attack’s life inevitably entails abnormal and suspicious
events and activities on both host and network levels [23,31,32,38,68,93].
• Unlike game-theoretic methods which commonly focus on finding the best attack-
response strategies for the players, we, however, with a cryptographic mindset,
mainly focus on the most significant and tangible aspects of sophisticated cy-
ber attacks: (1) the amount of time it takes for the adversary to accomplish
its mission and (2) the success probabilities of fulfilling the attack objectives.
Therefore, our goal is to translate attacker-defender interactions into a well-
defined game so that we can provide rigorous cryptographic security guaran-
tees for a system given both players’ tactics and strategies. We generalize the
basic notion of computational security of a cryptographic scheme [45] to a sys-
tem/infrastructure which must be defended and introduce a computationally
secure system in which a “given system is (Tbud, k, )-secure (for Tbud, k > 0,
and  ≤ 1), if any adversary limited with a (time) budget at most Tbud succeeds
in reaching the attack objective k, with probability at most .” We study under
which circumstances the defense system can provide an effective response that
makes  = negl(k)poly(Tbud).
• By modeling the learning rate of the defender as a function f (l) (which is the
probability of detecting and halting a next adversarial move) where l represents
the number of adversarial moves and actions so far observed and collected, we
47
present the following results:
− If f (l) does not converge to 1, then we call such a learning rate stagnating,
and the adversary can reach its winning state (attack objective) k within
poly(k) time budget. This result answers the question of why fighting
cyberattacks (especially APT-like attacks) remains a challenging quest for
cyber defenders. Even in ideal scenarios (especially where there is no false
positive in the learning process), to ‘win’ the game as the defender, i.e.,
preventing the attacker from accomplishing its mission, the true-positive
rates must converge (fast enough) to 1, which is a remaining challenge for
any defense system.
− If f (l) → 1 and more specifically 1 − f (l) = O(l−2), then the probability
of the adversary winning the game is proven to be negligible in k and
polynomial in the attacker’s time budget, i.e.,  = negl(k)poly(Tbud).
− The above results hold for time budget measured in logical Markov model
transitions or physical time (seconds), and also hold for learning rates that
remain equal to f(l) = 0 until a certain number l = L∗ adversarial moves
have been collected after which learning starts.
− The adversary may not reach its desired winning state of k, but will reach
a much smaller kc (called containment parameter) of the order O(L
∗ +
log Tbud), where Tbud is the attacker’s time budget, for 1− f (l) = O(l−2).
− We conclude that at a metalevel the adversary needs to find one at-
tack exploit/vector for which the defender cannot find a fast enough in-
creasing learning rate and the defender needs to have a learning sys-
tem/methodology in place which should be able to reach fast enough learn-
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ing rates for any possible attack exploit/vector. In practice, infrastructures
are being compromised and this means that, as given by our general frame-
work, and presented theoretical and numerical analysis, effort is needed in
order to understand a defense system’s associated learning rates and why
these are ≤ 1 − Ω(l−a) for some ‘a’ too small or have L∗ = O(k) (i.e.,
learning starts too late).
• The presented adversarial/defender game in terms of a Markov model is general
and fits most practical scenarios as our extensive overview shows. To show how
the presented modeling can be applied to various cyber attack and defense
scenarios, we walk through two examples and provide the security analysis for
them: (1) a malware propagation and botnet construction game (due to the
increase in the number of bots found in the wild), and (2) a moving target
defense game (as the state of the art defense strategy).
Based on our theoretical analysis and its applicability to practical scenarios, we
understand when an adversary with a time budget Tbud can be contained and pre-
vented from reaching its attack objective k with probability ≥ 1− negl(k)poly(Tbud).
As a consequence, if such containment is in place, then this allows one to trust cryp-
tographic protocols/systems which assume (for proving their security) attackers that
have not reached k (and have a key renewal / refresh operation that can be called
every Tbud seconds in order to push adversaries back to their initial state). Moreover,
we believe that the introduced notion of learning is an exciting approach to model
cybersecurity games and worth further investigations since it enables one to consider
a more intelligent defender instead of a “dummy” one. Besides, the formal definitions
of capacity region could be in particular interest as a metric for gauging a defensive
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system’s efficiency from a security perspective (by presenting rigorous cryptographic
security guarantees in terms of the security capacity region).
Limitations and Future Research. We explain why fighting against advanced
and persistent threats remains a challenging task for system defenders. In particu-
lar, we show that even in ideal situations, where there are no false positives in the
defender’s learning process, the learning must not stagnate, and it must tend to 1
with a fast-converging rate satisfying our presented criterion. Adding false positives
to this picture makes the defenders’ job assuredly more laborious, as such incidents
can disrupt the learning process, and therefore trouble the normal operation of the
system. In extreme cases, such as dealing with a delusive attacker [56, 89] who can
maliciously engineer the training data (capable of conducting noise injection attacks),
the learning may not always be positive, and the learning engine’s false-positive rates
must be taken into consideration. We recognize that in the current modeling, false
positives can happen on two levels: first, when it comes to learning from adversarial
actions and second, while using the gained information for blocking future adversar-
ial moves. We notice that if the attack samples collected by the defender contain
many false positives, the learning could become arduous (or even impossible), and
the assumption of enhancement in the “defender’s detection rates by witnessing more
samples” becomes less realistic. Therefore, a remaining challenge for future work is
taking false positives into consideration to have a more robust and realistic model.
Providing bounds on the total number of false positives that the defender can tolerate
in its learning process is the next essential step in extending this presented framework,
and we leave this problem for future studies. Also, the presented model can be fine-
tuned to investigate various scenarios for a defender with a more extensive defensive
action set, such as host-level cleaning and patching of network nodes. Although this
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can potentially lead to a more comprehensive model, we left the analysis for this case
for future studies since assuming a universal host-level defense system deployed on
all the network hosts is an unrealistic assumption in most practical scenarios.
Organization. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 briefly
reviews related works in modeling cyber attacks as a game between an attacker and
a defender. The interactions of the defender and the adversary are described as a
stochastic network security game in Section 3.3. The security analysis of the in-
troduced game is presented in Section 3.4 followed by the corresponding parametric
analysis of the game for various learning function and system’s parameters to explore
the effects of such variables on attack-defense objectives. In Section 3.5, we study
two attack-defense scenarios to show how our presented framework can be used to
capture attacker-defender interactions in real-world settings, in particular, we show
how a proper learning mechanism can bring the attacker’s progress in the game to a
standstill. We finally conclude this chapter and discuss future directions in Section
3.6.
3.2 Background and Related Work
Modeling cyber attacks as a game between a defender and an attacker is a classical
but challenging research problem. Here, we review some of the research that has been
done in this area which we find the most relevant (current state-of-the-art) to this
presented work.
The intrusion detection problem in heterogeneous networks consisting of nodes
with various security assets is studied in [13]. The expected behaviors of rational
51
attackers in addition to the optimal defender strategy are derived by formulating the
attacker-defender interaction as a non-cooperative game. The paper concludes that
sufficient resources for monitoring the environment and proper system configuration
at the defender side are two necessary conditions of efficiently protecting the network.
Similarly, the interaction of players is modeled as a general-sum stochastic game in [46]
in which Lye and Wing studied three different attack-response scenarios including
defacing a website, stealing confidential data, and launching a Denial of Service (DoS)
attack. The authors, though, left richer and more complex scenarios for future works.
These plots include a more capable defender with a more extensive action set for
attack detection and prevention purposes. Such a stronger defender could potentially
lure the attacker and learn the attack technology by setting up defensive agents such
as honeypots within the environment. Carroll and Grosu [11] consider such stronger
defense strategies, i.e., taking advantage of camouflage techniques (e.g., disguising a
regular system as a honeypot or vice versa) by investigating the effects of deception
on players’ interaction using a signaling game.
Motivated by the rise of advanced persistent threats, van Dijk et al. [87] introduced
the FLIPIT game to model the interaction of two players competing in a race of
maximizing the amount of time each is in control of a shared computing resource while
minimizing their total cost (associated with each player move). Strongly dominant
strategies for both players (if there exist such strategies) are determined based on
different employed attack strategies. Also, they provided general guidance on how
and when to implement a cost-effective defense strategy.
For a review of existing game-theory-based solutions for network security prob-
lems, we refer the reader to the surveys provided in [43,49]. In brief, Liang et al. [43]
summarized the presented game models’ application scenarios (both cooperative and
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non-cooperative games) under two categories: attack-defense analysis, and security
measurement. Manshaei et al. [49] however, surveyed the use of game theory in
addressing diverse forms of privacy and security problems in mobile and network
applications. The studied works are organized in six main categories: physical and
MAC layer security, security of self-organizing networks, intrusion detection systems,
anonymity and privacy, network security economics, and cryptography.
Although essential and insightful, the aforementioned game-theoretic modelings
and methods are mainly focused on finding the best attack-response strategies for
the players, and therefore, they deal with the difficulties of defining a proper set of
players’ actions, strategies, and payoffs in the game. Our work differs from such
studies, in the sense that we are looking into the problem of cyber attack-defense
modeling from a different perspective, in that we are seeking answers to different
questions such as “is it possible to provide rigorous cryptographic security guarantees
for a system/infrastructure given the players’ set of actions, strategies, and system’s
parameters?”. We believe answering such questions can lead to a new metric for
security and a means to be able to measure security and therefore define what it means
for a system/infrastructure/strategy to be secure. This is especially beneficial when
it comes to bootstrapping cryptographic protocols and having a proper reduction to
common assumptions on, for instance, the learning rate of a defender. To answer
such questions, we mainly focus on the most meaningful and tangible aspects of
sophisticated cyber attacks: (1) the amount of time it takes for an adversary to
accomplish its mission (called an attack objective in this manuscript) and (2) the
success probabilities of fulfilling the attack objective(s).
In the previous chapter, we made an initial effort in relating the number of adver-
sarial moves (i.e., logical time steps) and attack success probability in an MTD game
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using Markov modeling. We modeled the interaction of players in dynamic environ-
ments1 by probabilistic algorithms characterized by a Markov chain which led to the
concept of “security capacity” as a metric for gauging the effectiveness of an MTD
scheme [47]. In particular, the relationship between the attack success probability
and the time it takes to reach the attack objectives (i.e., the winning state for the
adversary in the studied game scenarios) is then translated into the security capacity
concept: “the security capacity of an MTD game (a defense system deploying an MTD
strategy) is at least c if the probability that the attacker wins in the first T = 2t time
steps is ≤ 2−s for all t + s = c.” In this chapter, however, we introduce and study a
general game which can capture not only MTD games but also various cybersecurity
game scenarios. Besides, we realize that the introduced “security capacity” concept
can be generalized to a broader and more precise definition which we call security
“capacity region” in our framework, and show that the studied MTD games in the
previous chapter are only specific examples of the general capacity region concept.
3.3 Game Modeling
In this Section, we introduce a general network security game based on the interactions
between an adversary, its agents (e.g., bots controlled by a botmaster), and a defender
who is equipped with a logically centralized defense system2 implemented in the
environment. We explain how this game can be directly mapped to an equivalent
Markov model and in the next Section, we provide the security analysis for this
1Those with changing system configurations and parameters, and therefore attack surfaces
2For instance, network/host-based intrusion detection and prevention systems, honeypots, etc.
One motivation for our work is the advent of Software-Defined Networking (SDN) in which the entire
network infrastructure can be controlled from a centralized software controller.
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Markov model as well as presenting compelling interpretations of the role of both
players’ strategies in their probability of winning the introduced game.
3.3.1 The Game of Consequences
[Game Setup] In almost any sophisticated and persistent cyber attack, the adver-
sary continues the attack until its attack objective is satisfied. However, due to the
incomplete and imperfect information of the players (in this case the attacker), and
the probabilistic nature of an attack’s success rates, the attacker’s objective can not
usually be achieved in only a few numbers of moves/attempts. Adding a defender
to this picture leads to an unceasing game unless the attacker decides not to play
anymore (i.e., dropping out of the game, whether the attack objective is satisfied or
the chances of making a progressive move become overwhelmingly small). We model
the interactions of players in such scenarios as a stochastic game.
To develop a mathematical model, we make reasonable simplified assumptions
from both attack and defense perspectives. This is due to the significant level of
freedom in attack design and technology and the complexity and diversity of defense
mechanisms and systems. For instance, when it comes to evaluating a defense sys-
tem’s efficiency (especially an IDPS), the accuracy, performance, completeness, fault
tolerance, and timeliness properties should be taken into considerations as the top
five criteria [22]. However, for this study, we believe considering all the playing fac-
tors in modeling such systems makes the model excessively complicated (and possibly
inaccurate). For this reason, we mainly focus on security-related concerns and speci-
fications, i.e., the accuracy and completeness (dealing with false alarms and detection
rates) of the system. This means that we only care about the ability of the system
55
in detecting malicious behaviors and parties in the environment, and its capabilities
in foiling such incidents, regardless of the system architecture, the used methods and
their impact on the system performance. Therefore, assuming that the non-security
related traits are ideal (e.g., no latency, high performance, unlimited bandwidth, and
fault tolerance), we are dealing with a defense system which is neither entirely ac-
curate nor complete, as every information technology system suffers from security
shortcomings and deficiencies.
In this regard, we consider a general system state (i, l) where i, and l represent
the attacker’s and defender’s view in the game respectively. Notice that the defined
state of the system at any instance of time projects the players’ progress in the game
based on merely the security-related parameters. The players start the game at the
state (i = 0, l = 0) in which it represents the inauguration of the attack and the
zero-knowledge of the defender regarding the attack technology at time zero. From
the adversary’s perspective, its view of the system state i will change only if it makes
a progressive move in the game. On the other hand, by noticing that any adversarial
move (whether fruitful or fruitless) can potentially be observed and captured by the
defender (for instance via the defense system’s agents and sensors implemented in
the environment), we model the defender as an incremental online learning process,
meaning that the defender’s view l gets updated as a consequence of discovering an
adversarial move (i.e., an attack sample).3 This increasing knowledge of the attack
technology enables the defender to correctly detect and halt a new incoming malicious
action with some probability f ( · ) (true positive). It is also possible that the system
fails in detecting an adversarial move (or it falsely labels it as benign) with probability
3Another motivation for this work is the introduction and widespread embrace of Automated
machine learning (AutoML) which provides the opportunity for automatic (and possibly distributed)
attack learning, detection, and prevention [30,55,81,83].
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1− f ( · ) (false negative). We later briefly discuss the impact of false positives in the
defender’s description part.
[Attacker] The attacker’s objective is to reach a winning state of the form (k, ∗)
within a limited time budget Tbud. We emphasize that k or in other words the attack
objective differs from scenario to scenario. It can represent the attacker’s goal in each
stage of an APT (e.g., reconnaissance) or the final objective of the adversary in the
attack as a whole. For instance, a malware propagator or a bot herder desires to
push k (in this case, the total number of infected nodes) as high as possible.4 On the
contrary, in an advanced persistent threat, the attacker may prefer to stop playing
after reaching a much smaller k to minimize the attack detection probability since
once the target machine has been identified, the attacker should use as few infections
as possible to decrease the chance of exposing the operation. An adversary trying
to access distributed information on a set of nodes within the network terminates
the attack as soon as its mission is accomplished. In a similar fashion, to construct a
hitlist, the attacker will conclude its reconnaissance after a compiled list of vulnerable
nodes is constructed.
To reach the winning state, at any time step, the attacker issues a move associated
with a success probability p (purely depends on attack strategy and not the defender’s
maneuvering) that can potentially lead to incremental progress in the game, that is
getting one step closer to the final attack objective (i = i + 1). This enables us to
represent the adversarial move in a single transition in the Markov model which will
be explained in Section 3.3.2. For generality, we consider a state-dependent success
probability, i.e., pi, since, intuitively, there could be cases in which the chances of
4Or at least 5% of the total number of vulnerable hosts, as [67] shows via simulation that in order
to have hopes that no more than 50% of the total vulnerable hosts ever become infected, patching
process must begin before 5% of such population become ever infected.
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making a progressive move depends on the current state of the attacker in the game.
For instance, consider an attacker who is trying to locate vulnerable nodes within an
address space of size N , while i out of K vulnerable hosts are already found, this
means that the probability of hitting a new vulnerable node is pi = (K − i)/(N − i).
Also, we assume that the adversary is aware of its current state in the game i in (i, l)
for some l ≥ 0 but it does not know the defender’s knowledge of the attack5 expressed
as l. This assumption basically enables the adversary to decide when to terminate
the attack and stop playing the game.
Moreover, we assume that at each time step, the interaction of the attacker (or
an attacker agent) with the system which is encapsulated as an adversarial move, can
potentially leak some information to the defender (if observed) regarding the attack
technology and methodology. This is because regardless of the mastery and skillful-
ness of an attacker, its taken actions during any phase of the attack, inevitably lead
to abnormal and suspicious incidents and events on both host and network levels.
Hence, almost all security tools and technologies rely on the existence of such attack
signal indicators for detection and prevention purposes. For instance, unusual port
usage [32], irregular system call sequences [38], and the occurrence of pointer value
corruption on a host’s process memory [44] are amongst a few events that can happen
as a result of adversarial moves on host levels. On the network levels, such conducts
include but are not limited to an increase in the network latency, high bandwidth
usage, suspicious traffic on exotic ports, irregular scan activity, simultaneous iden-
5An adaptive adversary, however, can infer information regarding the defender’s state in the
game. For instance, if the attacker observes that it cannot make progressive moves in the game and
its actions/moves are being halted in the environment, it can deduce that the defender has already
gained enough knowledge of the attack technology. Hence, an adaptive adversary may decide to stop
playing as soon as it observes no progress in the game, minimizing the cost of playing or investing
in new and enhanced attack methodologies to have a fresh start in the game.
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tical Domain Name System (DNS) requests, and Internet Relay Chat (IRC) traffic
generated by specific ports.
However, a skillful attacker leveraging different anti-malware and IDPS evasion
techniques6 is capable of minimizing the detection possibilities and therefore reduc-
ing the chances of leaking attack information at each adversarial move by sneaking
through the defensive system. This skillfulness can provide the adversary more time
to play the game7 as each attack sample has a lower probability of being discovered
and in extreme cases, it can ideally be different for each adversarial move making the
defender’s job surely difficult. For instance, an attacker taking advantage of a poly-
morphic or metamorphic malware (in contrast with a monomorphic one) will disclose
minimum information by encrypting the content and obfuscating the instruction se-
quences for each connection respectively leading to more propagation time available
to the attacker. Therefore, dealing with a skillful adversary, if the defense system
captures an attack sample, this property intuitively leads to maximizing the time
and effort to push out a solution to stop the attack and generate an attack signa-
ture. More importantly, it means that only a few samples are not enough for attack
signature generation.
[Defender] The defender’s objective is to learn more and more regarding the at-
tack technology and methodologies to be able to cease a next incoming adversarial
move. In this regard, it monitors the environment for attack detection and preven-
tion purposes via common security tools and technologies. Intrusion detection and
prevention systems are amongst the most common type of defense technologies used
6Obfuscation methods, fragmentation and session splicing, application/protocol violations, and
DDoS attacks [51] are among the most common techniques used by the adversaries to decrease the
attack detection probability or to increase the chances of attack prosperity.
7By minimizing the information leaked to the defender for the suspicious traffic flow detection,
signature generation, malware analysis, and reverse engineering processes.
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Figure 3.1: Defense system architecture; There exist both host-level defensive agents
and network-level traffic analysis and flow classification tools. The defender uses the
gained knowledge of the attack in bringing future adversarial actions to a standstill.
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for monitoring, incident identification, attack detection, and prevention on both host
and network levels.8 Virtual and physical sensors are a common component of such
systems used for data collection and analysis. Also, the defender can take advantage
of electronic decoys known as honeypots for the attack information assembly.
We give the defender the opportunity to learn from observed adversarial moves
and actions. The idea is that in the early phases of the game, the defender’s knowledge
of the attack is limited (almost non-existent). As the game proceeds, the defender’s
detection rates will be enhanced by witnessing enough number of attack samples.
In order to study the learning rate of the defender or the time that the system is
finally trained and is able to detect the adversary’s actions with probability almost
1, we consider a probabilistic function 0 ≤ f ( · ) ≤ 1 as the detection rate, which is a
function of the total number of times an adversary agent’s activity is captured or in
other words, an attack sample is given to the defender. The function f indicates the
probability that given l samples so far, the system halts a new incoming adversarial
move. The idea is the more samples are given to the defender, the more accurate
would be its attack signatures which immediately reflects in the detection rate which
is used by the system to filter future adversarial moves.
In this regard, we assume that all incoming traffic passes through an inline NIDS
implementation9 which gives the defender the ability to be able to block an adversarial
move with some probability f(l) in which l represents the current realization of the
attack by the defender (i.e., based on so far observed and collected adversarial moves
and attack information). Moreover, we assume that a copy of all incoming traffic is
8The first one is known as Host-based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS), and the latter is known
as Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS).
9Meaning that network traffic directly passes through the IDPS sensors, and the system is capable
of session snipping, dropping/rejecting suspicious network activities and altering and sanitizing the
malicious content within a packet.
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given to the defender’s traffic analysis and classification engine via a network tap or a
spanning port which provides the opportunity of detecting suspicious flows with some
probability. For simplicity and generality, however, we model this offline analysis as
a probabilistic sampling process [80] in which each incoming adversarial move can
be correctly sampled/labeled as suspicious with probability γ (therefore l = l + 1),
and with 1 − γ, the defender misses the adversarial move or it falsely labels it as
benign on this level.10 If the defender fails in bringing an adversarial move to a halt
with probability 1 − f(l), and therefore the attacker proceeds within the system,
the defender still has the opportunity to learn (i.e., l = l + 1) regarding the attack
technology with probability h via the defense agents (e.g., HPs, HIDS) implemented
in the environment. Hence, if the adversary deals with an electronic decoy, or as a
consequence of attack activities, on an endpoint device equipped with a HIDS, the
defender can learn regarding the attack that is l = l + 1 (see Figure 3.1).
We recognize that false positives can happen on two levels: first, when it comes
to learning from adversarial actions and second, while using the gained information
for blocking future adversarial moves. However, we consider the ideal situation where
there are no false positives in the learning, or at least the false positive rate is low
enough so that it does not disturb the defender’s learning process (i.e., we assume
the learning is always positive). Therefore, in the current modeling, false positives do
not change the security state of the system (neither the attacker’s nor the defender’s
view). Providing bounds on the total number of false positives that the defender can
tolerate in its learning process is the next essential step in extending this presented
framework, and we leave this problem for future studies.
10Note that γ (which represents the offline network-level analysis) reflects the classifier’s accuracy
in which it is the probability that an incoming packet will be marked as suspicious traffic conditioned
on the fact that it is indeed malicious.
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In summary, a progressive move by the defender (l = l + 1) leads to an increase
in its future detection rates f . This function gets updated in two different manners:
(1) if the attack traffic is correctly labeled as suspicious on the network levels with
probability γ due to the defender’s (offline) traffic analysis and classification; or (2)
if the attack activity leaks information on host levels with probability h (whether
via a honeypot or a host-based intrusion detection system installed on a fraction of
defender systems).11 This incremental learning of the attack enables the defender to
be able to bring a new incoming adversarial move to a halt with probability f(l+ 1).
Notice that the adversary’s chance of making a progressive move in the future time
steps decreases as the f function’s value increases over time.
3.3.2 Markov Model of the Game
The above description of the adversary-defender interactions can immediately be
translated into a Markov model. In summary, at each time step, the state of the sys-
tem can be identified with a tuple (i, l) in which i represents the adversary’s progress
in the game, and l delineates the defender’s knowledge of the attack methodologies
and technology. The adversary (or one of its agents) makes a move associated with
a success probability pi. Note that pi is indeed the attack success probability while
there exists no opponent player in the environment (i.e., the defender). In the mean-
time, the defender can block an incoming adversarial move with probability f(l), it
11Notice that, in case of a honeypot, any adversarial move will lead to an increase in the defender’s
knowledge of the attack l since all incoming communications with an HP is suspicious, while for a
HIDS, not all the adversarial moves might be observed by the defense system. For simplicity, we use
a single parameter h as the probability of gaining information on host levels (mainly HPs). However,
one can easily separate the learning from HPs and the HIDS agents by considering another parameter
for HIDS agents h′ or in general, a cumulative function fh′ for the host-level attack information and
signatures (observed and gained from HIDS agents).
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Figure 3.2: Possible transitions at each state (i, l) in the Markov model of the game
can also learn regarding the attack technology if the attack is observed on network
or host levels with probability γ, and h, respectively.
Let F denote the occurrence of the event that an adversarial move comes to a
halt by the defense system (with probability f(l)), and S denote the occurrence of
a network-level event that it gets sampled (or labeled as suspicious) by the defense
system (with probability γ). Notice that these two events are independent, as we
are assuming that the straining and filtering happens online for each detected inci-
dent whereas sampling deals with a copy of the actual traffic for attack analysis and
classification. Therefore the following outcomes are possible at each timestep:
• (F ∧ sS): The adversary’s move comes to a standstill by the defender (based on
the current knowledge of the attack technology) but not sampled which happens
with probability f(l)(1− γ), as a result, the Markov chain stays at state (i, l).
• ( sF ∧ sS): The adversary’s move gets neither filtered nor sampled, there exist
three possible scenarios for this case:
− If the adversary is dealing with an electronic decoy (e.g., a honeypot), the
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defender has the opportunity to learn from this interaction meaning that
the Markov model transits from state (i, l) to (i, l + 1) with probability
(1− f(l))(1− γ)h.
− If the attacker makes a progressive move with probability pi then the
Markov chain transits to state (i+1, l) with probability (1−f(l))(1−γ)pi.
Note that this is a “perfect move” for the adversary as in which the attacker
gets one step closer to the attack objective while the defensive system was
not able to detect and locate the adversary’s activities or it falsely labeled
the activity as benign (false negative) meaning that no information and
knowledge regarding the attack technology is leaked to the defender,
− and if the attacker is not dealing with a defensive agent and also not making
a progressive move with probability (1 − pi − h), the Markov chain stays
at the current state with probability (1− f(l))(1− γ)(1− pi − h).
• (F ∧S): If the attacker’s move gets both filtered and sampled, the chain transits
to the state (i, l + 1) with probability γf(l).
• ( sF ∧ S): If the attacker’s action does not get filtered but it gets sampled,
− for a successful move with probability pi, the Markov chain transits to the
state (i+ 1, l + 1) with probability (1− f(l))γpi,
− and for an unsuccessful move with probability (1− pi), the Markov chain
transits to the state (i, l + 1) with probability (1− f(l))γ(1− pi).
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In summary, the transition probabilities can be expressed by:
m1(i, l) = Prob((i, l)→ (i, l)) = f(l)(1− γ) +
(1− f(l))(1− γ)(1− pi − h), (3.1)
m2(i, l) = Prob((i, l)→ (i+ 1, l)) =
(1− f(l))(1− γ)pi, (3.2)
m3(i, l) = Prob((i, l)→ (i+ 1, l + 1)) =
(1− f(l))γpi, (3.3)
m4(i, l) = Prob((i, l)→ (i, l + 1)) =
(1− f(l))(1− γ)h+ f(l)γ +
(1− f(l))γ(1− pi). (3.4)
Figure 3.2 depicts the possible transitions at each state of the Markov model. The
initial state of the game is (0, 0) which represents the attack initialization, and the
defender’s nonexistent knowledge/realization of the attack at the beginning (e.g., a
zero-day vulnerability/exploit). As the game evolves, reaching to an state k is in favor
of the adversary which can happen via horizontalm2 or diagonalm3 transitions. In the
meantime, the defender’s knowledge of the attack technology and signatures improves
through transitions via m3 and m4 in which the number of attack samples provided
to the defender, i.e., l increases and the function f ( · ) gets updated consequently.
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3.4 Security Analysis
In this section, we provide the analysis of the presented Markov model governing the
players’ interactions defined in the previous section. We first discuss what it means
to contain the attacker in the game by intuitively defining the desired asymptotic for
the game. We then present the general formula for the attacker’s winning probability
w(k, Tbud), that is reaching a specific state in the game as the attack objective within a
limited number of moves/transitions. We then show that a defender with a stagnating
learning rate (i.e., 1− f(l) remains larger than some constant τ > 0) cannot contain
the adversary, i.e., w(k, Tbud) does not follow the desired asymptotic. For a learning
rate f(l) ≥ 1 − O(1/l2) which approaches 1 fast enough, we are able to prove the
desired asymptotic. We also develop tight lower and upper bounds on w(k, Tbud) and
present an efficient algorithm which is able to compute these bounds with O(k · Tbud)
complexity. The impacts of the defender’s delayed learning on the adversary’s progress
in the game, translating logical time steps to physical ones, and formal definition of
a capacity region are presented in this section as well. We conclude this section by
parametric analysis of the learning rate and its impact on the attacker’s winning
probability. For the proofs of theorems refer to the Section A.2.
3.4.1 Adversarial Containment
The goal of the adversary is to reach a winning state (k, l) for some l ≥ 0 within a
limited time budget Tbud in which k represents the attack objective which is defined
based on various attack scenarios,12 and time budget Tbud expresses the number of
12For instance, k could be the total number of nodes the adversary wishes to compromise before
using the collective of these nodes in the next attack phases (e.g., botnet applications).
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transitions in the Markov model, i.e., the total number of adversarial moves.
The objective of the defender is to learn more and more regarding the attack
technologies (e.g., malicious attack payloads), in order to be able to recognize and
halt future moves by the attacker. That is, the defender hopes to push level l –
the number of so far discovered adversarial moves– higher and higher, leading to a
probability f(l) of successfully blocking a next adversarial action. The ultimate goal
of the defender is to have a good enough learning mechanism in place such that the
probability of reaching k is negligible in k (i.e., exponentially small in k) and only
polynomial in Tbud. In other words, the adversary cannot reach a winning state in
practice.
We define w(k, Tbud) as the probability of the adversary reaching to a state (k, l)
for some l ≥ 0 within time budget Tbud. In the next subsections we analyze this
probability. We assume a parameter p = pi for all i, i.e., we simply give the adversary
the advantage of using p = supi pi instead of the smaller individual pi values. We
want to find a tight upper bound and determine for which model parameters γ, h, p,
and learning rate f(l) the upper bound proves the desired asymptotic
w(k, Tbud) = negl(k)poly(Tbud). (3.5)
We notice that in this case, even though the adversary cannot reach a large k because
w(k, Tbud) is negligible in k, the adversary may reach a (much) smaller k. We are
interested in the order of magnitude of this value as a sub-objective the adversary is
able to reach. For this reason, we define kc as the solution of
w(kc, Tbud) = 1/2.
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For instance, kc could reflect the order of magnitude of the number of compromised
nodes to which the adversary is contained. By using w(k, Tbud) = negl(k)poly(Tbud),
we can show that the ‘containment parameter’ is kc = O(log Tbud).
13
3.4.2 Formula for w(k, Tbud)
The following theorem characterizes a closed-form expression for the probability that
the attacker reaches a desired state k in the game within Tbud number of transi-
tions/moves, i.e., the attacker’s winning probability w(k, Tbud).
Theorem 4 (Closed Form Winning Probability). The adversary’s probability of win-
ning w(k, Tbud) is equal to
Tbud−1∑
L=0
min{L,(k−1)}∑
B=0
m2(L) +m3(L)
1−m1(L) · A ·
(Tbud−1)−[(k−1)+L−B]∑
T=0
B
with A and B substituted by
13This implies that with significant probability the adversary can reach an attack objective at
most O(log Tbud) (e.g., compromising at most O(log Tbud) nodes). Therefore, if the adversary would
not have the advantage of using p = supi pi, then it would (compromise less nodes and) only use
parameters p0, . . . , pO(log Tbud) in the Markov game. If these first few pi values do not differ much,
then a constant p becomes a realistic assumption which does not give the adversary that much
advantage.
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A =
∑
b1,...,bL∈{0,1}s.t.∑L
l=1 bl=B
L−1∏
l=0
(
bl+1
m3(l)
1−m1(l) + (1− bl+1)
m4(l)
1−m1(l)
)
·
∑
g0≥1,...,gL≥1s.t.∑L
l=0(gl−1)=(k−1)−B
L∏
l=0
(
m2(l)
1−m1(l)
)gl−1
, and
B =
∑
t0,...,tLs.t.∑L
l=0 tl=T
L∏
l=0
(
tl + gl − 1
tl
)
m1(l)
tl(1−m1(l))gl .
Note that the above expression simply corresponds to all the possible paths for
which the adversary can reach to a desired state (k, l) for all l ≥ 0 within at most
Tbud transitions. We later show that neglecting the sum over T of B values leads to
tight upper and lower bounds on this probability. The remaining sum over A values
turns out to correspond to a simpler Markov model, which can be used to compute
this sum in O(k · Tbud) time using dynamic programming.
3.4.3 Stagnating Learning Rate
Suppose that the learning rate stagnates in that 1−f(l) ≥ τ for some constant τ > 0.
This means that f(l) ≤ 1− τ and as a result at least a fraction τ goes undetected.
Theorem 5 (Stagnating learning rate). The probability w(k, Tbud) of the attacker
winning a game in which the defender’s learning rate stagnates in that 1 − f(l) ≥ τ
is given by
w(k, Tbud) ≥ 1− k(1− τp)Tbud/k. (3.6)
For a stagnating learning rate, the attacker almost always wins the security game,
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i.e., w(k, Tbud) ≈ 1 even for relatively small time budgets Tbud = c · k for some
multiplicative factor c ≥ 1. This is because 1 − w(k, Tbud) ≤ k(1 − τp)Tbud/k is
exponentially small in Tbud/k = c.
In order to have the desired asymptotics (3.5), the learning rate should not stag-
nate, i.e., we need 1− f(l)→ 0 for l →∞. Theorem 5 answers the question of why
fighting cyberattacks (especially APT-like attacks) remains a challenging quest for
cyber defenders. Even in ideal scenarios (especially where there is no false positive in
the learning process), to ‘win’ the game as the defender, i.e., preventing the attacker
from accomplishing its mission, the true-positive rates must converge (fast enough)
to 1, which is a remaining challenge for any defense system.
3.4.4 Upper and Lower Bounds on w(k, Tbud)
We present upper and lower bounds on the attacker’s winning probability. In the
notation of Theorem 4, we define w¯ as
w¯(k, Tbud) =
Tbud−1∑
L=0
min{L,(k−1)}∑
B=0
m2(L) +m3(L)
1−m1(L) · A. (3.7)
Theorem 6 (Upper and Lower Bounds on w). For v ≥ k, we have
w¯(k, Tbud/v) · (1− (k + Tbud
v
)(1− γ) vk ) ≤ w(k, Tbud) ≤ w¯(k, Tbud). (3.8)
In particular, for v = k ln((Tbud + k)/)/ ln(1/(1 − γ)), we have w(k, Tbud) ≥
w¯(k, Tbud/v) · (1− ).
Upper bound (3.7) proves that if w¯(k, Tbud) has the desired complexity mean-
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ing that w¯(k, Tbud) = negl(k)poly(Tbud), then w(k, Tbud) inherits this desired asymp-
totic. And vice versa, the lower bound in (3.8) for the special choice of v proves
that if w(k, Tbud) has desired asymptotic w(k, Tbud) = negl(k)poly(Tbud), then also
w¯(k, Tbud) ≤ w(k, Tbud · v)/(1 − ) = negl(k)poly(Tbud · v) = negl(k)poly(Tbud).
We conclude that in order to find out which learning rates lead to the desired
asymptotic for the defender, we only need to study which learning rates lead to
w¯(k, Tbud) = negl(k)poly(Tbud).
The advantage of studying w¯(k, Tbud) is having eliminated expression B in The-
orem 4 which represents the effect of self-loops (and turns out to be very inefficient
to evaluate as an exact expression). Notice that there is no learning from the de-
fender’s perspective for the self-loops (m1 transitions) in the Markov model. Hence,
intuitively, as far as the attacker’s move is not observed by the defender and no learn-
ing happens, for a fruitless move, we can ignore the adversarial move and act like
it never happened, which makes sense from the practical perspective as well. Prob-
ability w¯(k, Tbud) corresponds to a Markov model without any self-loops and with
horizontal transition probabilities m2(l)/(1 − m1(l)) = (1 − γ)α(l), diagonal tran-
sition probabilities m3(l)/(1 − m1(l)) = γα(l), and vertical transition probabilities
m4(l)/(1−m1(l)) = 1− α(l), where
α(l) =
p(1− f(l))
γ + (1− γ)(p+ h)(1− f(l)) . (3.9)
Algorithm 2 depicts how w¯(k, Tbud) can be computed in O(k · Tbud) time using
dynamic programming – and this is what we use in section 3.4.10 to evaluate w¯(k, Tbud)
for different learning rates.
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Algorithm 2 w¯ Computation
1: function w¯(k, Tbud)
2: pr ← zeros(k − 1, Tbud − 1)
3: pr[0, 0]← 1
4: for i← 0, Tbud − 1 do
5: if i! = 0 then
6: pr[0, i]← (1− α(i− 1))pr[0, i− 1]
7: end if
8: for j ← 1, k − 1 do
9: if i == 0 then
10: pr[j, i]← [(1− γ)α(0)]j
11: else
12: pr[j, i] ← (1 − γ)α(i)pr[j − 1, i] + γα(i − 1)pr[j − 1, i − 1] + (1 −
α(i− 1))pr[j, i− 1]
13: end if
14: end for
15: end for
16: w¯ ← 0
17: for i← 0, Tbud − 1 do
18: w¯ ← w¯ + α(i)pr[k − 1, i]
19: end for
20: return w¯
21: end function
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3.4.5 Analyzing Learning Rate f(l) = 1− d(l+2)2
We further upper bound w¯(k, Tbud) in the next theorem which shows that small enough
learning rates f(l) ≥ 1 − d/(l + 2)2 will attain our desired asymptotic (as explained
as a consequence after the theorem). In Section 3.4.6 we will discuss what happens if
there is an initial period during which the adversary already starts making progress in
the game (e.g., compromising nodes) without the defender being aware or not having
learned anything. For example, f(l) = 0 for l ≤ L∗ and f(l) ≥ 1− d
(l−L∗)2 for l > L
∗.
Here, L∗ represents this initial period; only after a sufficient level L∗ is reached, i.e.,
a sufficient number of attack samples (e.g., malware payloads) have been collected,
the learning rate increases.
Theorem 7 (Upper Bound on w¯). Assume that there exists a d ≥ 0 such that
1 − f(l) ≤ d for all l ≥ 0, or equivalently, β(l) =
√
1−f(l)
d
≤ 1 for all l ≥ 0. Let
θ ≥ (1− γ)/γ. Then,
w¯(k, Tbud) ≤ (1 + θ−1)
Tbud−1∑
L=0
[θpd]k
L∏
l=0
(
1 + (1 + θ−1)
β(l)
1− β(l)
)
.
Let c =
∫ Tbud−1
l=0
β(l)
1−β(l)dl +
β(0)
1−β(0) . Then, minimizing the above upper bound with
respect to θ proves
c ≤ 1− γ
γ
k ⇒ w¯(k, Tbud) ≤ (1− γ)−1Tbude(1−γ)−1c[1− γ
γ
pd]k.
Applying this statement for 1− f(l) ≤ d
(l+2)2
gives if Tbud ≤ e−1+k(1−γ)/γ, then
w¯(k, Tbud) ≤ e
1/(1−γ)
1− γ · T
1+1/(1−γ)
bud ·
[
1− γ
γ
pd
]k
.
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For f(l) ≥ 1 − d
(l+2)2
with d < γ
p(1−γ) , the theorem shows that if Tbud < exp(k),
then w(k, Tbud) ≤ w¯(k, Tbud) = poly(Tbud)negl(k) satisfying the desired asymptotic.
For analyzing other learning rates, the more general upper bound of the theorem can
be used.
3.4.6 Delayed Learning
In practice, learning may only start after observing a sufficient number of attack
samples. That is, f(l) = 0 for l < L∗ for some L∗ after which f(l) starts to converge
to 1. What would be the attacker state in the game during this initial phase, where
no learning takes place (for instance, how many nodes will be compromised)?
Theorem 8 (Delayed Learning). Suppose f(l) = 0 for l < L∗. Define u(k∗, L∗) as
the probability that L∗ is reached by a state (i, L∗) with i ≤ k∗, where we give the
adversary the advantage of an unlimited time budget. Then, for k∗ ≥ L∗ + 1,
u(k∗, L∗) ≥ 1− L∗[ (1− γ)p
1− (1− γ)(1− (p+ h)) ]
k∗−1
L∗ .
Let w′(k, Tbud) correspond to learning rate f(l + L∗) as a function of l (e.g., 1 −
f(l + L∗) ≤ d
(l+2)2
). Then, for k∗ ≥ L∗ + 1,
w(k, Tbud) ≤ (1− u(k∗, L∗)) + w′(k − k∗, Tbud), (3.10)
where 1 − u(k∗, L∗) is the probability that > k∗ is achieved during the initial phase
and where w′(k−k∗, Tbud) is the probability that another k−k∗ progressive adversarial
moves happen after the initial phase with time budget Tbud.
The lower bound on u(k∗, L∗) can be further simplified by using p ≤ 1− h which
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implies
u(k∗, L∗) ≥ 1− L∗[(1− γ)(1− h)] k
∗−1
L∗ .
Since 1 − u(k∗, L∗) is exponentially small in k∗/L∗, this shows that very likely
k∗ = O(L∗). This makes common sense because initially, every adversarial move has
a significant probability of success since the defender’s knowledge of the attack is
very limited in the beginning (the attack is still unknown to the defender, in other
words, no valid attack signature is formed yet). If we achieve desired asymptotic (3.5)
for w′(k, Tbud), then the resulting containment parameter for w(k, Tbud) (see Section
3.4.1) is kc = O(L
∗ + log Tbud). It is very important for the defender to keep L∗
small. A larger L∗ leads to a longer initial phase during which the adversary keeps
on making progressive moves of the order of O(L∗).
3.4.7 Time Budget Translation
We discuss the effect of translating the time budget Tbud, measured in Markov model
transitions, to a time budget which is measured in real time (seconds) as this makes
sense in some practical scenarios (e.g., malware propagation). For the sake of argu-
ment, let us assume that each state in the Markov model represents the number of
nodes (e.g., infected machines or bots) in control of the attacker. If the adversary
wins as soon as k nodes are compromised and if each Markov model transition takes
∆ seconds, then at most k moves can be made by each of the compromised nodes in
parallel in ∆ seconds. With a time budget of T seconds, this implies Tbud ≤ Tk/∆.
This means that the desired asymptotic (3.5) translates into
w(k, Tbud) ≤ poly(Tk/∆)negl(k).
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This is poly(T )negl(k) and again implies that in practice the adversary cannot reach
k since the probability of reaching k is negligible in k and only polynomial in the
physical time budget T .
In some scenarios, each adversarial move costs a certain amount, say C USD,
for example due to having to rent a virtual machine in order to remotely launch or
execute an attack move. In such cases, the time budget Tbud, measured in Markov
model transitions, directly translates into C · Tbud, the amount of USD the adversary
is restricted to. Such conversion allows one to reason about economically constrained
adversaries.
3.4.8 Capacity Region
In this subsection, we show that as a result of our analysis we are able to prove
statements like the one in the following definition which defines a ‘capacity region’
of combinations of parameters defining the adversarial time budget, the probabil-
ity of winning, and k which characterizes what it means to be in a winning state.
The definition describes what was previously called ‘desired asymptotics’ since a
non-empty capacity region shows that an exponentially small probability of winning
O(2−s) is achieved if k = O(s + log Tbud) implying that the probability of winning is
poly(Tbud)negl(k).
Definition 6. Suppose there exist vectors δ, µ, ξ, and the all-one vector 1, such
that, for all k ≥ 0 (characterizing a winning state for the adversary) and for all s ≥ 0
and t ≥ 0 satisfying
sδ + tµ ≤ k1 + ξ,
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we have the following security guarantee: If the attacker has a time budget ≤ 2t, then
its probability of reaching a winning state is at most ≤ 2−s.
We say that (δ,µ, ξ) describes a capacity region for {(s, t) : s, t ≥ 0}. This
definition implies that for a fixed k and time budget 2t, the probability of winning is
at most ≤ 2−s(k,t), where
s(k, t) = max{s ≥ 0 : sδ + tµ ≤ k1 + ξ}. (3.11)
Similarly, for a time budget 2t, the probability of winning is ≤ 2−s if a winning state
is characterized by some k ≥ k(s, t), where
k(s, t) = min{k ≥ 0 : sδ + tµ ≤ k1 + ξ}. (3.12)
This definition generalizes the notion of security capacity we studied in the pre-
vious chapter for the MTD games [47], where only a single equation of the form
s + t ≤ δ · k needs to be satisfied and where δ is defined as the “security capac-
ity.” The definition of capacity region may be of interest for other more general
defender-adversarial games where a Markov model is used to characterize defender
and adversarial moves.14
The definition of capacity region is of interest for a couple of reasons. First,
it clearly describes the limitation of the adversary: The capacity region explicitly
characterizes the probability of winning as a function of t and k, see (3.11). In
practice, the attacker’s time budget is ≤ 2t, limited to some “small” t, e.g., t = 80 or
128, and using such a fixed t makes the probability of winning only a function of k.
14A more general definition which captures winning states characterized by parameter vectors k,
rather than a single k, can also be formulated.
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Second, the capacity region can also be used to compute the containment param-
eter kc, defined as the solution k(s, t) in (3.12) where s is set to 1 which corresponds
to a probability of winning equal to 1/2. This allows us to understand how
kc = k(1, t) = O(t) = O(lnTbud)
depends on the parameters that describe the overall Markov model.
Third, the definition allows us to trivially compose capacity regions of Markov
models corresponding to different learning rates. For instance, in practice, an attacker
may use several exploits or attack vectors and use each attack vector to advance its
footprint and increase the number of compromised nodes. For each attack vector i, the
defender develops a learning rate fi(l). In essence, the defender plays individual games
with each attack vector, and the adversary wins the overall game if the individual
games lead to ki compromised nodes such that k =
∑
i ki. The following theorem
makes this argument precise.
Theorem 9. Let fi(l), 1 ≤ i ≤ a, be learning rates corresponding to Markov models
describing different defender-adversary games that are played simultaneously. Let
ki(s, t) for the i-th game be defined as in (3.12). Let Tbud ≤ 2t be the overall time
budget of the adversary. Then the probability of reaching a state with ki(s + ln a, t)
compromised nodes in the i-th game is at most ≤ 2−(s+ln a) = 2−s/a. Since the
transition probabilities in each of the Markov models are independent from the number
of compromised nodes, the probability of reaching k =
∑a
i=1 ki(s+ ln a, t) is at most
≤ 1−
a∏
i=1
(1− 2−s/a) ≤ 2−s.
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Notice that for ‘a’ simultaneous adversarial games, an exponentially small prob-
ability of winning O(2−s) is achieved for k = O(s + ln a + lnTbud). In this parallel
game, if the time budget is measured in real time T , then (as before) Tbud ≤ Tk/∆ for
k =
∑a
i=1 ki(s+ln a, t) and we require T ≤ ∆k 2t. As a final note, k =
∑a
i=1 ki(s+ln a, t)
is dominated by maxai=1 ki(s + ln a, t) ≥ k/a. In other words, the attacker keeps on
searching for an attack vector which can be used to achieve a large fraction15 of the
desired k, and the defender tries to learn how to recognize attack vectors as fast as
possible in order to contain these sufficiently.
3.4.9 Capacity Region Examples
As an example of a capacity region, we translate Theorem 7 for 1 − f(l) ≤ d
(l+2)2
in
terms of a capacity region:
Corollary 3. For the learning rate 1 − f(l) ≤ d
(l+2)2
, we have a capacity region
(δ,µ, ξ) defined by 2-dimensional vectors
δ = (0, q ln 2), where q =
[
ln(
γ
pd(1− γ))
]−1
,
µ = (
γ ln 2
1− γ , q(ln 2)(1 +
1
1− γ )),
ξ = (− γ
1− γ , q(−
1
1− γ + ln
1
1− γ ).
As a second example of working with capacity regions, we translate (3.10) in
Theorem 8 for the delayed learning:
15Due to the defender either starting learning after a too long initial period or, once learning
starts, not learning fast enough (in order to attain the desired asymptotic).
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Corollary 4. Suppose f(l) = 0 for l < L∗ and let (δ′,µ′, ξ′) be the capacity region
corresponding to learning rate f(l + L∗) as a function of l. Suppose that
z =
[
ln(
1− (1− γ)(1− (p+ h))
(1− γ)p )
]−1
≥ 0.
Then, first, for all s ≥ max{0, 1/z ln 2− ln(2L∗)ln 2} and t ≥ 0 satisfying
s[δ′ + L∗(ln 2)z1] + tµ′ ≤ k1 + [ξ′ − δ′ + (L∗(ln 2L∗)z − 1)1]
and, second, for all16 0 ≤ s ≤ 1/z ln 2− ln(2L∗)ln 2 and t ≥ 0 satisfying
sδ′ + tµ′ ≤ k1 + [ξ′ − δ′ − (L∗ + 1)1],
we have the following security guarantee: If the attacker has a time budget ≤ 2t, then
its probability of reaching a winning state is at most ≤ 2−s.
The corollary confirms that the containment parameter for delayed learning (for
both cases) is kc = O(L
∗ + log Tbud).
3.4.10 Parametric Analysis of the Learning Rate
In this subsection, we use Algorithm 2 to evaluate w¯(k, Tbud) (as an upper bound on
the attacker’s probability of winning i.e., making significant progress in the game)
based on different learning rates corresponding to α(l) of the form (l + 1)−a, while
Tbud = 10, 000 logical timesteps is given to the adversary to play the game.
16Notice that 1/z ln 2 − ln(2L∗)ln 2 ≥ 0 if and only if L∗ ≤ 12e1/z = 1−(1−γ)(1−(p+h))2(1−γ)p , which is
large for small (1− γ)p.
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Figure 3.3 depicts how w¯(k, Tbud) decreases as the attack objective k increases
for several values of γ, meaning that the chances of making progress in the game
become overwhelmingly small for the attacker. The larger the γ, the more samples are
provided to the defender’s learning engine as γ is the expected rate that the defender
observes adversarial moves on the network levels. As it can be seen from this plot,
a proper defense mechanism (with sufficiently fast converging learning rates (e.g.,
a > 1) and large enough γ values) substantially decreases the adversary’s chances of
making progress in the game.
Figure 3.4 depicts how the containment parameter kc (computed using w¯(k, Tbud))
depends on α(l) = (l + 1)−a. For a ≥ 0.9, kc ≤ 20 is very small making it impossible
for the adversary to reach high-value attack objectives (e.g., total number of infected
nodes in a malware propagation game).
The impact of delayed learning on the adversarial containment parameter kc is
shown in Figure 3.5 for two different cases. In the first scenario, the learning starts
immediately (with no delay, i.e., L∗ = 0), and in the second case, the learning com-
mences after missing the first 100 attack samples (or not learning from the first 100
samples, i.e., L∗ = 100). The defender must not wait for too long to start the learning
in order to keep kc as small as possible.
3.5 Case Studies
In this section, we walk through two examples of cyber attack-defense games as case
studies to show how such games can be translated into our presented framework.
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Figure 3.3: Upper bound on the attacker’s probability of reaching state k for
α(l) = (l + 1)−a
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Figure 3.5: The impact of delayed learning on kc
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3.5.1 A Malware Propagation and Botnet Construction Game
Consider a statically addressed network of size |N | in which a fraction of the hosts
K suffer from a zero-day vulnerability only known to an adversary. The attacker’s
objective is to locate such hosts in the network, based on a target discovery strategy σ
(e.g., a random scan scheme, or a hitlist) associated with a probability pi, and infect
them during the Window of Vulnerability (WoV) time as the number of vulnerable
systems is not yet shrunken to insignificance and the attacker’s exploit is useful in
this period. The game starts with one infected machine as the “Patient Zero.” The
attacker desires to take control of at least k out of |K| vulnerable hosts, meaning that
the winning state for the adversary is defined as (i, l) = (k, ∗). In the meantime, the
defender’s objective is to generate an attack signature to be able to filter next adver-
sarial attack traffic (see Figure 3.1). The defender’s knowledge of the attack can be
increased in two manners: (1) if an adversary agent hits a honeypot with probability
h (assuming that there exist in total |H| honeypots in the environment, therefore,
h = |H|/|N | for a memoryless blind scan strategy), or (2) if the attack traffic is cor-
rectly labeled as suspicious on the network (classifier) level with probability γ.17 In
either of these cases, the defender’s detection rate f(l) in which l is the number of so
far collected attack samples will be enhanced. This function represents the probability
that given l samples so far, the system blocks a new incoming malicious packet and
filters it on the fly. We also consider a skillful attacker (for instance taking advantage
of a polymorphic worm) as defined in previous sections, and therefore, having only a
few attack samples is not enough for the purpose of signature generation.
The system state (i, l) represents the total number of infected machines and the
17This is a common architecture in automatic signature generation schemes (e.g., see [37,42,55,82]).
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Algorithm 3 Malware Propagation Game Simulator
1: function Simulator(N ,K,H, k, σ, χ, γ, f(.), ϑ)
2: I = ∅; l = 0;
3: droppingOut = False; winningState = False;
4: while not droppingOut and not winningState do
5: targetHost ←− probe(N , pi(σ));
6: filtered,sampled
f(l),γ←−−−transmit(χ,targetHost);
7: if (not filtered and targetHost ∈ H) or sampled then
8: l += 1; update f(l);
9: if f(l) ≥ 1− ϑ then
10: droppingOut = True;
11: Output “Adversary dropped out! Defender won!”;
12: end if
13: end if
14: if targetHost ∈ K and not filtered then
15: I = I ∪ targetHost; K = K \ targetHost;
16: if |I| ≥ k then
17: winningState = True;
18: Output “Adversary won!”;
19: end if
20: end if
21: end while
22: end function
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total number of so far captured attack traffic (i.e., malware samples) by the defense
system. The attacker’s view of the system state will change if an agent’s effort in
infecting a new node is successful (or if it possibly loses its control over an agent). The
defender’s view gets updated as a consequence of discovering an adversarial move (i.e.,
an attack/malware sample). Algorithm 3 shows the above description of the game
in which the game simulator takes N ,K,H, k, and an adversarial target discovery
strategy σ and an exploit χ, in addition to the learning rate f ( · ), the sampling rate
γ, and an acceptable “threshold” 1−ϑ as the input, and outputs who wins the game.
The termination rule is whether the attacker compromises its desired number of hosts
k (a specific size for its botnet) or if the attacker decides not to play anymore,18 that
is f (.) ≥ 1−ϑ. Note that the transmit method returns a tuple, i.e., if the transmitted
packet by the attacker is filtered by IDPS with probability f (.) or is sampled at the
flow classifier level with probability γ.
Security Analysis of Case Study 3.5.1
In Section 3.4, we investigated the role of convergence rates of f(·) on the attacker’s
chances of winning the game. We know that for a stagnating learning rate, i.e.,
f(l) = 1 − τ , for some constant τ > 0, the adversary will always win the game.
Therefore, f must not stagnate unless the attacker decides to drop out of the game.
To show how effective a learning mechanism could be for containing the adversary’s
progress in the game, we consider an attacker who is using a polymorphic worm to
infect susceptible nodes in the environment and therefore construct a zombie army
18For instance, the attacker concludes that not enough gain can be made in a reasonable time
because of not being able to make progressive moves in the game due to defender’s high detection
rates that keep on improving.
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of a specific size. For the purpose of illustration, we consider the address space to be
|N | = 232 (the entire IPv4 ), the number of hosts vulnerable to the malware attack
as |K| = 350, 000 (i.e., for a memoryless uniform scan strategy p ≈ 8.15× 10−5), and
the number of scans performed by an infected machine to be 10, 188 scans per hour,
and an initially one infected node at time zero.19
Now consider a learning function of the form f(l) = 1− 1/(l/1000 + 1) for the de-
fender. In addition, let us assume γ = 0.05 that is only a small fraction of adversarial
moves (in this case worm traffic) will be observed by the defender on network levels.
Using Algorithm 3, we simulate the malware propagation game for the mentioned pa-
rameters and game settings. Figure 3.6 shows the average number of infected nodes
(based on 100 simulation runs) in the first 24 hours of the epidemic for two cases. In
the first case, we give the attacker the advantage of p = supi pi = |K|/|N |, and for the
second case, we assume a state-dependent adversarial move success probability i.e.,
pi = (|K|− i)/|N |. As it can be seen from this figure, this is a reasonable assumption
as the total number of infected nodes are almost the same for both cases.20 Also,
notice that based on the well-accepted simple deterministic epidemic model [103]
(where there is no learning during the malware propagation), we know that the to-
tal number of infected machines reaches its maximum (i.e., 350,000) in almost 24
hours of the attack initialization, however, as Figure 3.6 depicts this number remains
19Notice that these are the actual infamous CodeRed1v2 worm’s attack settings and parameters
[71]. Although the malware was not a polymorphic one, for illustration, we use these parameters
since the codeRed epidemic is well studied in the literature and the parameters make sense from a
practical perspective. The same analysis can be used for more recent and advanced malware such
as Stuxnet and WannaCry ransomware crypto worm, only if the attack settings and parameters are
known.
20This is because with a proper learning mechanism, the attacker’s state in the game i almost
always remains very small, and therefore pi = (|K| − i)/|N | ≈ |K|/|N | meaning that giving the
attacker the advantage of p = supi pi in our analysis is a reasonable assumption as it does not boost
its progress in the game significantly.
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Figure 3.6: Simulation of malware propagation game using Algorithm 3
overwhelmingly small in k (around 8, which means that the attacker’s progress is
almost contained due to high-value detection rates of the defender). Notice that this
plot shows simulations, and in this sense, it depicts the average case; no information
regarding the worst-case scenarios can be inferred.
For the worst-case analysis, let us assume that the defender is interested in figur-
ing out the highest number of infected nodes during a long time of window (e.g.,
a month) for a designated negligible probability of reaching the attack objective
by the adversary (e.g., 2−128 ≈ 10−38). Figure 3.7 depicts w¯(k, Tbud) (as an up-
per bound of w(k, Tbud)) when considering a fixed learning function of the form
f(l) = 1 − 1/(l/1000 + 1), while p = 8.15 × 10−5, and γ = 0.05 as the classifier’s
accuracy. Table 3.1 shows how a simple extrapolation of k can be done for a time
window of a month (i.e., Tbud ≤ 31× 24× 10, 188 adversarial moves in our example),
and setting w¯ to 10−38. By defining k(t) as the ‘fractinal’ k when 10−38 is reached for
different t of the form Tbud = 2
t, it can be seen that the differences i.e., k(t+ 1)−k(t)
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Figure 3.7: w¯(k, Tbud) for different values of Tbud = 2
t and a learning function of the
form f(l) = 1− 1/(l/1000 + 1), p = 8.15× 10−5, and γ = 0.05 as the classifier’s accuracy
is decreasing for t > 11. We can conclude that by taking the last difference, say κ,
and computing the log2 of the one month time budget t
′, the value of k is computed
to be at most 130 infected nodes using k = (t′ − 14) · κ + k(14). This means that
in practice, with these attack-defense parameters, the probability that the attacker
can construct an army of 130 infected nodes within a one-month time window is at
most 2−128, which depicts how important the learning function is when it comes to
containing the adversary.
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Table 3.1: Extrapolating k for a One-month Time Window and w¯ ≈ 10−38
t (Tbud = 2
t) k(t) k(t+ 1)−k(t)
8 25.61 4.01
9 29.62 4.64
10 34.26 5.03
11 39.29 5.13
12 44.42 5.02
13 49.44 4.78
14 54.22 -
3.5.2 A Moving Target Defense Game
As another example, we consider the “Multiple-Target Hiding” (MTH) game intro-
duced in Chapter 2 with minor modifications to the game. In the studied MTH
game, the adversary is interacting with a probabilistic defender taking advantage of
a moving target defense strategy in which it reallocates/shuffles its resources at each
time step of the game with some probability λ (for instance, consider an IP hopping
strategy). The targets may represent valuable assets or vulnerable machines within
the environment, as in early reconnaissance stages to the exfiltration of the data
phase of an attack. Initially, the attacker has no knowledge of the targets and it has
not yet found any of the targets I = ∅. In order to win the game, the adversary
needs to locate k out of |K| sensitive targets/resources distributed in the environ-
ment while there exist in total |N | “locations.” The defender moves by reallocating
targets causing the attacker to redo its search for the locations. The attacker moves
by selecting one of the N possible locations and examining whether it corresponds
to one of the targets or not. Notice that MTD strategies are usually costly for the
defender as they have an immediate impact on the availability of the resources and
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system performance [19]. Therefore, instead of a randomized defense strategy (i.e., a
probabilistic move at each time step), we consider that the defender issues a move if
the number of observed adversarial actions reaches a threshold L∗ based on which an
attack detection signal is being generated.
Algorithm 4 MTD Game Simulator
1: function Simulator(N ,K,H, k, σ, γ, L∗)
2: I = ∅; l = 0;
3: reallocateResources = False; winningState = False;
4: while not reallocateResources and not winningState do
5: observed,targetHost
(γ,h),pi←−−−− locate(N , σ);
6: if observed then
7: l += 1;
8: if l ≥ L∗ then
9: reallocateResources = True; I = ∅;
10: Output “Defender won!”;
11: end if
12: end if
13: if targetHost ∈ K then
14: I = I ∪ targetHost; K = K \ targetHost;
15: if |I| ≥ k then
16: winningState = True;
17: Output “Adversary won!”;
18: end if
19: end if
20: end while
21: end function
The system state (i, l) represents the total number of located target machines by
the attacker I, and the total number of recognized adversarial moves so far by the
defender. The attacker’s view of the system state will change if it successfully finds a
sensitive target based on its target discovery strategy σ, while the defender’s view gets
updated as a consequence of discovering an adversarial move (whether on network
levels with probability γ or on host levels with probability h via a defense agent).
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Algorithm 4 shows the above description of the game in which the game simulator
takes N ,K,H, k, and an adversarial target discovery strategy σ, in addition to the
sampling rate γ, and a “threshold” L∗ as the input and outputs who wins the game.
The termination rule is whether the attacker finds its desired number of sensitive
targets k or if the defender reallocates its resources as it discovers enough amount of
attack evidence in the environment which in turn pushesh the attacker back to the
state 0 in the game.
Security Analysis of Case Study 3.5.2
In this case, the defender’s defense strategy is to reallocate/shuffle its resources (or
at least a fraction of sensitive ones) when a sufficient number of attack evidence
is captured via the defense system (or in other words, the defender’s objective is
to generate a proper attack detection flag). Notice that the presented analysis in
Section 3.4.6 can immediately be applied to this case study. As f(l) remains 0 during
this period, therefore, the delayed learning analysis (see Theorem 8) can be used to
study how many targets will be discovered during the game by the adversary, before a
threshold L∗ is reached by the defender after which the defender shuffles its resources
pushing the adversary to the beginning state of the game in the Markov model. The
probability that more than k targets are discovered with an unlimited time budget is
equal to 1− u(k, L∗) which is exponentially small in k. A more precise upper bound
for limited time budgets can be found by applying Theorem 6.
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3.6 Concluding Remarks and Future Directions
In this Chapter, we presented a first attempt at constructing a theory of security and
developing a general framework for modeling cyber attacks prevalent today, includ-
ing opportunistic, targeted and multi-stage attacks while taking practical constraints
and observations into consideration. To this end, we have modeled the interactions
of an adversary (and possibly its agents) with a defensive system during the lifecy-
cle of an attack as an incremental online learning game. The presented framework
is comprehensive and general in the sense that it can be used to represent the dy-
namic interplay between the attacker and the defender in different game scenarios. In
particular, instead of considering a “dummy defender” in our modeling, we allowed
it to learn regarding the attack technology incrementally. As time elapses, and the
defender captures more attack samples, it can reach better detection rates. As the
defender’s learning rate increases, the attacker’s chances of making progressive moves
in the game decrease, and therefore the likelihood of fulfilling its attack objective
becomes smaller and smaller.
Moreover, by focusing on the most significant and tangible aspects of sophisticated
cyber attacks i.e., (1) the amount of time it takes for the adversary to accomplish
its mission and (2) the success probabilities of fulfilling the attack objectives, we
were able to study under which circumstances the defense system can provide an
effective response that makes the probability of reaching an attack objective k to be
negl(k)poly(Tbud) in which Tbud is the attacker’s (time) budget. This led us to the
definition of a security capacity region as a metric for gauging a defensive system’s ef-
ficiency from a security perspective. In particular, we show that a stagnating learning
rate allows the attacker to win meaning that being able to reach its attack objective
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within a limited budget (e.g., time, US dollars), whether it is constructing a botnet
of any specific size or locating information on a distributed number of nodes. The
defender cannot wait for too long learning about a used attack vector/exploit, and
once learning starts, it must continue learning with an associated detection probabil-
ity converging fast enough to 1. Our security analysis gives precise recommendations
for the defender, i.e., 1− f(l) ≤ O(l−a) for some a ≥ 2 with a proof for a = 2 in our
framework. The attacker needs to find just one attack vector/exploit for which the
defender is too slow to react or too slow in learning.
An essential venue of future work is to estimate the learning rate f(l) based on the
number of observed malicious acts given a “worst-case adversary.” Our framework
lays the foundation for such work and allows to give a worst-case probabilistic bound
on the maximal reached attack objective based on the estimated f(l). This, in turn,
provides guidance to the defender on how to allocate its resources.
A remaining challenge for future work is dealing with false positives as they can
disrupt the defender’s learning process, and therefore trouble the normal operation
of the system. Providing bounds on the total number of false positives the defender
can tolerate in its learning process is a next essential step in extending this presented
framework. Also, the presented model can be fine-tuned to investigate various sce-
narios for a defender with a more extensive defensive action set, such as host-level
cleaning and patching of network nodes. Although this can potentially lead to a more
comprehensive model, we left the analysis for this case for future studies since assum-
ing a universal host-level defense system installed on all the hosts is an unrealistic
assumption in most practical scenarios.
The presented worst-case analysis in this chapter is beneficial when it comes to
bootstrapping cryptographic protocols and having a proper reduction to common as-
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sumptions such as the learning rate of a defender. In Chapter 4, we switch gears and
focus on the worm/bot-like malware propagation phenomenon. We investigate how
the learning rate of a defender can lead to the containment of the malware by study-
ing the effectiveness of content-based filtering strategies as one of the most effective
and feasible solutions to tackle the spreading of such malware. From a practical per-
spective, we present an average-case analysis which is valuable for understanding how
the adversary advances in its mission (without being able to bootstrap cryptographic
protocols based on this analysis).
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Chapter 4
A Learning-based Malware
Propagation and Containment
Modeling
4.1 Introduction
With the rise of advanced and novel malware and the expanding population of Inter-
net residents, especially the explosion of connected Internet of Things (IoT) devices,
new methods, and research for understanding malware behaviors and jousting with
sophisticated botnets seem to be crucial. Of specific interest to us are two types of
malware, worms [92], and autonomous bots [64], mainly due to their wide-ranging
audience, and self-propagating characteristics. These types of malware execute a
“seek-and-infect” mission strategy. For instance, a scanning worm conventionally in-
fects a target by utilizing vulnerability exploitation, and it automatically probes the
environment to independently propagate itself (or modified copies of itself) from the
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infected machine to other vulnerable hosts in a network. Consequently, a straightfor-
ward way of assembling an army of infected hosts is spreading the malicious code in
the form of a scanning worm. This zombie army which is also known as a botnet is
indeed a collection of compromised machines distributed over a network (usually the
Internet) and controlled by its originator (known as a botmaster) through a Com-
mand and Control (C&C) structure [25]. Afterward, these infiltrated workstations
(bots) can be managed for different malicious purposes including but not limited
to ransom campaigns, massive spam-marketing, large-scale information harvesting
and processing, click fraud, pay-per installation, and, Distributed Denial-of-Service
(DDoS) attacks.
The never-ending battle between adversaries and system defenders drives both
parties to improve their methods and technologies to enhance their chances of pros-
perity. On the one hand, attackers and network penetrators come up with new attack
methods and evasion techniques to bypass (or even deny) defensive systems in any
possible manner. Code obfuscation, session splicing, fragmentation attacks, string
matching and DDoS attacks [51] are among the most common techniques used by the
adversaries to decrease the attack detection probability or to increase the chances of
attack prosperity. An armored malware (e.g., a metamorphic or polymorphic worm)
buys itself more propagation time by being hard to identify and disassemble. On
the other hand, a large number of studies on malware detection/prevention tech-
niques, Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPSes), and Honeypot (HP)
technologies have been carried out to present more effective methods and designs to
reach better accuracy and performance [9, 14, 31]. For instance, fast and automatic
signature generation schemes are introduced to fight against even the mightiest type
of malware [37, 39, 42, 55, 78, 82, 90]. Some claim that they can generate high-quality
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signatures (with negligible false alarm rates) based on only a few malware samples1
usually captured via honeypots or a heuristic flow classifier.
Although there exist various number of research for worm-like malware propaga-
tion modeling, in addition to proposals for containment strategies such as content-
based filtering based on automatic and distributed signature generation of the mal-
ware, the question unanswered here is how and why does the malware spread, especially
the kinds targeting a broad audience, if it is the case that we can generate high quality
and reliable signatures, even for an armored malware?
Our Approach. To answer such questions, in this chapter, we study the effective-
ness of content-based filtering strategies2 based on automatic signature generation
schemes. Instead of presenting yet another malware detection/prevention methodol-
ogy, we revisit the spread of malware phenomenon from a new perspective, especially
the self-propagating ones such as worms and bots.
We introduce a new model for capturing the interactions of an adversary and its
agents with the defensive system during the early phases of a zombie army construc-
tion. Unlike a malware propagator who usually follows a passive attack strategy for
malware distribution to a broad audience, meaning that the attack technology usually
remains the same after unleashing the first few samples of the malware, the defender
can incrementally learn regarding the attack technology (specifically, from observed
malware payloads). As time elapses, and the defender captures more attack data,
it can reach better detection rates and accuracy. This learning rate indeed reflects
into higher quality malware signatures which can be used for online malicious traffic
filtering and hence malware containment purposes.
1E.g., see Hamsa [42] which only requires 100-500 malware samples in the suspicious flow pool
to reach a %5 false negative rate, even for a previously unknown worm.
2As one of the most effective and feasible solutions to tackle the spreading of worm-like malware.
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Contributions & Results. The main contributions of our work can be summarized
as follows:
• Motivated by the advances in networking infrastructure and technologies such as
the introduction of Software-Defined Networking (SDN), and also the widespread
embrace of Automated Machine Learning (AutoML) techniques in different
realms of networking and security fields, we introduce a novel malware prop-
agation and containment modeling called the “learning-based model” suitable
for today’s technologies and infrastructure (e.g., Cloud environments) and more
advanced malware.
• The previous outdated models are mainly focused on the attacker’s strategies
(specifically target discovery and scanning rates [16,71,75]), or in best cases, an
ill-defined cleaning of the infection or patching processes [15,21,103]. However,
we show how the increased knowledge of the defender can be taken into consid-
eration by modeling the learning rate of the defense system as a function f(l)
(which is the probability of detecting and filtering a next malicious payload)
where l represents the number of malicious payloads for a specific exploit so far
collected.
• The model leads to the development of an automatic self-replicating malware
containment strategy that prevents the spread of the malware beyond its early
stages of propagation.
• We provide precise conditions on the convergence rates of a learning-based sig-
nature generation algorithm that determines whether the malware spread will
ultimately settle or not.
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• We derive tight upper and lower bounds on the total number of hosts the mal-
ware propagator can infect.
• The model is general enough and enables us to evaluate the effectiveness of
learning-based signature generation schemes and containment strategies. It is
especially suitable for “Cloud environments” where the defender (in this case
the Cloud service provider) has more control, and better visibility over its net-
work/infrastracture and the environment exposes more homogeneity by having
high-level similarities in the different layers of the software stack (e.g., hypervi-
sors, OS).
• We study learning functions of the form 1− f(l) = ( A
A+l
)α in which A is consid-
ered to slow down the learning process, and α is the amplification factor in the
learning. The amplification and deceleration parameters enable the fine-tuning
of the model to capture characteristics of both yesteryears malware (e.g., a
monomorphic worm) and also today’s more advanced ones such as polymorphic
malware.
• Numerical analysis and simulation results show that regardless of an attacker’s
scanning rates, with a proper learning function that converges fast enough to 1,
the propagation will be contained and only a negligible number of susceptible
population will be infected.
We offer a fresh look at a 15-year old research area (worm epidemic modeling). Al-
though the self-propagating class of malware may seem to be an old3 type of a threat
due to the decline in the “worm-like” Common Vulnerabilities Exposures (CVEs) [18],
3The Morris worm was the first computer worm released on the Internet on Nov. 1988, almost
three decades ago.
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the rise of self-propagating ransomware (e.g., the WannaCry4 cryptoworm) and the
highly sophisticated malware such as Stuxnet worm [35] attest that the network vec-
tor is one of the few attack vectors which is capable of passing the test of time. Taking
advantage of the network vector and releasing the malware in a worm-like fashion,
meaning that the malware is equipped with a self-propagating functionality, can pro-
vide the attackers a more potent malware which is capable of causing widespread
damage. This means that the security community and professionals need to take the
self-propagating class of malware more serious to first better understand such mal-
ware’s life cycle and then to be able to come up with feasible solutions to tackle this
problem.
We think the learning-based defense modeling is an interesting approach which
deserves further attention especially by having immediate applications in the Cloud
environments due to the specific characteristics of the Cloud, and the role service
providers play in coordinating network defense across all their tenants.
Organization. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 briefly
reviews existing worm-like malware’s propagation models in addition to automatic
signature generation schemes and content-based filtering of such malware. We present
a new learning-based propagation model in Section 4.3 followed by the corresponding
numerical analysis and simulation results of this model for various learning functions
in Section 4.4, and 4.5. We conclude this chapter and discuss future directions in
Section 4.6.
4The WannaCry ransomware incident was the first time that attackers combined the business
model of ransomware along with the worm tactics, and this was the main reason the campaign was
very flourishing and impactful. WannaCry was able to infect hundreds of thousands of machines
suffered from unpatched MS-17-010 Windows OS vulnerabilities by the weaponization of the Eternal
Blue exploit [52]. Taking advantage of this vulnerability, an attacker could launch a remote code
execution by sending specially crafted messages to a Microsoft SMBv1 server [53].
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4.2 Background and Related Work
The three potential solutions to mitigate a self-replicating code’s rampancy are pre-
vention, treatment, and containment strategies. The prevention and treatment schemes
can be summarized as following secure software/application development procedures
in hopes of having vulnerability-free software, or patching/updating vulnerable sys-
tems as soon as vulnerabilities are discovered. Unlike the containment techniques,
such conducts are usually vital for pre/post incident time and not during the period
of an incident. In this Section, we first review content-based filtering and automatic
signature generation schemes as the most effective containment strategy [54] to hinder
the spread of a malware. Moreover, we study some of the most relevant propagation
models existing in the literature before presenting our model.
4.2.1 Content-based Filtering and Automatic Signature Gen-
eration Schemes
Human interventions and attack response time must be minimized in order to be able
to prevent widespread infections. To this end, automatic, distributed and real-time
detection and containment strategies, even for the mightiest type of worm, i.e., a
polymorphic one, are introduced in the literature. Such signature-based detection
and prevention techniques are of particular interest of this work as “an ounce of
prevention is worth a pound of cure” meaning that such containment strategies can
be very efficient for thwarting the spread of malware, especially during the early
phases of a botnet construction and worm propagation, only if a high-quality signature
can be generated (automatically). Such signatures can be created based on various
attributes (e.g., length of the fields or invariant substrings of the byte sequences) of a
103
class of malware, and later these signatures will be used for content-based malicious
traffic filtering (even for extreme cases such as previously unknown malware or an
armored one, e.g., a polymorphic worm). While designing a new automatic signature
generation scheme is not the objective of this manuscript, here we review the most
notable works in this area in order to better understand such schemes especially their
architecture so that we can build a realistic propagation model based on a general
learning algorithm (on which the signature generator is built upon) which we explain
in later sections.
Autograph [37] is one of the first proposals for automatic (and optionally dis-
tributed) signature generation for a polymorphic worm, utilizing a naive portscan-
based flow classifier (for TCP worms) to lessen the volume of traffic on which it
performs a content-prevalence analysis. The flow classification enables Autograph to
construct a suspicious flow pool on which it executes TCP flow reassembly for the
payloads and outputs the most frequently occurring byte sequences across the flows
as signatures. EarlyBird [78] uses a similar approach as Autograph in generating
signatures by taking advantage of Rabin fingerprints.
On the other hand, Polygraph [55] forms signatures that consist of multiple disjoint
content substrings to address the inefficiency of single, contiguous string-based signa-
ture generation techniques (such as Honeycomb [39], EarlyBird, and Autograph). Its
underlying assumption for signature generation is that for a real-world exploit to func-
tion correctly, various invariant substrings must often be present in all alternatives
of a malware payload; and these substrings typically correspond to return addresses,
protocol framing, and in some cases, defectively obfuscated code. Hamsa [42] is an-
other fast content-based signature generation method which generates multiset tokens
as signatures. In comparison with Polygraph, it can provide better attack resilience
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and noise tolerance (accuracy). PolyTree [82] can show how the worm variants evolve
and make the signature refinement task upon a new worm sample arrival quick using
an incremental signature tree construction. This is based on the observation that
worm signatures are related and a tree structure can properly reflect their familial re-
semblance which enables organizing the extracted signatures from worm samples into
a tree structure. Unlike the aforementioned proposals which generate exploit-specific
signatures, the paper in [90] presented an automatic vulnerability-driven network-
based length-based signature generator called LESG for zero-day polymorphic worms
exploiting buffer overflow vulnerabilities based on the fact that specific protocol fields
in such attacks are usually longer than those in a conventional protocol usage.
4.2.2 Propagation Modeling and Estimating Size of a Botnet
In malware propagation models, possible states concerning vulnerable population dur-
ing a malware attack are Susceptible (S), Infectious (I), and Recovered (R). According
to a host’s state at different times, and based on the transition between such states,
malware propagation models can be categorized into three classes: if a host can only
have one of the susceptible or infectious states and not being able to be recovered
after an infection, the model is called Susceptible-Infectious (SI). If the model consid-
ers a permanent revival for an infected machine, meaning that the host remains in an
immune state after the recovery process, the model is called Susceptible-Infectious-
Recovered (SIR), and finally if there is the chance of being infected again after a
recovery the model is called Susceptible-Infectious-Susceptible (SIS).
The classical simple epidemic model which is an SI modeling is the most commonly
used model in the literature and can be simply described by the following differential
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equation in which k denotes the total number of vulnerable nodes to the epidemic
(i.e., the susceptible population), and at each time step, the so far infectious hosts
i(t) propagate the epidemic with a constant rate β.
di(t)
dt
= βi(t)[k − i(t)] (4.1)
One of the most widely used SIR modelings in the literature is the Kermack-
McKendrick model (also known as the classical general epidemic model [69]) which
is an extension to the classical simple epidemic model. In this modeling, the effects
of a removal process in the infectious hosts’ population is taken into consideration.
Consider r(t) as the number of removed hosts from previously infected hosts, and
ζ as the constant rate of removal, hence, the Kermack-McKendrick model can be
expressed by:
di(t)
dt
= βi(t)[k − i(t)− r(t)]− dr(t)
dt
(4.2)
where dr(t)
dt
= ζi(t).
Another proposal based on Kermack-McKendrick model is [21] in which it pro-
vides a diurnal model for different time zones for botnet propagation modeling by
introducing a correction factor α(t) (“the diurnal shaping function”) in the total
number of online (available) hosts based on the time region. Therefore the diurnal
worm propagation model can be represented by:
di(t)
dt
= βα2(t)i(t)[k(t)− i(t)− r(t)]− ζα(t)i(t) (4.3)
The two-factor model [103] enhances the Kermack-McKendrick’s model in two ways.
First, it separates the removal process into two parts, one for the elimination of
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infectious hosts (due to cleaning) and the other for purging the susceptible population
(due to patching and system updates). Second, it considers a time-varying infection
rate to take worm traffic’s impact on the network infrastructure into consideration
(e.g., congestion in the network).
di(t)
dt
= β(t)i(t)[k(t)− i(t)− (r(t) + q(t))]− dr(t)
dt
(4.4)
where dr(t)
dt
= ζi(t), and q(t) denotes the number of removed hosts from the susceptible
population.
Analytical Active Worm Propagation model (AAWP) which is a similar approach
in the discrete time setting is presented in [15].
Stochastic modeling of active worms is another line of research in this area. Sellke
et al. [75] model the propagation of the malware through a branching process, i.e.,
each infected machine in one generation will independently produce some random
number of infected machines in the next-generation according to a fixed probability
distribution. The model can determine the extinction condition of the malware and
provide an upper bound on the total number of infected hosts. Rohloff et al. [71]
used a simple stochastic density-dependent Markov jump process to model worm
propagation. Each state in the chain represents the number of so far infected machines
i(t), in addition to the total number of remaining susceptible population s(t). The
model does not consider any removal/cleaning actions meaning that the total number
of vulnerable hosts k = i(t) + s(t) is always constant at each transition of the Markov
chain. The time it takes for this chain to reach its absorbing state is calculated.
For more information regarding malware propagation models we refer to the survey
presented in [91].
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The models mentioned above mainly focus on the treatment processes –such as
patching a susceptible node or cleaning an infected machine– for vulnerable popula-
tion and infection rate reduction purposes. In practice, these treatment strategies,
however, are not suitable for the expeditious spread of the malware and therefore
short-term reliefs for an outbreak. Moore et al. [54] showed that a content-based
filtering strategy is the most vital containment strategy to limit the spread of the
malware via isolating it from the susceptible population. Therefore, in this work, we
mainly focus on the containment solutions made possible based on a defense system’s
learning engine which makes the propagation of the epidemic more difficult. We uti-
lize the same notion of learning that we discussed in Chapter 3, i.e., the attacker’s
chances of making a progressive move in the game depend on its previous actions and
the denfeder’s learning process [86]. This notion of learning has been previously used
in learning-based signature generation schemes for the polymorphic worm but never
been applied to propagation models. The advances in network technologies (especially
SDN) and AutoML provide more control and better visibility to the network defend-
ers in addition to facilitating the automation processes. These advances motivate us
to take advantage of such learning mechanisms and introduce a new learning-based
propagation modeling suitable for today’s and future’s infrastructure and technology.
Moreover, the most critical shortcoming of the traditional models is that they
suffer from not taking both parties ’ capabilities, actions and strategies into consid-
eration for the model development. Therefore, these static models are incapable of
representing the dynamic nature of today’s network attack-defense scenarios. Our
modeling differs from the previously mentioned models in the sense that as the time
elapses, we can take enhanced attack/defense strategies into consideration by rec-
ognizing the players’ interactions as a learning process, especially from the defense
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systems’ perspective. This presented framework enables us to explicitly study how
the learning rates of a defense system can affect future interplays of the players and
their probability of success in the malware propagation game. Moreover, instead of
considering an ill-defined removal/cleaning rate, we can describe where the contain-
ment process could come from by considering an incremental learning mechanism for
the defender.
4.3 A Learning-based Malware Propagation and
Containment Model
In this section, we study how a content-based filtering strategy–which utilizes a gen-
eral learning-based signature generation scheme– can play a role in containing the
propagation of a self-replicating code. More specifically, regardless of the limits on
the accuracy of any learning-based automatic signature generation algorithm, we
study the efficacy of such schemes in ceasing the propagation of the malware under
the assumption of their constructability.
To understand the effect of a defense system’s learning engine on the containment
of the malware, we model the defender’s learning engine (i.e., a signature generator
algorithm) as a function f , which takes so far collected/observed suspicious traffic
l (i.e., attack payloads) and outputs a signature for that class of malware. This
generated signature is then used for online content-based traffic filtering in which
each incoming malware traffic can be filtered with probability f(l) (true positive)
or with 1 − f(l) the system fails in detecting a malicious packet (or it falsely labels
it as benign, i.e., false negative). Later, we briefly discuss the occurrence of false
positives in the model. Moreover, we are interested in the infection modeling during
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the Window of Vulnerability (WoV) time as the number of vulnerable systems is not
yet shrunken to insignificance and the attacker’s exploit is useful in this period. This
means that we do not take patching and cleaning of the susceptible and infected
population into consideration.
4.3.1 Idealized Deployment, Network and Learning Model
We consider a logically centralized defense system (e.g., an IDPS) employed in the net-
work, that is the containment system is universally deployed within the address space,
and the learning engine works with all the observed/collected information regarding
the worm infections (i.e., samples) and then distribute the generated signatures to
defense system agents (e.g., edge routers, inline Network-based Intrusion Detection
Systems (NIDS)). Similar to [89], we also consider that the learning algorithm will
update its internal state after observing each new incoming batch of data, and these
updates will be made over all of the so far accumulated samples. In this regard, with
these updates, the learning engine might be able to find a high-quality signature over
a more extended period, while without such updates, no learning would be possible.
Moreover, we assume that the signature generation task on the accumulated samples
is performed with no delay. Also, the signature distribution to the defense agents will
be done immediately.
Automatic signature generation schemes (e.g., see [37, 42, 55, 82]) commonly take
advantage of a heuristic flow classifier for constructing a suspicious flow pool in order
to reduce the volume of traffic on which further analysis must be performed. There-
fore, we also consider that a copy of traffic is given to a flow classifier for suspicious
flow pool construction. For simplicity and generality, however, we model the defense
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system’s classifier and traffic analysis task as a probabilistic sampling process [80] in
which each malicious packet can be sampled with probability λ. Note that λ reflects
the classifier’s accuracy in which it is the probability that an incoming packet will be
marked as suspicious traffic conditioned on the fact that it is indeed malicious. The
captured payloads from the classifier are given to the signature generator engine for
signature generation. The generated signatures then are used for the inline packet
filtering by the defense system. This allows us not to be concerned about the trans-
mission protocol (TCP/UDP), and in general more stealthier propagation schemes
(e.g., second channel delivery) which are usually more robust against anomaly-based
detection systems, as they will not trigger any events during the propagation.5
One very common problem among any IDPS is the inability to provide absolutely
complete and accurate detection rates. This incompleteness and inaccuracy usually
lead to the occurrence of a false detection of a malicious activity as benign or vice
versa. Due to the existence of false alarms (especially false positives), it is a common
practice not to utilize black/whitelisting prevention policies for the IDPS. This means
that we do not care about stealthy attacks in which the attacker can conceal its real
identity and disguise the source of attack traffic to decrease the chance of being
located through common known practices such as IP address spoofing, use of proxies,
etc. However, false positives (labeling a benign packet/activity as suspicious on the
classifier level or malicious for inline filtering) play an essential role in the accuracy
of the generated signatures and therefore the normal operations of the network in
which the defense system is implemented. Note that in our model, false positives can
5Note that this is a practical assumption as the most common form of a self-replicating code
found in the wild is a self-carried (malware payload is transferred in a packet by itself) malware
which, regardless of the transmission scheme (TCP or UDP) utilizes a blind scan strategy as its
target discovery (see Table 1 in [41]).
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Table 4.1: Notations in this Chapter
Notation Explanation
n Total number of nodes in the address space
k Total number of vulnerable nodes (i.e., susceptible population)
i(t) Total number of infected nodes at time t
η Average scanning rate of an infected machine
f(l) Probability of filtering a malicious packet by the defender
λ Probability of marking malicious traffic as suspicious by the classifier
j(t) Total number of attack samples collected at time t
γ Average rate of attack sample collection by the defense system
α Amplification factor in learning
A Deceleration factor in learning
occur on two levels. First, the classifier may mark a benign packet as suspicious, which
eventually could lead to inaccurate signatures or taking longer times to generate a true
signature. To address this problem, we consider a deceleration factor in our modeling
to take the impact of such false positives in delaying the signature generation into
consideration. Second, since the generated signatures are used for online filtering
of incoming packets, a false positive at this level may drop a benign packet at the
network level. However, notice that such incidents do not impact the accuracy of our
model, i.e., the total number of infected nodes at any instance of time will not be
affected.
4.3.2 The Learning-based Model
For completeness, one can apply the learning-based model (i.e., the impact of a de-
fender’s learning in filtering malicious traffic) to any of the studied models in Section
4.2.2. This allows one to include other factors such as human involvement, differ-
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ent time zones, cleaning the infection, and patching the susceptible population into
the model. However, for brevity, simplicity, and generality, we develop the learning-
based model based on the simple classical epidemic to purely study the impact of a
defender’s learning engine on the malware containment process.
Our goal is to show that a sufficiently increasing learning rate will stop malware
from propagating and only a few number of susceptible nodes k will be infected.
Consider the SI modeling represented in (4.1), as follows
di(t)
dt
= η
k − i(t)
n
i(t),
where i(t) represents the number of infected nodes at time t, n is the size of address
space, and η is equal to the average scanning rate of an infected machine. Rather than
modeling the above equation, let us assume that we already will be able to bound
i(t) to a number  k so that
di(t)
dt
= p · i(t) (4.5)
would be a good approximation for some constant
p = ηk/n.
In fact this approximation gives the adversary an advantage since η k−i(t)
n
i(t) ≤ pi(t)
which makes the new differential equation (4.5) a best case scenario for the adversary.
We adapt (4.5) to include prevention of infection: If the defender gathers samples
of malicious payloads at a certain rate λ, then the defender collects λ·η·i(t) samples at
time t. Notice that unlike the previous models in which the higher the scanning rate
of the malware, the sooner the whole population become infected, in our modeling,
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however, a high scanning rate will also potentially provide more samples to the defense
system which can lead to constructing a valid signature sooner and therefore holding
the attack’s progress. If we denote the number of samples collected up to time t by
j(t), and defining γ = λ · η, then j(t) satisfies
dj(t)
dt
= γ · i(t). (4.6)
The defender’s knowledge of how to recognize and prevent malicious payloads in-
creases as a result of observing and collecting malicious traffic. This work does not
propose a learning algorithm per se. However, we mainly provide a high-level overview
of the learning process by abstracting it as a probabilistic function. We assume f(l)
captures this learning – with probability f(l), where l = j(t) is the number of sam-
ples collected so far, the adversarial payload is prevented from doing any harm. With
probability 1 − f(l) = 1 − f(j(t)), the payload may proceed and this leads to the
following adjustment of (4.5):
di(t)
dt
= p · i(t) · (1− f(j(t))). (4.7)
Equation (4.7) is the learning-based model and this is what we study; It shows that
in addition to hitting a vulnerable target, an infected machine’s endeavors to in-
fecting a new device by submitting an ominous packet to the target must not get
filtered/blocked by the defense system.
Although one can study any general form of a learning function f by plugging it
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in (4.7), we will analyze monotonically increasing learning rates of the form
1− f(l) =
(
A
l + A
)α
for some exponent α and constant A. The exponent α reflects how collected sam-
ples amplify the learning rate while constant A is included to slow down the learning
process, i.e., delayed learning. The motivation behind choosing this specific learn-
ing function is twofold. First, such family of functions can potentially satisfy the
convergence rate criterion (converging fast enough to 1), which guarantees the possi-
ble containment of the malware as we proved in the previous chapter. Second, this
specific learning function can be adjusted to take both yesteryears’ worms and to-
day’s more advanced malware’s characteristics into consideration in the model. For
instance, for a naive, monomorphic malware, which the signature generation is more
straightforward and can be done based on only a few malware samples, a small slow-
down factor A and a large enough amplification factor α can be used in the model
to capture the swiftness of signature generation task. On the other hand, for a more
potent malware, e.g., polymorphic/metamorphic worms, a large slow-down factor and
small amplification factor can depict the hardness of signature generation task when
dealing with such malware.
Substituting 1− f(l) into (4.7) yields
di(t)
dt
= p · i(t) ·
(
A
j(t) + A
)α
. (4.8)
Now notice that (4.6) expresses i(t) as i(t) = j′(t)/γ where j′(t) = dj(t)
dt
is the first
derivative of j(t). By denoting j′′(t) the second derivative of j(t) and substituting
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these into (4.8) gives the final differential equation which we wish to solve:
j′′(t)/γ = p · j′(t)/γ ·
(
A
j(t) + A
)α
. (4.9)
We are interested in bounding j′(t)/γ = i(t). Initially,
j(0) = 0 and
j′(0) = γ · i(0) = γ,
meaning that there is a single infected node within the network at time zero (patient
zero) and the defender’s knowledge of the attack is zero at the beginning (zero-day
vulnerability/exploit).
We now present the following theorem (for the analysis and the proof see A.3)
which provides lower and upper bounds on the total number of nodes the attacker
can infect.
Theorem 10 (Containment Criterion). For α < 1, i(t) = Ω(t1−α). For α = 1,
i(t) = Ω(ln t). For α > 1,
i(t) ≤ 1 + Ap
(α− 1)γ .
Corollary 5. In order to contain the malware from propagation, the convergence rate
of a learning-based signature generation scheme must have an amplification factor
α > 1.
Corollary 6. For α > 1, we have:
• the number of nodes that will be infected is proportional to the deceleration factor
A.
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• substituting p = ηk/n, and γ = λη, gives i(t) ≤ 1 + A
(α−1)λ(
k
n
) meaning that i(t)
is independent from the malware’s scanning rate η.
For the defense system, the smaller the deceleration factor and the more sig-
nificant the amplification factor, the minimal will be the impact of an attack (i.e.,
the total number of infected machines). The environment must expose a minimum
vulnerability density k/n as well.
4.3.3 Model Extensions and Limitations
In this section, we briefly discuss some possible scenarios which require further inves-
tigations or can be modeled through the same methodology presented in this work.
Where possible, we provide general guidance for the curious reader on how such cases
can be analyzed with a few adjustments to the model.
An adaptive adversary with multiple exploits: After observing no progress
in the malware propagation mission (i.e., being contained with some limited number
of agents), an adaptive adversary may decide to improve and update its attack tech-
nology. For instance, a bot herder can update the malware binary on its bots for
different purposes. This includes enhancing and extending attack vectors and tech-
nologies by adding new functionalities or evasion techniques, migrating to different
C&C servers, and considering recent and revised exploits. Our framework, can also
capture such strong and possibly well-funded adversary. From the attacker’s perspec-
tive, each new exploit χj (or in other words an enhanced attack technology) should
be associated with some probability pj (as each exploit may correspond to a different
set of vulnerable nodes within the network). From the defender’s perspective, the
signature generator, if it cannot generate a single universal signature which matches
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all the malware’s instances, must be able to generate multiple signatures each of
which matches some subset of flows in the suspicious flow pool. Therefore, multiple
detection rate functions and learning rates fj should be considered for each class of
malware.
A deceptive attacker capable of misleading the learning engine: There
exist various attacks against signature generation schemes especially those with learn-
ing based on pattern extraction (see [27,56,65,88]). Noise injection attacks in which
the attacker can systematically inject noise (or deliberately crafted attack samples)
in the training pool to mislead the defender’s learning engine are amongst the most
notable challenges for signature generation schemes in adversarial settings. In de-
veloping the learning-based model, we decided not to consider a deceptive adversary
since in practice, a malware propagator usually follows a passive attack strategy for
the propagation of the malware with a broad audience (e.g., worms/bots), meaning
that the attack technology usually remains the same after unleashing the first few
samples of the malware. That is the malware propagation game is not a dynamic
interaction between the attacker and the defender (especially from the attacker’s per-
spective) and although such attacks are theoretically possible, they have not yet been
observed in the wild. In general, when dealing with a delusive adversary, the learning
rate of the defense system may not always be positive, and the learning engine’s false
positive rates should be taken into consideration in the model. We leave this problem
for future studies and refer the reader to [89] which studies the signature generation in
adversarial settings and proves lower bounds on the number of mistakes any pattern
extraction learning algorithm can take under common assumptions.
Host-level detection and prevention: When the malware resides on a ma-
chine, it surely exhibits abnormal and erratic behavior (both externals such as un-
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usual port usage [32] and internals such as irregular system call sequences [38]) on that
machine. Therefore, one possibility is taking the knowledge gained at the host-level
into consideration for the purpose of attack/malware signature generation by means
of monitoring events on endpoint devices through a Host-based Intrusion Detection
System (HIDS). Such signatures can be generated based on the malware residual
activity on the target machine or the specific exploit/vulnerability used by the ad-
versary during the infection. Hence, a cumulative function fh can be considered
for the host-level signatures which depends on the total number of so far infected
machines. Therefore, one can easily fine-tune the model to capture such defensive
scenarios by multiplying the adversary’s probability of success at each time step pi
with 1 − fh(i) meaning that not only it must hit the right target (i.e., a vulnerable
host), the malware should not be neutralized too at the host level. The fh function
gets updated once a new node becomes infected. There exist proposals for combined
detection methods, i.e., taking both host-level and network-level information into con-
sideration to fight against a worm/bot malware. For example, [95] introduced a C&C
protocol-independent detection framework based on the combination of information
gained from both host and network level bot activities. We decided not to count
such strategies, since considering a universal host-level defense system installed on
all the network devices is an unrealistic assumption in almost any practical situation.
In brief, the model per se is an excellent fit for the environments where the rapid
patching of tenants’ applications/OS is not possible for the service provider (e.g., in
the Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) Cloud service model), i.e., the defense is purely
based on network filtering. However, with only a few modifications, the model can
also capture other scenarios such as host-level detections, patching, and cleaning.
Scalability and heterogeneity aspects of the problem: Implementing the
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learning-based solution on very large scales (e.g., the entire IP address space) is
undoubtedly an arduous task or even maybe impossible. However, we think the model
is a perfect fit for smaller scales such as a class B enterprise/organization network.
Such environments relax the assumptions used in the model in two aspects. First,
the negligible delay assumption in the signature generation and distribution process
becomes more realistic when the size of the network under the watch is relatively
smaller. Furthermore, the central focus of this article is on the defense aspects of
the problem, and the main novelty lies in the dynamic learning of the defender.
From the attack perspective, though, the model can be strengthened by weakening
the homogeneity assumption and investigating the spread of the malware in more
heterogeneous/arbitrary networks. However, for smaller-scale networks, especially
when a single entity is in charge of providing and maintaining the infrastructure
and the entire software stack on top of it (for instance, Cloud environments), the
homogeneous susceptible-infection assumption is more valid in that the chances that
the environment exhibits a constant vulnerability density is very high. Moreover, the
logically centralized defense assumption makes more sense for signature generation
and distribution due to more visibility and control over the network.
4.4 Numerical Analysis of the Model
The learning-based model is a general malware propagation model with several pa-
rameters. Notice that when the learning function is set to zero, i.e., f(.) = 0, and
p = η k−i(t)
n
, we have exactly the classical epidemic model. Although the effects of
cleaning the infection and patching the susceptible population can be easily included
120
in the model, we decided to ignore such conducts since they have been well studied
in the literature. Also, we are interested in evaluating the impacts of learning even
in the worst case scenarios for the defender (i.e., giving a leg up to the attacker by
considering p = supi pi).
For the purpose of illustration, we consider a hypothetical polymorphic worm,
propagating in an address space of size n = 232 (the entire IPv4 address space),
while the size of susceptible hosts’ population is k = 350, 000. We assume a blind
scan strategy for which each infected host performs a uniform scanning in the address
space with an average rate of 10, 188 scans per hour.6 Moreover, we consider i(0) = 1,
and j(0) = 0, meaning that initially there exists one infected machine at time zero,
and the defender has no knowledge regarding the attack (signature).
Although we proved upper and lower bounds on the total number of infected nodes
i(t) (see Theorem 10), for the general learning-based model, we cannot get closed-
form solutions. Instead, we present numerical solutions of the differential equation
by using Python scipy.integrate package.
Figure 4.1 depicts the solution of the learning-based model when the learning
parameter is set to zero. As mentioned earlier, without a learning process the model
is equivalent to the classical epidemic model, and the saturation in the curve depicts
how the whole susceptible population will be infected as time elapses.
We now study the impact of different parameters on the total number of infected
nodes in the learning-based model. Figure 4.2 depicts how the amplification factor
α plays a role in the modeling. The Ω(t0.5) and Ω(ln t) growth in the population of
infected hosts, for α = 0.5, and α = 1 respectively, can be seen from this plot which
6These are the actual infamous codeRed1v2’s epidemic parameters [71]. We use these values only
for the purpose of illustrations since the malware is well studied and the parameters are already
known.
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Figure 4.1: No learning, classical epidemic model
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Figure 4.2: Numerical solution of learning-based model for 1− f(l) = (1000/(l+ 1000))α
while λ = 0.001
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Figure 4.3: Numerical solution of learning-based model for 1− f(l) = (A/(l+A))2 while
λ = 0.001
               
 W L P H   K R X U 
 
   
   
   
   
 7 R
 W D
 O  Q
 X P
 E H
 U 
 R I
  L Q
 I H
 F W
 H G
  K
 R V
 W V
  L 
 W 
 1 X P H U L F D O  V R O X W L R Q  R I  O H D U Q L Q J  E D V H G  P R G H O
λ=0.1
λ=0.01
λ=0.001
λ=0.0001
Figure 4.4: Numerical solution of learning-based model for 1− f(l) = (1000/(l+ 1000))2
and different values of λ
123
is consistent with Theorem 10. In addition, notice that based on the theorem, for
α > 1, the upper bound on the total number of infected nodes is i(t) ≤ 1+82/(α−1),
which gives 83, and 42 for α = 2 and 3 respectively. The value of i(t) based on the
numerical solution of the differential equation for these two cases tends to 79.99 and
41.77 which is very close to the upper bound.
In order to study the impact of other parameters (i.e., A, and λ) in the learning-
based model, we numerically solved the differential equation for a constant α = 2
to see how the other parameters play a role while the amplification factor is set to
an acceptable value. Figure 4.3 depicts how the deceleration factor A impacts i(t).
The deceleration factor in learning must remain small enough for the containment
purposes meaning that the defender cannot wait for too long learning about a used
exploit, and once the learning starts it must continue with an associated detection
probability converging fast enough to 1. In addition, the impact of λ on the malware
containment is shown in Figure 4.4. Note that λ is the probability that incoming
malicious traffic is marked as suspicious by the classifier. As it can be seen from
this plot, the larger the λ, the sooner the attacker’s progress is contained in the
environment and that is because more samples are being provided to the signature
generator engine.
4.5 Simulation Results
In this section, we want to see how reasonable is the assumption of giving the adver-
sary the advantage of p = supi pi in our analysis by simulating the malware propaga-
tion process. Algorithm 5 provides a high-level overview of malware’s self-propagation
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activity. The simulator’s inputs are N ,K (set of all nodes and susceptible nodes
within the address space respectively), and an adversarial exploit χ, in addition to
the filtering probability f(l) based on the so far collected samples l (initially set to
0 to depict a zero-day vulnerabilty/exploit situation) and the corresponding gener-
ated signatures, and the defense system’s sampling rate λ. At each time step, an
infected machine transmits an ominous packet which includes the attack sample to
a (random) target. If the defense system does not filter the submitted packet, and
the destination is indeed vulnerable, the number of infected nodes is increased by one
and the target will be added to the set of so far infected machines I. Excluding the
“patient zero,” initially, we assume that |I| is zero. If an attack sample is captured by
the system, the number of samples will be increased by one consequently. Note that
the transmit method returns a tuple, i.e., if the transmitted packet by an infected
machine is filtered by the defense system or is sampled at the flow classifier level. The
termination rule is whether the attacker compromises all the susceptible population
or the defender finds a true signature, that is f(l) = 1.
We simulate two different scenarios. In the first scenario, we give the attacker a
leg-up by considering a constant p (i.e., p = supi pi = ηk/n; this requires removing
line 18 in Algorithm 5, and updating the termination rule in line 19 to |I| == |K|).
For the second scenario, we consider p to be a function of so far infected nodes (i.e.,
p = η(k − i(t))/n). For both cases, we consider λ = 0.001 and a learning function of
the form 1− f(l) = ( 1000
l+1000
)2 as it satisfies the containment requirement (i.e., α > 1).
We again use the same propagation parameters we used in the numerical analysis
section only for the purpose of illustration.
Figure 4.5 shows the expected number of infected nodes among 100 simulation
runs of the learning-based model. As it can be seen from this figure, the infected
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Algorithm 5 Worm Propagation Simulator
1: function Simulator(N ,K, χ, λ, f(.))
2: I = ∅; l = 0;
3: trueSignature = False;
4: thoroughInfection = False;
5: while not trueSignature and not thoroughInfection do
6: targetHost
$←− probe(N );
7: filtered,sampled
f(l),λ←−−−transmit(χ,targetHost);
8: if sampled then
9: l += 1;
10: update f(l);
11: if f(l) == 1 then
12: trueSignature = True;
13: Output “Attacker cannot make any progress!”;
14: end if
15: end if
16: if targetHost ∈ K and not filtered then
17: I = I ∪ targetHost;
18: K = K \ targetHost;
19: if |K| == 0 then
20: thoroughInfection = True;
21: Output “All vulnerable targets are infected!”;
22: end if
23: end if
24: end while
25: end function
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Figure 4.5: Simulation of malware propagation using Algorithm 5 for two cases:
p = supi pi, and p = p(i)
population are almost the same for both cases of p = supi pi, and p = p(i) meaning
that η k−i(t)
n
≈ ηk/n = p is indeed a good approximation, and considering a constant
p in the model is a reasonable assumption. Notice that this behavior was expected
since in the learning-based model as time elapses and f(l)→ 1, the chances of making
progress for the malware propagator get smaller and smaller (causes the saturation
observed in the plots). This means that the value of i(t) remains relatively small in
comparison to k and therefore i(t) can be bounded to a number  k. Figure 4.6 on
the other hand, compares the result of simulations with the numerical solution of the
learning-based model. For both scenarios, the upper bound on the size of the infected
population can be used as a tight estimate.
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Figure 4.6: Comparing the total number of infected nodes based on simulations (using
Algorithm 5 with p = supi pi) and numerical solution of the learning-based model for
1− f(l) = (1000/(l + 1000))2 while λ = 0.001
4.6 Concluding Remarks and Future Directions
We revisited the spread of malware phenomenon, especially worm and bot type mal-
ware, from a new perspective. We have modeled the interactions of an adversary and
its agents with a defensive system during the construction of a botnet as an incre-
mental online learning process. By focusing on the learning rate of a defense system’s
learning engine and signature generation algorithm, we presented a novel and general
propagation model called the learning-based model suitable for today’s technology
and infrastructure.
Unlike the existing outdated static modelings in this area, the learning-based
model is a dynamic one which can capture the increased knowledge of the defender
regarding the attack technology into consideration for bringing next adversarial ac-
tions into a halt.
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We studied monotonically increasing learning functions for which we showed how
different system parameters play a role in the malware containment process. In
particular, we showed that a learning function with amplification factor α ≤ 1 allows
the attacker to succeed in its zombie army construction mission. The deceleration
factor in learning must remain small enough for the containment purposes meaning
that the defender cannot wait for too long learning about a used exploit, and once the
learning starts it must continue with an associated detection probability converging
fast enough to 1. Using the learning-based model, we provided a precise bound on
the convergence of a learning-based scheme that ensures that the worm propagation
reaches minimal saturation in the number of infected hosts during the worm’s life
cycle.
The presented analysis and simulation results back up the validity of the learning-
based approach and suggest that the idea worth to be investigated further and to
be implemented to collect experimental results. We have shown that learning-based
signature generation schemes can be very effective for malware propagation contain-
ment purposes only if their convergence rates satisfies our presented criteria. The
presented security analysis recommends 1 − f(l) ≤ O(l−α) with a proof for α > 1
in our framework, which were consistent with the numerical analysis and simulation
results. The attacker needs to find just one exploit for which the defender is too slow
to react or too slow in learning. Instead of focusing on higher scan rates, the attacker
must invest in more stealthier and robust target discovery schemes and malware de-
livery techniques, which would not raise suspicions, leading to fewer attack samples
provided to the defense system.
A possible direction for future work is to estimate the learning-based model’s
parameters, especially the learning rate f(l), based on the size of suspicious traffic
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pool (i.e., number of observed malicious payloads) given a “worst-case adversary.”
Our framework lays the foundation for such work and allows to provide a worst-case
probabilistic bound on the number of compromised nodes based on the estimated f(l)
which in turn, offers guidance to the system defender in how to earmark its resources
and use the model for damage assessment and prediction purposes.
We believe our study can provide network security researchers and architects valu-
able lessons and more robust understandings of both attack and defense technologies
concerning malware with a broad audience. Besides, with the advent of software-
defined networking in which the entire network infrastructure can be controlled from
a centralized software controller, and the embrace of AutoML in defense technologies,
new generations of traditional cyber defense technologies (e.g., HPs, IDPSes, firewalls,
etc.), which are more capable, scalable and secure, are already being introduced. This
could be a new opportunity and a fresh start to fight against the botnet phenomenon
or the spreading of the malware in general. For future work, we would like to evaluate
the performance of common automatic signature generation schemes using real data
from enterprise networks by porting the learning-based containment mechanism to
edge and local routers, especially in a software-defined network environment.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
In this dissertation, we showed how mathematical modeling could be used to repre-
sent real-world cyber-attack situations. We investigated how such models could play a
beneficial role when it comes to the design and evaluation of systems/infrastructures,
especially from a security perspective. We presented a mathematical framework for
modeling various cyber-attack and defense scenarios. We first defined a formal lan-
guage for Moving Target Defense (MTD) analysis, as the state of the art defense
strategy. Using this language, we were able to evaluate the effectiveness of different
MTD schemes from a security standpoint by relating the time/cost spent by an ad-
versary to the chances of winning the introduced MTD games. Motivated by the IP
address hopping scheme as a well-known MTD technique, we introduced and analyzed
two different MTD game scenarios called Single-Target Hiding and Multiple-Target
Hiding to explain how our presented framework can be used to model real-world cyber
scenarios. More importantly, we investigated how the composition of MTD schemes
could be beneficial in that we proved that layered MTD games could provide larger
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security capacity and, therefore, more robust security guarantees for a system.
We extended our Markov-based framework to other cyber scenarios and further
investigated a general game of consequences in multi-stage and APT-like attacks, in
which the defender could learn from the observed adversarial actions and therefore
bring next attacker moves in the game to a standstill with a higher probability. We
defined the notion of security capacity region for cybersecurity games in which we
related the most important aspects of cyberattacks, i.e., success probabilities and the
time it takes to reach the attack objective(s) in the game. The presented worst-case
analysis is beneficial when it comes to bootstrapping cryptographic protocols and
having a proper reduction to common assumptions such as the learning rate of a
defender.
Lastly, we introduced a new malware propagation modeling and containment
strategy called the “learning-based model” in which we showed how the spread of
the malware could be settled based on the learning rate of the defender and various
attack-defense parameters. From a practical perspective, the presented average-case
analysis is valuable for understanding how the adversary advances in its mission
(without being able to bootstrap cryptographic protocols based on this analysis).
All in all, we showed how mathematical approaches and modeling could be help-
ful in studying the essential aspects of today’s cybersecurity problems. Utilizing
mathematical modeling, we can have a better understanding of system vulnerabili-
ties, attack vectors, points of failure, and in general, the life cycle of a cyber attack.
Besides, one could analyze various defense mechanisms/strategies, provide rigorous
security guarantees for a system, perform a cost-benefit analysis by finding the best
attack-response strategies in different scenarios, and also define what it means for a
system/infrastructure/strategy to be secure.
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Appendix A
Proofs and Math Derivations
A.1 Proofs of Theorems in Chapter 2
A.1.1 Adversary’s Winning Probability of an M-MTD Game
– Proof of Theorem 1
In order to prove Theorem 1, we give the adversary the advantage to initially start
in a state drawn from the stationary distribution pi rather than starting in the state
0 which represents the worst starting state for the adversary. For pi we prove the
following lemma:
Lemma 2. If the MTD game starts in a state drawn from the stationary distribution
pi, then E, the expected number of times the attacker enters state k within the first T
time steps, is equal to E = T · pi(k).
Proof. Let Z be the random variable representing the sequence of T states entered
in the first T time steps, i.e., if Z = (z1, . . . , zT ) then in the i-th time slot the game
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entered state zi. Let Xi be the indicator random variable with Xi = 1 if zi = k and
Xi = 0 if zi 6= k. By the definition of expectation
E =
∑
(z1,...zT )
Prob[Z = (z1, . . . zT )] · |{i : zi = k}|
=
∑
(z1,...zT )
Prob[Z = (z1, . . . zT )] ·
∑
i
Xi
=
∑
i
∑
(z1,...zT )
Prob[Z = (z1, . . . zT )] ·Xi
=
∑
i
Exp[Xi].
Notice that Exp[Xi] is equal to the probability that the game enters state k during
the i-th time slot. Since pi is the stationary distribution and the game is assumed
to start from a state drawn from pi, this probability is equal to the k-th entry of
piM i = pi, i.e., pi(k). This proves E =
∑
iExp[Xi] = T · pi(k).
Lemma 3. Let E be the expected number of times the attacker enters state k within
the first T time steps. Then, the probability that the attacker wins in the first T time
steps is ≤ E.
Proof. Let p(j) be the probability the attacker enters state k exactly j times in
the first t time steps. By the definition of expectation, E =
∑
j p(j) · j. Now
notice that the probability that the attacker wins in the first T time steps is equal to∑T
j=1 p(j) ≤
∑T
j=0 p(j) · j = E.
The two lemmas together prove1 Theorem 1.
1We notice that the upper bound is close to the actual probability for T · pi(k) 1 since (1) the
assumed stationary distribution has its probability mass at and around the initial state 0 for well
designed MTD strategies and (2)
∑T
j=1 p(j) ≈
∑T
j=0 p(j) · j as p(j) p(1) for j > 1.
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A.1.2 Cost Analysis – Proof of Theorem 2
We prove Theorem 2: Let Ai,j represent the probability the adversary moves in state
i and reaches state j as a consequence of the move. Let the real number ci,j ≥ 0
indicate the adversarial cost associated to Ai,j. Then
α =
∑
i,j
piiAi,jci,j (A.1)
is a convex combination of costs ci,j (since
∑
i,j piiAi,j ≤
∑
i,j piiMi,j =
∑
j pij = 1).
We need to prove that the probability the attacker wins the M -MTD game by paying
at most C is
≤ C · pik∑
i,j piiAi,jci,j
.
We first introduce a mapping of matrix M to a new matrix M∗ which we can
analyze using our theorem but has all the necessary cost information embedded:
First, we split each transition from state i to state j with probability Mi,j into two
transitions. One from i to j with probability Ai,j and the other from i to j with
probability Di,j = Mi,j−Ai,j: Ai,j represents the probability that the adversary moves
in state i and reaches state j as a consequence of that move, while Di,j represents the
probability of a defender’s move or no move (if i = j) from state i to state j. Second,
let ci,j ≥ 0 be a real number representing the cost for the adversary if he moves from
i to j with probability Ai,j. Let  ≥ 0 (later in the proof we will take the limit → 0)
and define
Ci,j = dci,j

e ∈ N
We transform each edge from i→ j with probability Ai,j into a path i→ (i, j; 1)→
(i, j; 2) → . . . → (i, j;Ci,j) → j with probabilities as depicted in Figure A.1. The
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(i,j;1) (i,j;2)i j(i,j;𝐶𝑖,𝑗)…
𝐴𝑖,𝑗 1 1 1
𝐷𝑖,𝑗
1
Figure A.1: Each transition Mi,j from i→ j will be replaced with above transition from
state i to j
transition i→ (i, j; 1) has probability Ai,j. If Ci,j = 0, then i is directly connected to
j without intermediary nodes and i → j is transitioned with probability Ai,j by the
adversary. We denote the transformed matrix by M∗.
Lemma 4. If M has an stationary probability distribution pi, then M∗ has an sta-
tionary distribution pi∗ defined by:
pi∗i =
pii
1 + α
and
pi∗i,j;h =
pii · Ai,j
1 + α
for 1 ≤ h ≤ Ci,j.
Proof. From pi∗ = pi∗M∗ and the definition of M∗ we infer the following equations:
pi∗i,j;1 = pi
∗
i · Ai,j, if Ci,j ≥ 1,
pi∗i,j;h+1 = pi
∗
i,j;h, for 1 ≤ h ≤ Ci,j,
pi∗j =
∑
i
pi∗iDi,j +
∑
i
Ci,j 6=0
pi∗i,j;Ci,j +
∑
i
Ci,j=0
pi∗i · Ai,j.
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By combining the above equations we have,
pi∗j =
∑
i
pi∗iDi,j +
∑
i
Ci,j 6=0
pi∗i,j;1 +
∑
i
Ci,j=0
pi∗i · Ai,j
=
∑
i
pi∗iDi,j +
∑
i
pi∗i · Ai,j =
∑
i
pi∗iMi,j
We conclude that the vector (pi∗1, pi
∗
2, ...) is proportional to vector pi and this proves
pi∗i = pii/ρ for some ρ. As a result
pi∗i,j;h = pi
∗
i,j;1 = pi
∗
i · Ai,j =
pii · Ai,j
ρ
for 1 ≤ h ≤ Ci,j.
The proportionality factor ρ satisfies
1 =
∑
i
pi∗i +
∑
i,j,h
Ci,j 6=0
1≤h≤Ci,j
pi∗i,j;h
=
∑
i
pii
ρ
+
∑
i,j,h
Ci,j 6=0
1≤h≤Ci,j
pii · Ai,j
ρ
=
∑
i
pii
ρ
+
∑
i,j
pii · Ai,j · Ci,j
ρ
Together with
∑
i pii = 1 and (A.1), this proves ρ = 1 + α and the lemma follows.
In order to prove the theorem we introduce new random variables: Let TM be
the random variable indicating the number of transitions i
Di,j−−→ j, i Ai,j−−→ (i, j; 1) (if
Ci,j ≥ 1) and i Ai,j−−→ j (if Ci;j = 0), made before the adversary wins the MTD-game
corresponding to M∗.
Let TC =
∑
i,j Ni,j · Ci,j be the random variable indicating the number of all
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other transitions where Ni,j represents the random variable counting the number
of times the path(i, j; 1)
1−→ (i, j; 2) 1−→ . . . 1−→ (i, j;Ci,j) is traversed. Notice that
T = TM +
∑
i,j Ni,j is the random variable representing the number of transitions in
the M -MTD game before the attacker wins the game.
Let the random variable CR represent the real cost of the adversary before he wins
the MTD-game corresponding to M . Notice that, for random variables Ni,j in the
MTD-game corresponding to M∗,
CR =
∑
i,j
Ni,j · ci,j.
This shows how the MTD games based on M and M∗ are related.
We derive
TC =
∑
i,j
Ni,j · Ci,j =
∑
i,j
Ni,j · dci,j

e
=
1

∑
i,j
Ni,j · (dci,j

e · )
=
1

∑
i,j
Ni,j · ci,j + 1

∑
i,j
Ni,j · (dci,j

e · − ci,j)
=
CR

+ E where 0 ≤ E ≤
∑
i,j
Ni,j (A.2)
Since T = TM +
∑
i,j Ni,j represents the number of transitions in the M -MTD
game before the attacker wins the game, we can use Theorem 1 in combination with
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(A.2) and derive for all t,
C · pi∗k

≥ Prob(TM + TC ≤ C

) = Prob(TM +
CR

+ E ≤ C

) (A.3)
= Prob(CR ≤ C − (TM + E))
≥ Prob(CR ≤ C − t|TM + E ≤ t)Prob(TM + E ≤ t)
= Prob(CR ≤ C − t)−
Prob(CR ≤ C − t|TM + E ≥ t)Prob(TM + E ≥ t)
≥ Prob(CR ≤ C − t)− Prob(TM + E ≥ t)
≥ Prob(CR ≤ C − t)− Prob(TM +
∑
i,j
Ni,j ≥ t)
= Prob(CR ≤ C − t)− Prob(T ≥ t). (A.4)
If we choose  = 1
t2
and let t→∞ then (A.4) tends to Prob(CR ≤ C).
We now analyze upper bound (A.3) by using Lemma 4:
C · pi∗k

=
C · pik
(1 + α)
, where
(1 + α) = +
∑
i,j
piiAi,jCi,j ·  = +
∑
i,j
piiAi,jdci,j

e
= +
∑
i,j
piiAi,jci,j +
∑
i,j
piiAi,j(dci,j

e− ci,j)
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Hence,
(1 + α)−
∑
i,j
piiAi,jci,j ≤ +
∑
i,j
piiAi,j(dci,j

e− ci,j)
≤ +
∑
i,j
piiMi,j = +
∑
j
pij = 2.
This proves that, for  = 1
t2
and t → ∞, (1 + α) → ∑i,j piiAi,jci,j = α and the
theorem follows:
Prob(CR ≤ C) ≤ C · pik/α.
A.1.3 Upper Bound on the Winning Probability of a Layered
MTD Game – Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. To analyze this composition game, we slightly modify the composition game
by giving the adversary two extra advantages. First, the attacker is also able to play
in Mj if it is currently already in a winning state in Mj (as we will explain this is not
really an advantage that helps the adversary). Second, the defender can only play
game Mj if the attacker is also allowed to play that game. This restriction of the
defender implies that in the modified composition game only if the attacker is in a
winning state in Mj or in Mj+1, then the defender and attacker are able to play in
Mj+1; if the attacker is not in a winning state in Mj or Mj+1, then Mj+1 is put “on
hold” as both the defender and attacker do not issue moves in Mj+1. The modified
composition game is formally defined as follows:
Definition 7. Let Mj with winning (for the adversary) states kj, 0 ≤ j ≤ f , represent
a sequence of MTD games. We define the (M0, . . . ,Mf )-MTD game as the following
composition of the individual Mj-MTD games:
140
1. The M0-MTD game is played in every time slot.
2. For 0 ≤ j < f , the Mj+1-MTD game is only played in a time slot if
• the Mj-MTD game is in its winning state kj at the start of the time slot
or
• the Mj+1-MTD game is in its winning state kj+1 at the start of the time
slot.
3. The composed game is won by the adversary as soon as it enters the winning
state kf of the Mf -MTD game.
We say that the Mj-MTD game is played at level j in the composition of the Mj-MTD
games.
In order to get a feeling for how a (M0, . . . ,Mf )-MTD game behaves we consider
the toy example of Figure A.2 which depicts the Markov chains of a sequence of (in
our example equivalent) games M0, M1, and M2 (with similar time scales) at levels 0,
1, and 2. A sample run of a simulation of the (M0,M1,M2)-MTD game is illustrated
in Figure A.3 in which after 439 time steps the attacker wins. Notice that the defender
and attacker can play moves in games at different levels at the same time. E.g., if
at the start of a time slot the attacker is not in the winning position in the game at
level 0 but is in the winning position in the game at level 1, then during the time slot
it can play moves in both M0 and M2, but not in M1.
From the attacker’s point of view (in Definition 7), if it is in the winning state of
the game at level j+1, then playing the game at level j+1 means not doing anything
at all as it does not want to lose its winning position. So, equivalently, the adversary
only plays the game at level j + 1 if it is in the winning state of the game at level
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Figure A.2: An example of a composed game made of 3 similar levels
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Figure A.3: Simulated modified composed game example (sample run) where for each
level N = 5,K = k = 2, and µ = λ = 0.5
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Figure A.4: Simulated composed game example (sample run) where for each level
N = 5,K = k = 2, and µ = λ = 0.5
j. On the other hand, from the defender’s point of view, the definition unnecessarily
restricts it: The defender stops playing the game at level j+1 if the game at level j is
not in state kj and at the same time the game at level j+ 1 is not in state kj+1. This
is an advantage for the adversary which does not happen in practice i.e., the defender
does not know the states of the various games/levels, and it will continuously play
its MTD strategy at all times.
The (M0, . . . ,Mf )-MTD game is only introduced for proving Theorem 3: We now
show that the theorem holds for (M0, . . . ,Mf )-MTD games which implies the theorem
must hold for layered MTD games as these represent adversaries without additional
advantages.
Let Ej be the expected number of times the attacker enters state kj in the game
at level j within the first T time steps. Let pj(t) be the probability that the attacker
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enters state kj exactly t times in the game at level j in the first T time steps. Let
qj(w) be the probability that the game at level j is played during exactly w time slots
in the first T time steps. We define pj(t|w) as the probability that the attacker enters
state kj exactly t times in the game at level j in the first T time steps conditioned
on the assumption that the game at level j is played during exactly w time slots in
the first T time steps. Notice that pj(t) =
∑T
w=t qj(w)pj(t|w).
We derive
Ej+1 =
T∑
t=0
pj+1(t) · t
=
T∑
w=0
qj+1(w)
w∑
t=0
pj+1(t|w) · t.
Notice that Lemma 2 applies directly to the expectation
∑w
t=0 pj+1(t|w)·t: By Lemma
2,
w∑
t=0
pj+1(t|w) · t = w · pij+1(kj+1).
Hence,
Ej+1 =
T∑
w=0
qj+1(w) · w · pij+1(kj+1).
By the definition of composition, the game at level j + 1 is only played at time
slot t when the game at level j is in kj at the start of time slot t or when the game
at level j + 1 is in kj+1 at the start of time slot t. Let t0 be a time slot during which
the game at level j + 1 transitions from kj+1 to a state 6= kj+1. Let t1 be the most
recent time slot before t0 during which the game at level j + 1 transitioned from a
state 6= kj+1 to state kj+1. This means that (a) the game at level j + 1 enters (or
remains in) state kj+1 at time slots t1, t1 + 1, . . . , t0 − 1, and (b) the game at level
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j + 1 was played in time slot t1 when at the start of time slot t1 the game at level
j + 1 was not in kj+1.
By the definition of composition and choice of t0, (a) implies that the game at
level j + 1 is played during time slots t1 + 1, . . . , t0; at the start of each of these
time slots the game at level j + 1 is in kj+1; during time slot t0 the game at level
j + 1 exits state kj+1. This process is described by a Poisson process with parameter
λj+1, i.e., the probability that the game at level j + 1 behaves this way is equal to
(1− λj+1)t0−1−t1λj+1. Therefore the expectation of t0 − t1 is equal to 1/λj+1.
By the definition of composition, (b) implies that the game at level j must have
been in kj at the start of time slot t1. It may happen that during the Poisson process
as described above the game at level j enters state kj once more in which case the
current Poisson process proceeds and a new Poisson process is not spun off. In the
worst case analysis for the defender, however, each time the game at level j is in kj at
the start of a time slot a Poisson process (as described above) is spun off (which adds
more time slots during which the game at level j + 1 is being played). We conclude
that the expected number of times the game at level j + 1 is played is at most the
expected number of times the game at level j is played times 1/λj+1. That is,
T∑
w=0
qj+1(w) · w ≤ Ej/λj+1.
This leads to the recurrence
Ej+1 = Ej · pij+1(kj+1)/λj+1
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with E0 = T · pi0(k0) by Lemma 2. Its solution is
Ef = T · pi0(k0) ·
f∏
j=1
pij(kj)/λj+1.
Application of Lemma 3 proves the theorem.
Since an (M0, . . . ,Mf )-MTD game assumes a much weaker defender than the cor-
responding layered MTD game, the layered MTD game may have a security capacity
which is significantly larger than (2.7). In the example of Figure A.3 the average
(simulated) time to win the (M0,M1,M2)-MTD game is 471.8 time steps while the
average time to win the corresponding layered MTD game is 14, 257 time steps.2
Theorem 3 is a first analysis of layered MTD games and future research is needed
to understand the exact effect of such composition. Is it possible to derive a much
stronger bound on the security capacity for (M0, . . . ,Mf )-MTD games if the defender
has stronger capabilities? E.g., if the defender is able to detect whether the adversary
enters a state kj, then we may give the defender the ability to immediately kick the
adversary out of state kj after one time slot. In the proof of Theorem 3 this means
that we do not need to consider the arguments related to the Poisson process; the
upper bound can be improved by discarding the factors λj. However, this does not
change the asymptotic behavior of the upper bound and therefore extra investment
in such advanced detection will likely not pay off (we expect this intuition to also
hold for layered MTD games).
2The security capacity of an individual game Mi is at least − log pii(2) = − log 0.1 = 3.32 and
(2.7) gives at least a security capacity of 3 · 3.32 + log 0.25 = 7.97 for the (M0,M1,M2)-MTD game.
The simulation results fit up to a constant factor the theoretical prediction as the average time to
win an individual game Mi is 24.3 and is approximately twice 2
3.32 and the average time to win the
(M0,M1,M2)-MTD game is 471.8 and is approximately twice 2
7.97.
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A.2 Proofs of Theorems in Chapter 3
A.2.1 Closed Form Winning Probability – Proof of Theorem
4
Before proving any bounds on w(k, Tbud) we first provide a closed form for w(k, Tbud)
itself. To this purpose we introduce p(k−1, L, Tbud) defined as the probability that the
adversary reaches state (k − 1, L) and is ready to leave state (k − 1, L) (after zero or
more self-loops at state (k − 1, L)) within time budget Tbud. Any possible path from
state (0, 0) to state (k − 1, L) in the Markov model with self-loops along the way in
each of the visited states (including (k− 1, L)) contributes to this probability. In our
notation we use k− 1 rather than k because after a path to (k− 1, L) for some L ≥ 0
only a single horizontal or diagonal move is needed to reach (k, L) for the first time,
and this probability is what we will need for our characterization of w(k, Tbud):
The formula for w(k, Tbud) considers all the possible paths towards a state (k−1, L)
within Tbud − 1 transitions and a single final horizontal or diagonal transition (via
m2(L) orm3(L)) towards the winning state (k, L). We are interested in the probability
of entering state (k, L) for some L ≥ 0 and the time it takes to reach there for the
first time. Appropriately summing over probabilities p(k − 1, L, Tbud − 1) gives
w(k, Tbud) =
∑
L≥0
p(k − 1, L, Tbud − 1) ·
(
m2(L)
1−m1(L) +
m3(L)
1−m1(L)
)
, (A.5)
where each path represented by p(k − 1, L, Tbud) is ready to leave (k − 1, L) imply-
ing that the horizontal and diagonal transition probabilities are conditioned on “not
having a self-loop” and this explain the division by 1−m1(L).
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A path to (k − 1, L) till the moment it is ready to leave (k − 1, L) is uniquely
represented by
• gl; the number of states on the path that have the same level l,
• bl; if level l is entered via a vertical transition, then bl = 0; if level l is entered
via a diagonal transition, then bl = 1,
• t(i, l) counts the number of self-loops on the path in state (i, l).
Notice that b0 is undefined and gl ≥ 1 for all 0 ≤ l ≤ L. Fig. A.5 depicts a typical
path from (0, 0) to (k − 1, L) without showing any self-loops, where
• il+1 = il + bl+1 + gl+1 and i0 = 0; when the path enters level l for the first time,
k = il.
The probability of having exactly t(i, l) self-loops in state (i, l) after which the
path exits (i, l) is equal to
Prob(t(i, l) = u) = m1(l)
u(1−m1(l))
and describes a Poisson process. The probability that the path exits (i, l) along a
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Figure A.5: A sample path toward the winning state without depicting the self-loops at
each state (i, l) in the path
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horizontal, diagonal or vertical transition given no more self-loops in (i, l) is equal to
Prob(horizontal transition) = Prob((i, l)→ (i+ 1, l)|no self-loop)
=
m2(l)
1−m1(l) ,
P rob(diagonal transition) = Prob((i, l)→ (i+ 1, l + 1)|no self-loop)
=
m3(l)
1−m1(l) , and
Prob(vertical transition) = Prob((i, l)→ (i, l + 1)|no self-loop)
=
m4(l)
1−m1(l) .
Combination of the probabilities describing diagonal and vertical transitions shows
that
Prob((il+bl+1+gl+1, l)→ (il+1, l+1)|no self-loop) = bl+1 m3(l)
1−m1(l)+(1−bl+1)
m4(l)
1−m1(l) .
The above analysis proves that the probability of having the Markov model transition
along a path which is represented by gl, bl, t(i, l), and il is equal to
L−1∏
l=0
(
bl+1
m3(l)
1−m1(l) + (1− bl+1)
m4(l)
1−m1(l)
)
(A.6a)
·
L∏
l=0
(
m2(l)
1−m1(l)
)gl−1
(A.6b)
·
L∏
l=0
gl−1∏
i=0
m1(l)
t(il+i,l)(1−m1(l)), (A.6c)
where (A.6a) corresponds to diagonal and vertical transitions, (A.6b) corresponds to
horizontal transitions, and (A.6c) corresponds to self-loops.
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The length of the path, i.e., total number of transitions without self-loops, is equal
to
(k − 1) + L−B, where B =
L∑
l=1
bl
is the total number of diagonal transitions. The total number of vertical transitions
is equal to L−B and the number of horizontal transitions is equal to ∑Ll=0(gl− 1) =
(k − 1)−B.
Summing the above probability over all possible combinations of gl, bl, and t(., .)
for paths that reach state (k − 1, L) and are ready to leave (k − 1, L) such that the
number of self-loops is equal to T and the total number of transitions including self-
loops is equal to (k−1)+L−B+T ≤ Tbud leads to an expression for p(k−1, L, Tbud):
p(k − 1, L, Tbud) =
∑
B,Ts.t.
(k−1)+L−B+T≤Tbud∑
b1,...,bL∈{0,1}s.t.∑L
l=1 bl=B
(A.6a) (A.7a)
∑
g0≥1,...,gL≥1s.t.∑L
l=0(gl−1)=(k−1)−B
(A.6b) (A.7b)
∑
t0,...,tLs.t.∑L
l=0 tl=T
∑
t(i0,0),...,t(i0+g0−1,0)
s.t.
∑g0−1
i=0 t(i0+i,0)=t0
. . .
∑
t(iL,L),...,t(iL+gL−1,L)
s.t.
∑gL−1
i=0 t(iL+i,L)=tL
(A.6c) (A.7c)
Notice that (A.6a) = 0 if B > L and (A.6b) = 0 if B > k − 1. So, the main sum
only needs to consider B ≤ min{L, (k − 1)}. Plugging the above formula into (A.5)
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gives
w(k, Tbud) =
Tbud−1∑
L=0
min{L,(k−1)}∑
B=0
m2(L) +m3(L)
1−m1(L) · (A.7a) · (A.7b) (A.8a)
·
(Tbud−1)−[(k−1)+L−B]∑
T=0
(A.7c). (A.8b)
This closed form together with
(A.7c) =
∑
t0,...,tLs.t.∑L
l=0 tl=T
∑
t(i0,0),...,t(i0+g0−1,0)
s.t.
∑g0−1
i=0 t(i0+i,0)=t0
. . .
∑
t(iL,L),...,t(iL+gL−1,L)
s.t.
∑gL−1
i=0 t(iL+i,L)=tL
L∏
l=0
gl−1∏
i=0
m1(l)
t(il+i,l)(1−m1(l))
=
∑
t0,...,tLs.t.∑L
l=0 tl=T
∑
t(i0,0),...,t(i0+g0−1,0)
s.t.
∑g0−1
i=0 t(i0+i,0)=t0
. . .
∑
t(iL,L),...,t(iL+gL−1,L)
s.t.
∑gL−1
i=0 t(iL+i,L)=tL
L∏
l=0
m1(l)
tl(1−m1(l))gl
=
∑
t0,...,tLs.t.∑L
l=0 tl=T
L∏
l=0
∑
t(il,l),...,t(il+gl−1,l)
s.t.
∑gl−1
i=0 t(il+i,l)=tl
m1(l)
tl(1−m1(l))gl
=
∑
t0,...,tLs.t.∑L
l=0 tl=T
L∏
l=0
(
tl + gl − 1
tl
)
m1(l)
tl(1−m1(l))gl
proves Theorem 4.
A.2.2 Stagnating Learning Rate – Proof of Theorem 5
In order to prove a lower bound on w(k, Tbud) we give a benefit to the defender and
assume the learning rate f(l) is as large as possible given 1−f(l) ≥ τ , i.e., 1−f(l) = τ
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i i+ 1
m2 +m3
m1 +m4
Figure A.6: Reduced Markov model of the game for a constant 1− f(l) = τ > 0
with equality.
If 1 − f(l) = τ , then m1,m2,m3 and m4 are independent of l and the Markov
model reduces to Fig. A.6 where each state i represents the collection of states (i, l)
for l ≥ 0 in the original Markov model.
Within time budget Tbud we reach i = k with probability
w(k, Tbud) =
Tbud−k∑
T=0
∑
f0,...,fk−1s.t.∑
fj=T
∏
j
(m1 +m4)
fj(m2 +m3)
k,
where the time budget is distributed over k steps from each state to the next until
state k is reached and T ≤ Tbud−k transitions consisting of fi self-loops in state i for
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0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1. This probability is equal to
∑
f0,...,fk−1s.t.∑
fj≤Tbud−k
∏
j
(m1 +m4)
fj(m2 +m3)
k
≥
(Tbud−k)/k∑
f0=0
· · ·
(Tbud−k)/k∑
fk−1=0
∏
j
(m1 +m4)
fj(m2 +m3)
k
=
k−1∏
j=0
(Tbud−k)/k∑
fj=0
(m1 +m4)
fj(m2 +m3)
k
=
k−1∏
j=0
1− (m1 +m4)Tbud/k
1− (m1 +m4) (m2 +m3)
k
= [1− (m1 +m4)Tbud/k]k ≥ 1− k(m1 +m4)Tbud/k,
where the last equality follows from 1 − (m1 + m4) = m2 + m3. Now we substitute
m1 +m4 = 1− τp which yields Theorem 5.
A.2.3 Upper and Lower Bounds – Proof of Theorem 6
By noticing that (A.8b) for Tbud = ∞ is equal to 1, a straightforward upper bound
on w(k, Tbud) is given by just formula (A.8a): We have w(k, Tbud) is at most equal to
w¯(k, Tbud).
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In order to prove a lower bound we first analyze
(A.8b) =
(Tbud−1)−[(k−1)+L−B]∑
T=0
(A.7c)
=
(Tbud−k−L+B)∑
T=0
∑
t0,...,tLs.t.∑L
l=0 tl=T
∑
t(i0,0),...,t(i0+g0−1,0)
s.t.
∑g0−1
i=0 t(i0+i,0)=t0
. . .
∑
t(iL,L),...,t(iL+gL−1,L)
s.t.
∑gL−1
i=0 t(iL+i,L)=tL
L∏
l=0
gl−1∏
i=0
m1(l)
t(il+i,l)(1−m1(l))
=
∑
t0,...,tLs.t.∑L
l=0 tl≤(Tbud−k−L+B)
∑
t(i0,0),...,t(i0+g0−1,0)
s.t.
∑g0−1
i=0 t(i0+i,0)=t0
. . .
∑
t(iL,L),...,t(iL+gL−1,L)
s.t.
∑gL−1
i=0 t(iL+i,L)=tL
L∏
l=0
gl−1∏
i=0
m1(l)
t(il+i,l)(1−m1(l)).
Notice that (A.8b) is used within another sum with B ≤ min{L, (k − 1)}. This
implies that B ≤ (k − 1)L or equivalently −(L + 1)k ≤ −k − L + B. Let v ≥ 1.
For now we only consider L ≤ (Tbud/v) − 1, or equivalently v ≤ Tbud/(L + 1). Then
(L+ 1)(v − k) ≤ Tbud − (L+ 1)k ≤ Tbud − k − L+B, hence,
v − k ≤ Tbud − k − L+B
L+ 1
.
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This allows us to lower bound the above sums and obtain
(A.8b) ≥
v−k∑
t0=0
· · ·
v−k∑
tL=0
∑
t(i0,0),...,t(i0+g0−1,0)
s.t.
∑g0−1
i=0 t(i0+i,0)=t0
. . .
∑
t(iL,L),...,t(iL+gL−1,L)
s.t.
∑gL−1
i=0 t(iL+i,L)=tL
L∏
l=0
gl−1∏
i=0
m1(l)
t(il+i,l)(1−m1(l))
≥
∑
t(i0,0),...,t(i0+g0−1,0)
s.t.
∑g0−1
i=0 t(i0+i,0)≤v−k
. . .
∑
t(iL,L),...,t(iL+gL−1,L)
s.t.
∑gL−1
i=0 t(iL+i,L)≤v−k
L∏
l=0
gl−1∏
i=0
m1(l)
t(il+i,l)(1−m1(l))
≥
∑
t(i0,0)≤t0/g0
· · ·
∑
t(i0+g0−1,0)≤(v−k)/g0
. . .
∑
t(iL,L)≤tL/gL
· · ·
∑
t(iL+gL−1,L)≤(v−k)/gL
L∏
l=0
gl−1∏
i=0
m1(l)
t(il+i,l)(1−m1(l))
=
L∏
l=0
gl−1∏
i=0
∑
t(il+i,l)≤(v−k)/gl
m1(l)
t(il+i,l)(1−m1(l))
=
L∏
l=0
gl−1∏
i=0
1−m1(l)
v−k
gl
+1
1−m1(l) (1−m1(l))
=
L∏
l=0
(1−m1(l)
v−k
gl
+1
)gl ≥
L∏
l=0
(1− glm1(l)
v−k
gl
+1
).
We observe that gl ≤ k within the larger sum that contains (A.8b). If v ≥ k, then
this implies v/k ≤ 1 + (v − k)/gl proving
(A.8b) ≥
L∏
l=0
(1− glm1(l)v/k)
Since m1(l) = [(1− γ)(1− (p+h)(1− f(l)))] ≤ 1− γ, we can further lower bound
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this to
(A.8b) ≥
L∏
l=0
(1− gl(1− γ)v/k)
≥ 1− (
L∑
l=0
gl)(1− γ)v/k.
Within the larger sum that contains (A.8b), we have
∑L
l=0 gl = (L+1)+
∑L
l=0(gl−1) =
(L+ 1) + (k − 1−B) = k + L−B ≤ k + Tbud/v. This yields
(A.8b) ≥ 1− (k + Tbud
v
)(1− γ)v/k.
The obtained lower bound on (A.8b) =
∑(Tbud−1)−[(k−1)+L−B]
T=0 (A.7c) is independent
of any of the other summing variables used in (A.8a) but requires L + 1 ≤ Tbud/v.
By restricting L to be ≤ (Tbud/v)− 1 in (A.8a), i.e., we substitute Tbud by Tbud/v, we
obtain a lower bound on w(k, Tbud):
w(k, Tbud) =
Tbud−1∑
L=0
min{L,(k−1)}∑
B=0
m2(L) +m3(L)
1−m1(L) · (A.7a) · (A.7b) ·
(Tbud−1)−[(k−1)+L−B]∑
T=0
(A.7c)
≥
(Tbud/v)−1∑
L=0
min{L,(k−1)}∑
B=0
m2(L) +m3(L)
1−m1(L) · (A.7a) · (A.7b) ·
(Tbud−1)−[(k−1)+L−B]∑
T=0
(A.7c)
≥
Tbud/v−1∑
L=0
min{L,(k−1)}∑
B=0
m2(L) +m3(L)
1−m1(L) · (A.7a) · (A.7b)(1− (k +
Tbud
v
)(1− γ)v/k)
= w¯(k, Tbud/v) · (1− (k + Tbud
v
)(1− γ)v/k),
where the last equality follows from the fact that (A.7a) and (A.7b) do not depend
on Tbud (they depend on L). This completes the proof.
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A.2.4 Analyzing the Learning Rate – Proof of Theorem 7
Theorem 7 has a couple of statements and we start by proving the first most general
claim that upper bounds w¯(k, Tbud) in terms of the general parameters of the Markov
model.
We define and assume
β(l) =
√
1− f(l)
d
≤ 1.
This allows us to bound
α(l) =
p(1− f(l))
γ + (1− γ)(p+ h)(1− f(l)) ≤
p(1− f(l))
γ
=
pdβ(l)2
γ
,
α(l) =
p(1− f(l))
γ + (1− γ)(p+ h)(1− f(l)) ≥ p(1− f(l)) = pdβ(l)
2.
Since β(l) ≤ 1, β(l)2 ≤ β(l). Let θ be such that (1 − γ)/γ ≤ θ. Then the above
inequalities allow us to bound
m2(l)
1−m1(l) = (1− γ)α(l) ≤
(1− γ)pd
γ
β(l)2 ≤ θpdβ(l)2
≤ θpdβ(l),
m3(l)
1−m1(l) = γα(l) ≤ pdβ(l)
2, and
m4(l)
1−m1(l) = 1− α(l) ≤ 1− pdβ(l)
2.
Plugging the above bounds in expression (3.7) for w¯(k, Tbud) with
m2(L)
1−m1(L) ≤
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θpdβ(L)2 and m2(l)
1−m1(l) ≤ θpdβ(l) yields
w¯(k, Tbud) ≤
Tbud−1∑
L=0
(1 + θ)pdβ(L)2
·
L∑
B=0
∑
b1,...,bL∈{0,1}
s.t.
∑L
l=1 bl=B
L−1∏
l=0
bl+1pdβ(l)
2
+(1− bl+1)(1− pdβ(l)2)
(A.9a)
·
∑
g0,...,gL≥1s.t.∑L
l=0(gl−1)=(k−1)−B
L∏
l=0
(
θpdβ(l)
)gl−1
(A.9b)
Let bL+1 = 0 and define
Z =
L∏
l=0
(
θpdβ(l)
)bl+1
.
We will multiply (A.9b) with Z and show an upper bound of the product which is
independent of bl and B. We will multiply (A.9a) with Z
−1 and show that it behaves
like a product of 1 + β(l)
θ
, which (as we will see) remains ‘small enough’:
We choose d such that θ ≤ (pd)−1 (if d does not satisfy this inequality, then the
to be derived upper bound will be larger than 1 and will therefore trivially hold for
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w¯(k, Tbud)). Then, since B =
∑L
l=0 bl+1,
(A.9b) · Z =
∑
g0,...,gL≥1s.t.∑L
l=0(gl−1)+bl+1=(k−1)
L∏
l=0
(
θpdβ(l)
)(gl−1)+bl+1
≤
∑
g′0,...,g
′
L≥0s.t.∑L
l=0 g
′
l=(k−1)
L∏
l=0
(
θpdβ(l)
)g′l
≤ (θpd)k−1
∑
g′0,...,g
′
L≥0s.t.∑L
l=0 g
′
l=(k−1)
L∏
l=0
β(l)g
′
l
≤ (θpd)k−1
∑
g′0≥0
. . .
∑
g′L≥0
L∏
l=0
β(l)g
′
l
= (θpd)k−1
L∏
l=0
∑
g′l≥0
β(l)g
′
l = (θpd)k−1
L∏
l=0
1
1− β(l) .
Now notice that each bl+1 is either equal to 0 or 1 and therefore
(bl+1pdβ(l)
2+(1−bl+1)(1−pdβ(l)2))·(θpdβ(l))−bl+1 = bl+1β(l)
θ
+(1−bl+1)(1−pdβ(l)2).
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We derive
(A.9a) · Z−1 =
L∑
B=0
∑
b1,...,bL∈{0,1}
s.t.
∑L
l=1 bl=B
L−1∏
l=0
bl+1
β(l)
θ
+(1− bl+1)(1− pdβ(l)2)
=
∑
b1,...,bL∈{0,1}
L−1∏
l=0
bl+1
β(l)
θ
+(1− bl+1)(1− pdβ(l)2)
=
L−1∏
l=0
∑
bl+1∈{0,1}
bl+1
β(l)
θ
+(1− bl+1)(1− pdβ(l)2)
=
L−1∏
l=0
(
β(l)
θ
+ (1− pdβ(l)2)
)
≤
L−1∏
l=0
(
β(l)
θ
+ 1
)
.
Combination of the above results proves
w¯(k, Tbud) ≤
Tbud−1∑
L=0
[θpd]k(1 +
1
θ
)
β(L)2
1− β(L)
L−1∏
l=0
1 + β(l)/θ
1− β(l)
≤
Tbud−1∑
L=0
[θpd]k(1 +
1
θ
)
L∏
l=0
1 + β(l)/θ
1− β(l) ,
where the last inequality uses β(L)2 ≤ 1 ≤ 1+β(L)/θ. The argument in the resulting
product is equal to (1+β(l)/θ)/(1−β(l)) = 1+(1+θ−1)β(l)/(1−β(l)). This completes
the proof of the first statement.
In order to prove the second bound in Theorem 7 we define
B′(l) =
β(l)
1− β(l) and y = 1 + θ
−1
and apply the next lemma. Notice that B′(l) ≥ 0 and, since f ′(l) ≥ 0 (because
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learning only increases),
B′′(l) = β′(l)
2− β(l)
(1− β(l))2 =
−f ′(l)
2β(l)
2− β(l)
(1− β(l))2 ≤ 0.
Lemma 5. For differentiable continuous functions B(.), if B′(l) ≥ 0 and B′′(l) ≤ 0
for l ≥ 0, then, for y ≥ 0,
L∏
l=0
(1 + yB′(l)) ≤ ey(B′(0)−B(0)+B(L)).
Proof. We find an upperbound of ln
∏L
l=0(1 + yB
′(l)) =
∑L
l=0 ln(1 + yB
′(l)). Differ-
entiating w.r.t. y gives
L∑
l=0
1
1 + yB′(l)
·B′(l) ≤
L∑
l=0
B′(l) = B′(0) +
L∑
l=1
B′(l)
≤ B′(0) +
∫ L
l=0
B′(l)dl
= B′(0) +B(L)−B(0)
We also have
L∑
l=0
ln(1 + yB′(l))|y=0 = 0 = y · [B′(0)−B(0) +B(L)]|y=0.
We conclude that
∑L
l=0 ln(1 + yB
′(l)) ≤ y · [B′(0)−B(0) +B(L)] for y ≥ 0.
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For our B′(l) and y, application of the lemma to our upper bound yields
w¯(k, Tbud) ≤ (1 + θ−1)
Tbud−1∑
L=0
[θpd]ke(1+θ
−1)(B′(0)−B(0)+B(L))
≤ Tbud · (1 + θ−1)[θpd]ke(1+θ−1)(B′(0)−B(0)+B(Tbud−1)).
Minimizing θke(1+θ
−1)c for
c = B(Tbud − 1)−B(0) +B′(0)
gives θ = c/k if c/k ≥ (1 − γ)/γ and gives θ = (1 − γ)/γ if c/k ≤ (1 − γ)/γ.
Substituting this in our upper bound (e denotes the natural number) yields
w¯(k, Tbud) ≤ Tbud(1 +
k
c )[
c
kpd]
kek+c = Tbud(1 +
k
c )[epd
c
ke
c/k]k, if c/k ≥ (1− γ)/γ
Tbud(1− γ)−1[ 1−γγ pd]ke(1−γ)
−1c, if c/k ≤ (1− γ)/γ.
(A.10)
The first case of the upper bound is less interesting as c
k
ec/k may be large yielding
a bad upper bound. The second case of the upper bound gives the most insight and
proves the second statement of Theorem 7.
As an example, suppose that
1− f(l) ≤ d
(l + 2)2
.
To get an upper bound, we give the adversary the advantage of having the defender
play with the smallest possible learning rates. i.e., 1 − f(l) = d
(l+2)2
. This gives
B′(l) = 1/(l + 1), hence, B(Tbud − 1) = ln(Tbud), B(0) = 0, and B′(0) = 1. This
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implies c = 1 + ln(Tbud). The second case of the upper bound translates into: If
Tbud ≤ e−1+k(1−γ)/γ, (A.11)
then the probability of winning for the adversary is at most
w(k, Tbud) ≤ w¯(k, Tbud) ≤ e
1/(1−γ)
1− γ · T
1+1/(1−γ)
bud · [
1− γ
γ
pd]k.
This proves the last statement of the theorem.
A.2.5 Delayed Learning – Proof of Theorem 8
In practice, we may not immediately start learning at a rate 1−f(l) ≈ d/(l+2)2. This
will only happen after reaching for example L∗ samples. During such a first phase the
defender is not yet able to increase f(l) and f(l) remains 0, i.e., 1 − f(l) = 1. The
adversary tries to compromise as many, say k∗, nodes as possible before reaching L∗
levels.
For 1− f(l) = 1, we have:
m1(l) = (1− γ)(1− (p+ h)),
m2(l) = (1− γ)p,
m3(l) = γp, and
m4(l) = [h− γ(h+ p)] + γ = (1− γ)h+ γ(1− p),
which are all independent of l. For this reason we use m1, m2, m3, and m4 where
suited in our derivations below.
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We are interested in k∗ as a function of  for which
u(k∗, L∗) =
k∗−1∑
k=0
p(k, L∗ − 1, Tbud − 1)( m4(L
∗ − 1)
1−m1(L∗ − 1) +
m3(L
∗ − 1)
1−m1(L∗ − 1)) + (A.12)
p(k∗, L∗ − 1, Tbud − 1) m4(L
∗ − 1)
1−m1(L∗ − 1) ≥ 1− .
Here u(k∗, L∗) is equal to the probability that ≤ k∗ nodes will be compromised
before level l = L∗ is reached for the first time: The sum in (A.12) considers all paths
reaching a state (k, L∗ − 1) for some k < k∗ after which a single vertical or diagonal
transition reaches level L∗ for the first time. The additional term considers paths
that reach a state (k∗, L∗ − 1) after which only a vertical transition reaches level L∗
without increasing the number of compromised nodes beyond k∗. If (A.12) holds,
then the probability of winning is
≤ + (1− )w(k − k∗(), Tbud), (A.13)
where w(k − k∗(), Tbud) is defined for learning rate f(l + L∗) as a function of l. In
other words, during the first phase a node with i < k∗() is reached with probability
≥ 1 −  after which the learning rate increases according to f(l + L∗) leading to a
winning state if the Markov model increments i at least another k − k∗() steps.
In order to find a lower bound on u(k∗, L∗) we give the adversary the benefit of
an unlimited time budget (implying (A.7c) = 1) giving
u(k∗, L∗) ≥
k∗−1∑
k=0
p(k, L∗ − 1,∞)( m4(L
∗ − 1)
1−m1(L∗ − 1) +
m3(L
∗ − 1)
1−m1(L∗ − 1)) (A.14)
=
min{L∗−1,(k∗−2)}∑
B=0
k∗−1∑
k=B+1
(A.7a) · (A.7b) · m3(L
∗ − 1) +m4(L∗ − 1)
1−m1(L∗ − 1) . (A.15)
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We simplify this lower bound by noticing that (A.7a) does not depend on k and
k∗−1∑
k=B+1
(A.7b) =
k∗−1∑
k=B+1
∑
g0≥1,...,gL∗−1≥1s.t.∑L∗−1
l=0 (gl−1)=k−1−B
L∗−1∏
l=0
(
m2(l)
1−m1(l)
)gl−1
=
∑
g′0,...,g
′
L∗−1≥0s.t.∑L∗−1
l=0 g
′
l≤k∗−2−B
L∗−1∏
l=0
(
m2(l)
1−m1(l)
)g′l
≥
(k∗−2−B)/L∗∑
g′0=0
· · ·
(k∗−2−B)/L∗∑
g′
L∗=0
L∗−1∏
l=0
(
m2(l)
1−m1(l)
)g′l
=
L∗−1∏
l=0
(k∗−2−B)/L∗∑
g′l=0
(
m2(l)
1−m1(l)
)g′l
=
L∗−1∏
l=0
1
1− m2(l)
1−m1(l)
(
1− ( m2(l)
1−m1(l))
k∗−2−B
L∗ +1
)
=
L∗−1∏
l=0
1−m1(l)
m3(l) +m4(l)
(
1− ( m2(l)
1−m1(l))
k∗−2−B
L∗ +1
)
=
(
1−m1
m3 +m4
)L∗(
1− ( m2
1−m1 )
k∗−2−B
L∗ +1
)L∗
.
Since B ≤ L∗ − 1, this can be further lower bounded as
k∗−1∑
k=B+1
(A.7b) ≥
(
1−m1
m3 +m4
)L∗(
1− ( m2
1−m1 )
k∗−1
L∗
)L∗
.
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Notice that this lower bound is independent from B, hence,
u(k∗, L∗) ≥
min{L∗−1,(k∗−2)}∑
B=0
(A.7b) · m3(L
∗ − 1) +m4(L∗ − 1)
1−m1(L∗ − 1)
·
(
1−m1
m3 +m4
)L∗(
1− ( m2
1−m1 )
k∗−1
L∗
)L∗
=
min{L∗−1,(k∗−2)}∑
B=0
(A.7b) ·
·
(
1−m1
m3 +m4
)L∗−1(
1− ( m2
1−m1 )
k∗−1
L∗
)L∗
.
We assume k∗ ≥ L∗ + 1 and derive
min{L∗−1,(k∗−2)}∑
B=0
(A.7b) =
L∗−1∑
B=0
∑
b1,...,bL∗−1∈{0,1}s.t.∑L∗−1
l=1 bl=B
L∗−2∏
l=0
(
bl+1
m3(l)
1−m1(l) + (1− bl+1)
m4(l)
1−m1(l)
)
=
∑
b1,...,bL∗−1∈{0,1}
L∗−2∏
l=0
(
bl+1
m3(l)
1−m1(l) + (1− bl+1)
m4(l)
1−m1(l)
)
=
L∗−2∏
l=0
(
m3(l)
1−m1(l) +
m4(l)
1−m1(l) ) =
(
m3 +m4
1−m1
)L∗−1
.
Substituting this in the lower bound for u(k∗, L∗) yields
u(k∗, L∗) ≥
(
1− ( m2
1−m1 )
k∗−1
L∗
)L∗
≥ 1− L∗( m2
1−m1 )
k∗−1
L∗
= 1− L∗[ (1− γ)p
1− (1− γ)(1− (p+ h)) ]
k∗−1
L∗ .
A.2.6 Capacity Region – Proofs of Corollaries 3 and 4
Proof of Corollary 3. As an example of computing a capacity region, we translate
Theorem 7 for 1 − f(l) ≤ d
(l+2)2
in terms of a capacity region: We have the security
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guarantee
Tbud ≤ e−1+k(1−γ)/γ ⇒ w¯(k, Tbud) ≤ e
1/(1−γ)
1− γ · T
1+1/(1−γ)
bud · [
1− γ
γ
pd]k. (A.16)
If
2t ≤ e−1+k(1−γ)/γ, and (A.17)
2−s ≥ e
1/(1−γ)
1− γ · (2
t)1+1/(1−γ) · [1− γ
γ
pd]k,
then Tbud ≤ 2t implies the condition on the left hand side of the implication in (A.16),
hence,
w¯(k, Tbud) ≤ e
1/(1−γ)
1− γ · T
1+1/(1−γ)
bud · [
1− γ
γ
pd]k
≤ e
1/(1−γ)
1− γ · (2
t)1+1/(1−γ) · [1− γ
γ
pd]k
≤ 2−s.
This shows that the capacity region is characterized by (A.17), or equivalently after
taking logarithms, assuming pd(1−γ
γ
< 1, and reordering terms, δ, µ, and ξ are given
by 2-dimensional vectors
δ = (0, q ln 2), where q =
[
ln(
γ
pd(1− γ))
]−1
,
µ = (
γ ln 2
1− γ , q(ln 2)(1 +
1
1− γ )),
ξ = (− γ
1− γ , q(−
1
1− γ + ln
1
1− γ ).
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Proof of Corollary 4. Delayed learning shows that for all k∗ ≥ L∗ + 1,
w(k, Tbud) ≤ (1− u(k∗, L∗)) + w′(k − k∗, Tbud)
≤ L∗[ (1− γ)p
1− (1− γ)(1− (p+ h)) ]
k∗−1
L∗ + w′(k − k∗, Tbud).
If
L∗[
(1− γ)p
1− (1− γ)(1− (p+ h)) ]
k∗−1
L∗ ≤ 2−(s+1) and (A.18)
w′(k − k∗, Tbud) ≤ 2−(s+1), (A.19)
then w(k, Tbud) ≤ 2−s.
We assume (1−γ)p
1−(1−γ)(1−(p+h)) < 1. Then, after taking logarithms, substituting
k∗ = kˆ + L∗ + 1 with kˆ ≥ 0, and reordering terms, condition (A.18) is equiva-
lent to (s + 1)δ′′ ≤ kˆ + ξ′′, where δ′′ = L∗(ln 2)z, and ξ′′ = L∗[1 − (lnL∗)z] for
z =
[
ln(1−(1−γ)(1−(p+h))
(1−γ)p )
]−1
.
Suppose that w′(·, ·) corresponds to capacity region (δ′,µ′, ξ′). Then, condition
(A.19) is implied by Tbud ≤ 2t and
(s+ 1)δ′ + tµ′ ≤ (k − (kˆ + L∗ + 1))1 + ξ′.
If we assume learning is delayed sufficiently long such that
(s+ 1)δ′′ ≥ ξ′′
169
(e.g., L∗ ≥ z−1/2 for s = 0), then we may choose
kˆ = (s+ 1)δ′′ − ξ′′ ≥ 0.
This satisfies condition (A.18). Condition (A.19) (after substituting kˆ) is now equiv-
alent to Tbud ≤ 2t and
(s+ 1)(δ′ + δ′′1) + tµ′ ≤ k1 + ξ + (ξ′′ − (L∗ + 1))1.
In other words,
(δ′ + δ′′1,µ′, ξ′ − δ′ + (ξ′′ − δ′′ − (L∗ + 1))1)
is a capacity region.
If we assume learning is moderately delayed such that
(s+ 1)δ′′ ≤ ξ′′,
then we may choose kˆ = 0 and
(δ′,µ′, ξ′ − δ′ − (L∗ + 1)1).
is a capacity region.
Substituting
s ≥ ξ′′/δ′′ − 1 = (L∗[1− (lnL∗)z])/L∗(ln 2)z − 1 = (L∗[1− (ln 2L∗)z])/L∗(ln 2)z
= 1/z ln 2− ln(2L∗)ln 2
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and
ξ′′ − δ′′ − (L∗ + 1) = L∗[1− (lnL∗)z]− L∗(ln 2)z − (L∗ + 1) = L∗(ln 2L∗)z − 1
proves the corollary.
A.3 Proofs of Theorems in Chapter 4
A.3.1 Containment Criterion – Proof of Theorem 10
In order to make the next derivations readable we introduce
y = j(t),
v = y′ = j′(t) = γ · i(t).
Differential equation (4.9) in terms of y and v after reordering terms reads
y′′ = Aαp · v · (y + A)−α. (A.20)
We derive
y′′ = v′ =
dv
dt
=
dv
dy
dy
dt
= y′
dv
dy
= v
dv
dy
.
Substituting this expression into (A.20), dividing by v, and multiplying with dy yields
dv = Aαp · (y + A)−α · dy.
171
Assuming α 6= 1, then taking integrals on the left and right side gives the equation
v =
Aαp
1− α · (y + A)
1−α + c1 (A.21)
for some constant c1. For t = 0, we have y(0) = j(0) = 0 and v(0) = y
′(0) = j′(0) =
γ · i(0) = γ. Substituting this into the above equation solves
c1 = γ +
Ap
α− 1 . (A.22)
Now we substitute v = dy
dt
into (A.21) and multiply both sides with dt:
dy =
{
Aαp
1− α · (y + A)
1−α + c1
}
· dt. (A.23)
Equivalently, we have
dt =
{
Aαp
1− α · (y + A)
1−α + c1
}−1
· dy.
Taking integrals on the left and right side gives the expression
t = c2 +
∫ y(t)
y=y(0)
{
Aαp
1− α · (y + A)
1−α + c1
}−1
dy
for some constant c2. Substituting t = 0 gives c2 = 0 and y(0) = j(0) = 0. Plugging
in (A.22) proves
t =
∫ y(t)
y=0
{
Aαp
1− α · (y + A)
1−α + γ +
Ap
α− 1
}−1
dy
=
α− 1
Ap
·
∫ y(t)
y=0
{
1− (y/A+ 1)1−α + γ(α− 1)
Ap
}−1
dy.
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As an immediate consequence we can take the derivative (using the chain rule)
with respect to t on both sides. This shows that (this can also directly be concluded
from (A.21))
1 =
α− 1
Ap
·
{
1− (y(t)/A+ 1)1−α + γ(α− 1)
Ap
}−1
· y′(t). (A.24)
Notice that y(t) = j(t) is increasing (since j′(t) = γ · i(t) ≥ 0) with y(t) ≥ y(0) = 0.
Therefore, if α > 1, then 0 ≤ (y(t)/A+ 1)1−α ≤ 1 and
{
1− (y(t)/A+ 1)1−α + γ(α− 1)
Ap
}−1
≥
{
1 +
γ(α− 1)
Ap
}−1
.
Case I (α > 1): Substituting this into (A.24) yields for α > 1,
1 ≥ α− 1
Ap
·
{
1 +
γ(α− 1)
Ap
}−1
· y′(t)
proving
i(t) = y′(t)/γ ≤ Ap
α− 1 ·
{
1 +
γ(α− 1)
Ap
}
/γ = 1 +
Ap
(α− 1)γ .
Case II (α < 1): As a second consequence of (A.24), we derive for α < 1,
y′(t) =
Ap
α− 1
{
1− (y(t)/A+ 1)1−α}+ γ ≥ γ = y′(0). (A.25)
Hence,
y(t) ≥ γ · t.
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Substituting this back into (A.25), and noticing that i(t) = y′(t)/γ gives
i(t) ≥ Ap
α− 1
{
1− (γ · t/A+ 1)1−α} /γ + 1 = Ω(t1−α).
This proves that only a learning rate with amplification α > 1 will prevent the
malware from propagating to all k vulnerable nodes.
Case III (α = 1): For completeness, if α = 1, then taking integrals that led to
(A.21) for α 6= 1, now lead to
dy
dt
= v = Ap ln(y + A) + c1 (A.26)
with
c1 = γ − Ap lnA.
Notice that y′(t) = Ap ln(y/A+ 1) + γ ≥ γ and we use the same argument as we did
above for α < 1. We again have y(t) ≥ γ · t and substituting this back gives
i(t) ≥ Ap/γ ln(γ · t/A+ 1) + 1 = Ω(ln t).
These lower bounds can be improved by recursively substituting lower bounds back
into (A.25) and (A.26), respectively.
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